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Foreword 
John Borneman, Series Editor 
Crowds: Ethnographic Encounters, the sixth volume of this series, examines 
personal encounters with crowds and crowded situations in the fieldwork 
experience of contemporary ethnographers in nine countries: Syria, Thailand, 
Nigeria, China, India, Indonesia, the United States, Ukraine, and Bangladesh. In 
these encounters, ethnographers not only observe and participate in crowds but 
are invariably drawn into them, often in face-to-face situations. The intimacy of 
participation provides access to a quality specific to all experiences of crowds: a 
movement between individual and collective experience that tends to blend the 
two categories. Being drawn into crowds in this way affects the relationships of 
ethnographers with the people they study, creating new solidarities or distances; 
as well, it affects the environments which generate crowds and their study, 
blurring the distinctions between emic and etic, insider and outsider, observer 
and actor. To arrive at an accurate description of the perceptions of their 
interlocutors in crowds, ethnographers thus also rely on their own perception 
and embodied knowledge to facilitate the critical process of verifying their own 
experiences and those of their interlocutors. 
This approach to crowds and crowdedness is similar to that adopted by the 
authors of the other volumes already published in this series, who have taken 
up encounters with other phenomena with cross-cultural relevance. Thus far, 
these include encounters with money, violence, children, food, and sex. What 
is peculiar here is that each encounter is shaped similarly by the nature of the 
object itself (for example, violence is inflicted and food is eaten in every culture) 
and differently by the specificity of that object in particular cultural settings (for 
example, today one can “steal a kiss in France” but not in India or the United 
States). In any event, this volume considers not crowds in themselves but crowds 
as experienced relationally and temporally. 
Authors in this volume do not provide us with a general definition of crowds 
nor do they contribute systematically to typologies of forms of gathering together. 
Although crowds have been widely depicted and theorized within literature 
and social science, few analysts have been able to draw on their own firsthand 
Foreword 
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accounts as many ethnographers can. What this volume is able to add, then, is 
a reflexive analysis of the perception of crowds. Such firsthand experience of 
crowd formation is important as a basis for a comparative understanding of how 
crowd behavior partakes of varying complexity, duration, intent, and effects. 
Above all, the crowds examined here reveal different forms of sociality in-
dissolution or in-formation. The sociality depicted includes that of a subway 
crowd, a pious crowd, a mass, a revolutionary crowd, a virtual crowd, a crowd 
of ghosts, a spontaneous crowd, and a choreographed crowd. This diversity 
of crowds could contribute to a potentially limitless typological classification. 
What the authors instead point to, however, are aspects of crowd sociality as 
a product not simply of modernity but of our time, of the early twenty-first 
century. Crowds are, for example, highly sensitive to temporal conditions of 
gathering and communication. The contributors comment on some of these: 
increased urbanization (and thus density), quickened communication that 
negates geographical distances (through cell phones and digital communication), 
increased surveillance (by the state and non-state data-gathering agents), and the 
ascendance of far-right populist-authoritarian leaders. As Steffen observes, we 
did not anticipate, as this volume took shape, some of the ways in which people 
are generating new ways of deploying crowds to create significant political and 
social agents. These new deployments include increased use of deadly weapons 
on crowds, vehicle-ramming attacks on crowds, and attaching increased 
importance to counting the bodies in crowds. Future scholars will undoubtedly 
attend to these new kinds of crowd formation. 
We asked the authors in this series to write with a particular concern in mind: 
to focus on stories that showed their own engagement with “crowds” in fieldwork. 
We also requested that they resist the temptation to let theoretical concerns 
dominate their writing. We encouraged them instead to allow their descriptions 
of fieldwork to show how and in what way cultural difference is learned in an 
encounter with “crowds.” We invited them, in other words, to write outside the 
current normative genres of anthropology, and some contributors responded 
by including unconventional objects, such as videos, along with conventional 
discussions and interviews. We encouraged them to risk exposing themselves— 
warts, private pleasures, misunderstandings, and all—in the thick of it. Hence 
contributors have elaborated their specific interactions and eschewed many of 
the conventions that authorize most ethnographic accounts, such as footnoting, 
long bibliographies, or dense theoretical language. 
Such rhetorical change makes new demands on our readers: we ask them to 
enter, openly, into the often threatening, sometimes embarrassing, but always 
Foreword 
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potentially insight-bearing situations of fieldwork. In return, we hope that the 
reading of these essays awakens an appreciation for the quality of subjective 
sensual experience (personal, tied to a particular time and place); for curiosity 
in difference itself, in translating the strange, foreign, or unassimilable; and for 
a kind of storytelling that contributes both to the documentary function of the 
ethnographic encounter and to its analytical potential. 
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Introduction 
Megan Stefen 
What exactly is a crowd? Why do experiences and definitions of crowdedness 
differ from place to place? How can encounters with particular crowds illuminate, 
refute, or enhance classical social theories of “the Crowd”? Large groups form 
in every human culture and society, affirming old patterns or creating new 
ways of being together. Like the related but distinct concept of the masses or 
the public, the crowd is one of many constructed categories people use to order 
groups defined not by who takes part in them but by how they behave. Unlike 
other groups, such as religious communities, family structures, and ethnic or 
national groups, crowds are often characterized by a sense that inclusion and 
exclusion is neither controlled nor necessarily controllable. Despite the negative 
associations “crowding” as a verb has in English, as an analytical concept “the 
crowd” putatively describes a social form rather than its content. In other words, 
crowds can be passionate or bored, elated or furious, unexpected or routine. 
As the majority of the world’s population shifts from rural to urban areas, the 
experience of crowdedness is increasingly a defining aspect of people’s lives. In 
Crowds: Ethnographic Encounters, scholars describe crowds, the implications 
of “crowds” as a category, and crowded situations in Bangladesh, China, India, 
Indonesia, Nigeria, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, and the United States. These essays 
demonstrate how ethnographers, drawing on their own expertise, might use 
their embodied knowledge of groups as social forms in sociocultural context to 
help us better understand what it means to invoke crowds analytically, as agents, 
objects, and experiences. 
Unlike the other themes of this series, which could be identified materially— 
such as food and money—crowds must, to some extent, be created as an object 
for research before ethnographic identification and analysis can take place. For 
the contributors to this volume, this definitional ambiguity surrounding crowds 
Crowds
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generates new analytical categories, questions, and definitions. Rather than 
producing a strict, all-encompassing analytic definition of what might count as 
a “crowd,” this volume asked ethnographers to find and describe “crowd-like” 
phenomena in their field sites. The resulting chapters reveal the continuities and 
discontinuities within the concept of the crowd and—at times—demonstrate 
how the history of “the crowd” as a pejorative term undermines its ability to fully 
capture the mercurial potential of contemporary group formations. Many of the 
contributors wrestle with crowds they could not join without putting themselves 
in harm’s way but find to be illuminating of crowds’ significance within the 
local context. Some of the phenomena described are what we might think of as 
uncontroversial crowds that would be recognizable in many different contexts: 
the routine crowd that forms in a subway during the rush hour commute; the 
ebullient crowd pouring into the street during political demonstrations; and the 
passionate crowd of the faithful, praying and participating in religious rituals. 
Other essays, however, have taken unconventionally crowded social forms as 
their objects of study: the haunting crowd of ghosts and memories filling a 
person’s unconscious; the virtual crowd that rallies online in response to an 
injustice; and the contained, choreographed crowd that cannot help but remind 
observers of its chaotic cousin, the spontaneous crowd. The contributors are 
interested both in what these crowds reveal about the places, societies, and 
communities in which they form and also in how experiences of crowdedness 
influence other kinds of sociality—such as the formation of cliques or the ability 
of people to socialize in their workplaces—in a particular context. This volume 
asks what kinds of social formations an idiom of “crowds” is likely to reveal and 
what such formations might illuminate about how people think of themselves 
both separately, as individuals, and together, as group. 
To answer this charge, each chapter draws on the analysis of specific 
examples. What counts as “crowded” in a southern Californian mall might 
register as spacious to a resident of Bangkok. Similarly, while a visitor might 
find the flows of people shuffling through a Beijing subway security checkpoint 
extraordinary—humans reduced to bodies reduced to particles obeying the laws 
of thermodynamics—this same phenomenon is entirely ordinary to a commuter 
who passes through it every day. It’s not necessary to travel long distances to 
find examples of disagreement over what it means to “crowd” another person. 
Even a group of Americans from Buffalo, New York, who’ve driven only two 
hours across the border to Canada may find themselves unintentionally causing 
conflict in Toronto, Ontario, should they fail to understand that what looks— 
to them—like a relatively empty bar may in fact be beyond capacity. Legal 
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3 Introduction 
definitions can create unspoken, embodied social definitions. The ability to 
react intuitively to “crowded” situations can demonstrate either belonging or else 
a disruptive lack of familiarity. 
Despite the large variations in crowdedness or what people experience as 
crowding, there are some common, formal elements of crowds. Joining a crowd 
is often described as a transformative experience that causes people to lose their 
self-control either by making them more submissive to the group or else by 
giving them permission to behave in ways they might not dare to as an individual 
person. In contrast, we might think of a purely crowded situation as one that is 
entropic in which a collective spirit is not felt and people find themselves in 
a mutually antagonistic relationship with those in proximity to them. Where 
people in a crowded situation find themselves paradoxically isolated, together, 
crowds can be attractive or even seductive to those who join them. 
By asking ethnographers to describe and examine their own encounters with 
crowdedness and crowds in the field, this volume intervenes in the existing 
theoretical literature on crowds, some of which is speculative, based off of 
others’ written accounts or produced in controlled laboratory experiments. In 
the “Guide to Further Reading” at the end of the volume, I describe in more 
detail the works contributors found particularly generative and the thinkers 
who shared our approach by foregrounding experience. The validity of people’s 
reported experiences in crowds—whether they felt liberated or constrained, 
whether they understood what they were doing, and whether they acted at the 
behest of specific others or just worked off of a common feeling—is hard to 
verify after the fact. Ethnographers are therefore in a unique position to analyze 
and theorize crowds as they form in real time throughout the world. When, 
where, and with whom crowds form are all questions that can be answered 
empirically from a distance, but the more complex questions of how exactly 
crowds form, for what purposes, and which aspects of the experience stay with 
the members of crowds after they disperse require a researcher willing to be 
there on the ground. This volume models a comparative approach by insisting 
on the comparison of distinct, unlike instances of group formation; many of the 
chapters show what a decision to call these formations “crowds” opens up and 
what it forecloses. The crowds described in this volume do not all have the same 
effects on their participants, and the contributors do not always agree on the 
reasons for certain types of behavior in crowds; however, by considering each of 
these cases together, not as an example of what “the Crowd” must be but of what 
a specific crowd can be, each chapter generates insights that travel beyond the 
particular cases analyzed here. 
Crowds
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Ethnographic encounters with the Crowd or crowds 
Although anthropologists often write about other types of group formation— 
such as those related to kinship, community, or society—crowds have historically 
posed a challenge for ethnographers conducting participant observation, and 
the Crowd—that generalized, theoretical object with its implicit, primordial 
typology—has remained an elusive subject of ethnographic reflection. There are 
many reasons for this. The first is that for the first few decades of the discipline’s 
existence, anthropologists were trained to focus on the routine, the everyday, the 
cyclical, and the representative. By definition, many of the spontaneous crowds 
or sudden outbreaks of mob violence explored in this volume would fall outside 
of those categories. For example, in his stunning book Leveling Crowds, Stanley 
Tambiah introduces his first hand account of witnessing ethnic riots in Sri Lanka 
in 1956 by noting that despite his physical proximity to the violence, he did 
not have “any inkling of the explosion about to happen in our midst” (Tambiah 
1997: 86). Similarly, his observation and analysis of events are understandably 
constrained by the fact that he and the ethnically diverse group of students he 
was supervising had to be evacuated from the violent area for their own safety 
(Tambiah 1997: 87). Working from historians’ reconstructions, news reports, 
and witness accounts, Tambiah attempts to determine who “the faces in the 
crowd” are for a number of incidents of mass, ethnic violence in South Asia. 
Though the crowd and crowd dynamics are the objects of his rigorous and 
detailed study, Tambiah is necessarily unable to draw on the kind of first hand 
accounts found in this volume; to study the rioting crowd through participant 
observation would have meant putting himself in grave danger. Ironically, it’s 
this grave danger that shapes the high stakes of Tambiah’s need to understand 
and humanize the crowd that transformed Sri Lanka before his eyes. 
Another reason crowds have not attracted ethnographic attention is that 
though crowds are ubiquitous, they are more difficult to interpret and analyze 
than the occasions that prompt them. When crowds do appear in classic 
ethnographic accounts, they are often portrayed not as a phenomenon of interest 
but as an effect of other, more sociologically significant events, such as rituals, 
festivals, or markets. Recall that Clifford Geertz’s (1973) now classic account of 
the Balinese cockfight opens with the image of the crowds watching the fight and 
then fleeing—the act that famously gave him and Hildred Geertz ethnographic 
access. Geertz spends the rest of the article reflecting not on his experience of 
joining the crowd in flight but on the meaning of the cockfight that drew them 
together in the first place. For an anthropologist focused on interpretation, this 
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5 Introduction 
analytic move makes sense. Experiences of crowds are, on almost every level, 
more difficult to “read” than repeated, social practices. This may have to do with 
crowds’ status as a collateral consequence of events or perhaps with the chaotic 
texture of experience within a crowd. It may even be because, as a social form, 
crowds are not associated with a specific type of content, function, or meaning, 
and the multiplicity of “authors” or “agents” means that the crowd’s intent or 
purpose is difficult to uncover. As the chapters in this volume show, crowds 
can unite and divide, can be useful for the purposes of the right and the left, 
and can enable communal recognition or act as dehumanizing experiences that 
reduce the bodies of others to obstacles. Geertz himself describes the cockfight 
audience in contradictory terms, first as a united “superorganism” (Geertz 
1973:  3) and then as “something not vertebrate enough to be called a group 
and not structureless enough to be called a crowd” (Geertz 1973: 10). It’s the 
presence of this audience that creates the drama, the stakes, and the deepness of 
the play Geertz argues the Balinese engage in through the cockfight, and yet the 
dynamics of the spectators themselves—as a group or as individuals—are never 
fully explored. 
This avoidance may be due to a third reason ethnographers rarely take on 
crowds: the challenge people in crowds pose to the ideals and principles that 
have long been associated with anthropological projects. Consider, for instance, 
Claude Lévi-Strauss’s (1962) description of the crowds he confronted in Calcutta. 
He can rationally recognize the hunger and extraordinary demographic shifts 
that created the crowds of beggars, merchants, and others that rush to greet 
him (Lévi-Strauss 1962: 4), and yet he cannot escape his own sense of revulsion. 
Lévi-Strauss finds himself simultaneously dehumanizing the people standing in 
a desperate crush before him (in the end, he compares them to birds) and being 
dehumanized by their supplication (Lévi-Strauss 1962: 5). In Calcutta, Lévi-
Strauss reports, “Everyday life appears to be a permanent repudiation of the very 
notion of human relationship” (Lévi-Strauss 1962: 4). He laments, 
One is compelled by the other to deny him the humanity which one wants so 
much to recognise. All the initial situations which defne relationships between 
persons are falsifed, the rules of social intercourse are “fxed,” there is no way of 
making a start. (Lévi-Strauss 1962: 4) 
Here we see the ethnographer’s desire to find a connection with those different 
from him evaporating in the face of reality. There will be no communion with 
this crowd, no glimmer of mutual recognition. The lingering and loitering 
ethnographers like Geertz have often employed to advantage will be no help 
Crowds














here. Precisely because his presence provides the occasion for its mobilization 
and pantomimes, there is no way for Lévi-Strauss to join the Calcutta crowd or 
even, as Tambiah strived to do after the fact, to recognize the faces in the crowd. 
Lévi-Strauss can no longer focus on the details of each encounter with every 
crowd. Instead, he overlays each instance of a crowd in Calcutta over the others 
until the common elements and characters become clear, and something like a 
structural form—the Calcutta Crowd, representing the unconscious and actual 
“wasteland” of India’s great cities—emerges (Lévi-Strauss 1962: 3). 
This instinct to create typologies of the crowds ethnographers encounter is 
a common one. This is perhaps because categorizing is an easy way to order 
and make sense of difficult and chaotic phenomenon or perhaps because this 
is one of the most obvious legacies of crowd theory. In the “Guide to Further 
Reading,” I argue that throughout its history, crowd theory has usually had an 
instrumental edge. Much of the classic literature on crowds is connected to 
times of political crisis or great transformations. Even Gustave Le Bon’s racist 
and yet somehow timeless 1895 book, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind
(2002), can be seen as reacting to the challenges of new political philosophies 
that challenged the rule of elites. As Christian Borch argues, Le Bon’s book 
is “ultimately a Machiavellian manual that advised the statesman on how to 
combat the revolutionary crowd” (Borch 2009: 275). Similarly, when Sigmund 
Freud (1921) attempts to explain the mechanics of how and why people submit 
to a single leader in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, the political 
implications are clear and troubling. More recently, the atrocities committed by 
crowds in fascist states during the Second World War motivated the writings of 
other theorists, such as Elias Canetti, Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, and 
others, and much of their work appears in the following chapters. Canetti in 
particular is remarkable in his resistance to say that crowds always need a leader 
and much more optimistic about the capacity of crowds to be liberating. 
In these postwar works, the ability of the crowd to act as a projective screen means
that these scholars sometimes end up amplifying the anxieties, prejudices, and
preoccupations of their times. When reading crowd theory, it’s almost impossible
to escape the pressing questions that motivated its writing: Could the seductive
power of the crowd have been responsible for something as tremendous as the
Holocaust? Would that be an easier or a harder truth to bear than holding each
individual accountable? And if it were true—if the triumphs of the right-leaning,
fascist regimes demonstrated that crowds did make ordinary people capable of
despicable acts—what would that mean for communism and other left-leaning
movements that relied on organizing large numbers of people to achieve their












projects of liberation? These questions, which have motivated so much of what’s
been written in the twentieth century, continue to shape the current conversation
about crowds. In this volume, the authors draw on these theories with the hopes of
pushing the intellectual debate past these particular, historically shaped questions
and toward questions relevant to our own time. For instance: How has the spread
of smartphones and social media applications changed the significance of crowds
in different contexts? Does technology make us more or less likely to connect to
others in a crowd (as opposed to just feeling crowded)? And in a digitally crowded
landscape, how does the crowd figure into people’s emotional experiences? These
are questions that ethnographers, with their expertise and embodied exposure to
crowd phenomena, are well positioned to answer. 
Summary of chapters and main themes 
Rather than summarize each chapter on its own, I will first give a brief outline 
and then draw out the details of each contribution as they speak to some of the 
main themes and issues that emerge in the study of crowds. John Borneman uses 
his prolonged engagement with his interlocutors in Aleppo, Syria, to analyze 
how a society that appeared to be without crowds—and where people gathered 
but only as masses—became the site of revolutionary crowds that ultimately 
failed. Writing after the 2014 coup in Thailand, Tyrell Haberkorn describes how 
shifting legal definitions of who could appear in public and for what purpose 
led first to arrests and then, ironically, to more crowds and more protests. To 
investigate the role of the crowd in religious experiences, Ebenezer Obadare 
examines the deliberately spectacular praying sessions government leaders in 
Nigeria hold in stadiums. Abdellah Hammoudi draws on his experience as a 
pilgrim in the Hajj crowds to contest the interpretations of theorists like Canetti. 
Megan Steffen compares three types of groups—a crowd that gathered at the 
scene of a car accident, the crowd of performers in the Beijing 2008 Olympic 
Opening Ceremony, and the cliques people form on Chinese social media— 
to explore the role crowds can play in Chinese social and political life. Rashmi 
Sadana examines what the figure of the crowd and the metro crowd in particular 
mean for modernity in India by bringing together the ladies’ coach crowd 
in the Delhi Metro with a violent mob that formed in the metro in 2014. In 
Douglas Hollan’s chapter, dreams from his interlocutors in the United States 
and Indonesia demonstrate how social formations can become “crowded” with 
the emotional memories of others who are not necessarily physically present. 
Crowds
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Bjørn Thomassen gathers evidence from the 2013 Maidan uprising in Ukraine 
to argue that crowds can endure over long periods of time. In a chapter that 
explicitly wrestles with the question of what happens when a digital crowd takes 
to the streets, Nusrat Sabina Chowdhury teases out the ways class informs the 
ethics and politics of how crowds form in response to scandals in Bangladesh. 
Finally, Scott Moskowitz’s harrowing account of being caught in the Shanghai 
New Year’s Eve 2015 crowd that killed thirty-six people shows the deadly price 
many young Chinese people are willing to pay to become cosmopolitan and 
modern. Even these short summaries show how varied the material analyzed by 
each contributor is, but there are, nevertheless, important continuities between 
the chapters. Each in their own way confronts how to theorize crowds, the ability 
of crowds to generate social meaning, the affect associated with crowds, the 
political implications of crowds, and the ways crowds can exist beyond physical 
co-presence in the virtual or imaginary. 
Ethnographic engagements with theory 
The contributors to this volume have made an effort to use ethnographic 
knowledge to elaborate theoretical understandings of crowds. This explicit 
attempt to generate new takes on older social theories seems inevitable given 
how difficult it can be to define what a crowd even is. Most contributors either 
specifically delineate parameters for the types of crowds they examine—for 
example, Hammoudi distinguishes “pious crowds” from other kinds, Steffen 
compares “choreographed crowds” and “unintended crowds,” and Borneman 
contrasts “recursively constituted masses” with “revolutionary crowds”—or else 
rely on existing distinctions described by interlocutors in their field site—for 
instance, Sadana elaborates on widely held views about the ladies coach crowd 
vs. the bus crowd vs. the metro crowd. As I already argued, the urge to divide 
both the concept and the phenomenon of “crowding” into different types reflects 
the generative ambiguity of crowds as an object of research. Literal, legal, and 
technical definitions appear insufficient; Haberkorn notes that even in a place 
where public assembly and protests are outlawed, people still cannot determine 
the “magic number” that might make a gathering into an illegal crowd. Sadana 
uses the opportunity to ask when a crowd can become a public; Thomassen 
argues that a gathering can still be considered a crowd even when it persists for 
long periods of time; Steffen distinguishes between crowds and other types of 
group formation; and both Chowdhury and Hollan examine crowds that are not 
physical but exist virtually or unconsciously. 
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Each chapter tackles crowds in different geographical and cultural contexts, 
and this diversity of ethnographic materials has led to a variety of different 
approaches to building theories about crowds. Borneman draws on his 
engagement with people in Aleppo, Syria, between 1999 and 2017 to distinguish 
theoretically between masses and crowds; he demonstrates how a largely 
imaginary idea of the people as a non-threatening mass transformed into actual 
crowds that were overtly political. Haberkorn uses her encounters at political 
protests under a regime that has outlawed assembly in Bangkok, Thailand, to 
ask what it means to crowd together if such gatherings always anticipate the 
isolation of prison, and if—paradoxically—imprisonments always anticipate 
the potential emergence of other protesting crowds. In a chapter anchored by a 
strong analysis of the existing literature on crowds and masses, Obadare explores 
old contentions that crowds are irrational and suggestible by analyzing mass 
prayer sessions called by government leaders in Nigeria. Working in Delhi, India, 
Sadana similarly works alongside her interlocutors to distinguish between the 
“good” modern crowds on the city’s Metro and those that devolve into violence. 
Indeed, many of this volume’s contributors find their ethnographic 
experiences pose challenges to prevailing theoretical assumptions about crowds 
and group formation. Through a detailed analysis of his own experience in 
the crowds of the hajj, Hammoudi contests Canetti’s (1984) interpretation of 
hajj crowds in flight and builds a theory of “pious crowds,” which are plural, 
neither the product of one single crowd and yet also not as overarching as the 
Crowd, and can be multidirectional, transient, and liminal. In a chapter that 
also engages with the temporality of crowds, Thomassen examines the Maidan 
Uprising and proposes the concept of “enduring crowds” to trouble the notion 
that a crowd must necessarily be short-lived or composed of the same persons to 
be considered the same crowd; like Obadare, Thomassen challenges the theories 
that presume crowds are irrational or even anti-rational. Hollan critiques Randall 
Collins’s (2004) theories of emotional entrainment by comparing cases from 
Indonesia and Southern California where crowds of physical bodies compete 
in his interlocutors’ minds with crowds of remembered ghosts. Steffen’s chapter 
attempts to disentangle crowds in the contemporary People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) from the Crowd’s association with either fascism or revolution in the 
work of thinkers like Walter Benjamin, Susan Sontag, and Jacques Rancière. In 
her chapter on crowds, mobs, and media in Bangladesh, Chowdhury challenges 
prevailing theoretical assumptions about the visual aspect of crowd formation— 
what crowd theorists have long referred to as “picture-thinking”—through 
an examination of how crowds are mediated both by technology and by their 
Crowds
9781350002340_txt_print.indd  10 29-08-2019  21:14:17
10 
association with certain classes and religions. Finally, in a chapter that also tries 
to understand which kinds of classed bodies are more likely to join crowds, Scott 
Moskowitz upends conventional methodological wisdom by arguing that the 
ethnographic sensibilities he cultivated as a participant observer made him less 
aware of reality and more vulnerable to injury during an encounter with a fatal 
crowd on New Year’s Eve in Shanghai, PRC. 
Interpreting crowds as symbols and threats 
The chapters in this book intervene in long-standing arguments about how 
to interpret the significance of crowds, both to existing political orders and 
to theories of group formation in general. As Borch (2012: 16) argues, crowds 
and the idea of suggestion that shaped the way people thought about the 
transformative effect joining a crowd could have on their behavior posed a 
threat to “the ideal of the constituent liberal subject” (and thus were unpopular 
subjects of study for many sociologists). Crowds have, by definition, no single 
agent or author, and though several crowd theorists—such as Le Bon (2002) 
and Freud (1921)—are fixated on how to make the figure of a “leader” essential 
to the crowd’s theoretical form, even the leader cannot take full responsibility 
for the actions of a crowd. Steffen’s chapter argues that in the case of leaderless, 
spontaneous crowds, the actual intentions of a crowd are not easily deciphered 
and sometimes remain mysterious even to the members of the crowd themselves. 
As examined by Chowdhury, the “viral” and “contagious” metaphors that 
describe crowd formation both in actual life and online convey the way crowds 
are thought to happen to their participants, perhaps without their conscious 
consent. The actions of a crowd are as likely to generate meaning as incoherence. 
Nevertheless, the chapters in this volume show that people—including 
participants, observers, and scholars—continue to feel compelled to make sense 
of even the most chaotic crowds. For Hammoudi and his fellow pilgrims, the 
rites of the hajj, its symbolism, and the significance of joining the crowds as 
acts of pilgrimage are clear. Moskowitz highlights the tragic irony of the New 
Year’s Eve crowd in Shanghai, for although the crowd represents modernity 
and cosmopolitanism to Armani (Moskowitz’s newly arrived interlocutor), its 
results (death and chaos) exemplify the very shortsighted backwardness Armani 
was trying to escape. Sadana (this volume) argues that, within public discourse 
in Delhi, the experiences of actual commuters are shaped by the idea that the 
metro crowd “‘does’ or even accomplishes modernity,” a conviction that further 
shapes the way they regard other members of the crowd. In Haberkorn’s chapter, 
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political intentions and outcomes cannot be separated from the emergence of 
crowds. Activists in Bangkok used symbols of dissent—such as reading certain 
books in public or wearing certain colors—to signify their alliance to a potential, 
larger crowd of like-minded others who may not be present; these symbols 
became so potent and threatening that the government made them illegal. When 
together at a large rally, activists deliberately coordinated actions like releasing 
balloons all together to produce specific symbolic effects precisely so that others 
can interpret them as reflecting the intentions of the crowd. As Tambiah (1997) 
argues, crowds themselves can become ritualized and generate meaning on their 
own within larger social contexts. The praying, pious crowd Obadare opens his 
chapter with is itself part of a repertory of signs used by the political elite in 
Nigeria to achieve specific ends, and particular actions (such as the governor 
going down on his knees) are recognizable signs to the assembled crowd present 
at the event and also to observers elsewhere. 
And yet the question posed by William Mazzarella (2015) in the subtitle 
to his article, “Totalitarian Tears,” continues to haunt these kinds of collective 
interpretations: Does the crowd really mean it? And if the crowd—or rather 
the people in it—don’t, what difference does it make? In the Nigerian case, 
Obadare maintains that the prayer session makes the crowd into a spectacle to 
be watched, which is both an obfuscation of their political significance and also 
the entire point of the assembly. Just as the governor cynically performs humility 
for the masses who are present and those elsewhere, so too the crowd performs 
docility, but the fact of their performance does not—Obadare insists—mean 
that the ritual automatically lacks transformative power. Thomassen argues that 
part of the reason crowds were seen as loci for irrationality or emotion had in 
part to do with the idea that they formed, took action, and then dissipated too 
quickly to be able to be subjected to reason; however, by examining the enduring 
crowd—a crowd that lasts over days and during which people have enough 
time to think about what it is—he reaches a conclusion similar to Obadare’s: 
“human beings in enduring crowds do not lose their character: they step into it” 
(Thomassen, this volume). In fact, the volume’s contributions suggest that this 
may be a characteristic of ritual crowds. For instance, the overarching meaning 
of the hajj as a ritual does not preclude pilgrims from assigning it a distinctly 
personal significance. On the contrary, it may be that the overarching structure 
of significance ordering the crowd permits and enables what Hammoudi (this 
volume) calls “pockets of reflexivity” within it (emphasis in original). Though 
distant observers of hajj crowds, like Canetti, see them as mechanistic, from 
within the crowd Hammoudi observes distinct outbursts among his companions 
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that show how one can be within a crowd and yet separate from it, fully absorbed 
by one’s own discrete emotional experience while immersed in a container of 
togetherness. Like Hammoudi, Hollan examines on two different kinds of rituals 
(a feast and interactions in the workplace) to work against the idea that crowds 
produce an experience held in common; instead, he demonstrates that people’s 
experiences of one crowd will not be, as some of the theoretical literature claims, 
consuming and monolithic but will be variable and ambivalent. 
By returning to Mazzarella’s generative question (“Does the crowd really mean 
it?”), we can see how the ethnographic evidence accumulated in other chapters 
shifts the emphasis in from the problem of intentions (whether they mean it) to 
the problem of experience (whether they mean it). Drawing on Hans Loewald’s 
(2000: 249) observation that “the unconscious is a crowd of ghosts,” Hollan shows 
how the public, social meanings of a ritual interaction can differ from the ritual’s 
private meaning to a particular person; grappling with that divergence can leave 
people haunted by and isolated from those they appeared to share experiences 
with. Even after escaping from the crowd that trampled several people to death, 
Moskowitz reports that while he feared for his life, his Chinese companions 
remained unfazed. Their blasé reactions leave him disoriented and make him 
doubt that he’d ever even been in any actual danger. Chowdhury goes even 
further by examining mutually antagonistic crowds, one of which prides itself 
on being putatively secular (and thus rational); however, by showing how this 
so-called rational group draws on the language of crowd theory to dehumanize 
the other, Chowdhury undermines the idea that people’s perceptions of their 
experiences in a crowd are accurate. She also troubles the idea that people might 
think, earn, or modernize their way out of the basest impulses that can exist in 
a crowd. In contrast, Steffen’s encounter with people rubbernecking at the site 
of a traffic accident demonstrates that a crowd in which people have openly 
voyeuristic intentions may inadvertently have altruistic effects. 
Te emotions associated with crowds 
Much of crowd theory—including the work of thinkers as different as Le Bon 
and Canetti—presumes that entering a crowd intensifies feelings, which is why 
the actions of a crowd are passionate rather than rational. Many of the chapters 
address what happens to participants’ emotions once they join a crowd. After 
years of enduring a prohibition against gathering together, Borneman’s Syrian 
interlocutors at first feel joy and a sense of liberation in crowds. People from 
the enduring crowd of the Maidan Uprising compare joining the crowd to 
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“falling in love,” a sensation Thomassen (this volume) suggests we use Victor 
Turner’s work on ritual transformations to understand. The online mobs 
Chowdhury investigates find themselves drawn together by indignation, 
righteousness, and fury. The prayer sessions in Nigeria described by Obadare 
are necessarily emotional, but—as Obadare argues—the question of whose 
emotions are genuine troubles simple interpretations of the event. During the 
sustained journey of the hajj, Hammoudi’s and his companions’ emotions vary 
considerably both with and against the sense of the crowd. Calm—a state not 
often associated with crowds in theory—appears often in the volume. Sadana 
records feelings of liberation and righteousness in the mobs that form in the 
Delhi Metro, while at the same time noting the ordinary boredom and release of 
vigilance that characterizes the crowd in the ladies’ coach. Steffen encounters a 
crowd that is poised, quiet, and seemingly impassive even in the face of a violent 
scene. Moskowitz observes that, especially at its most dangerous moments, 
people in the Shanghai New Year’s Eve crowd appeared calm or at least passive. 
Here especially, Hollan’s chapter provides a useful methodological reminder that 
a multiplicity of emotions can exist not only within the crowd but also within a 
single person, whose emotional understanding of the crowd after they leave it 
may be vastly different than the emotion they displayed while they participated 
in it. 
By exploring how people feel as they experience being in a crowd, the volume’s 
contributors attempt to understand what it is that draws people to crowds or— 
conversely—repulses them about crowds. Their conclusions often vary. Obadare 
presents a case in which the crowd of the prayer session is “called for” by a leader, 
whereas Borneman draws on psychoanalysis to interpret the crowds of the 
Syrian uprising as reflecting a longing to break away from the paternal register 
of the oppressive regime and return to a maternal, undifferentiated form. 
Hollan holds that the reasons people are drawn to or pushed away by crowds 
are not necessarily socially constructed but individually held. The distinction 
between choreographed crowds—pulled together, in her case, at the behest 
of the state—and spontaneous crowds is critical to Steffen’s analysis. Sadana’s 
interlocutor describes leaving an ordinary commuting crowd to impulsively join 
a spontaneous crowd for an Independence Day protest. Haberkorn outlines the 
way protest crowds in Bangkok are both carefully planned by activists and also 
warily anticipated by authorities. Chowdhury’s interlocutors seem to be defying 
their own expectations by appearing in the street rather than simply gathering 
online; she argues that the online crowds she studies are less organized than they 
are coordinated. 
Crowds
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Taken together, part of what these chapters demonstrate is that bodies in an 
unorganized or unauthorized crowd are exposed to different kinds of dangers 
than a body alone and that these dangers in turn shape the affective experience 
of being in a crowd. Death can either provide the occasion for the crowd—as 
in Chowdhury’s chapter, where the deaths of a blogger and a boy create crowds 
in the street and online, respectively—or else be its result—as in Moskowitz’s 
chapter. The fatal crowd Moskowitz describes is the clearest example of how a 
crowd can become a crisis, but many of the other chapters also associate crowds 
with death or at least with violence. In Chowdhury’s essay, death and violence 
are everywhere: the killing of a blogger inspires people to take to the streets, the 
accidental beating to death of a boy feeds into the righteousness of another online 
crowd, and the harassment of women fuels the creation of an online mob fixated 
on finding those responsible for the assaults. The ladies coach crowd Sadana 
opens her chapter with is similarly created by the differently distributed risk of 
being sexually harassed in a crowd; by combining this need to protect women’s 
bodies with an incident where African students were chased and attacked on 
the Metro, she shows how the metro crowd can suddenly become a violent mob, 
undermining its own promise of modernity and civility. Both the psychological 
crowds described by Hollan’s interlocutors are associated with the fear of death, 
either social or actual. In Steffen’s case, it’s the violence of the accident and the 
possibility of death that seduces and attracts the bystanders who make up the 
crowd. In the hajj as experienced by Hammoudi, even beyond knowing that a 
number of people may die by trampling during the pilgrimage each year, the 
hajj’s ritual significance is tied symbolically to the violence of sacrifice. Both 
Haberkorn’s and Borneman’s crowds form despite the knowledge that making 
their bodies vulnerable in the street means they may become sacrifices if and 
when authorities decide to inflict violence. 
Te politics of and in crowds 
Attempts to restrict crowds through laws, the manipulation of space, or violence 
reveal how threatening crowds can be to existing structures of authority. As 
Borneman (this volume) observes, “The very idea of a crowd forming and its 
intervention has the potential to unsettle the political field.” Haberkorn argues 
that it is precisely this—the very idea of a crowd—that prompts the regime in 
Thailand to release activists; perversely, they must release people whose crime 
was participating in a protest crowd or else face even more crowds of protesters. 
Within crowds, people often see themselves as part of a transformative force. In 
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both Syria and Ukraine, respectively, Borneman’s and Thomassen’s interlocutors 
associate gathering in a crowd with their hopes for political change. And yet, 
as Sadana points out, though they may carry the possibility of resistance, many 
crowds are characterized by submission: to a leader, to a prefigured space, even 
to a machine like the Metro. By drawing on an example where the representative 
of a struggling government calls people together in a crowd and uses their hope 
to buttress his own authority, Obadare complicates the notion that the people 
are right to feel hopeful within a crowd, which may—like the prayer sessions in 
Nigeria—turn out to be not the beginning of a transformation but a ruse. While 
Steffen’s chapter demonstrates how the PRC’s authorities use choreographed 
crowds to publicly claim authorship over the country’s masses, Moskowitz shows 
how the Shanghai government undermined its own authority by calling for a 
crowd it ultimately couldn’t control on New Year’s Eve. In contrast to Moskowitz’s 
interlocutors, who appear satisfied by official accounts of the tragedy, the people 
in the online mobs examined by Chowdhury are fueled by the gap between the 
difficulties invoked by Bangladeshi authorities in the wake of violent crowd 
incidents (“we couldn’t see who did it”), which are seemingly belied by the public 
circulation of security camera footage (“how can you say that when we can all
see”). Just as interpreting crowds’ significance or intentions can be difficult, so 
predicting the effects crowds can have on the social and political contexts they 
form in can be impossible. As Hammoudi points out, the heavy surveillance 
and regulation of the hajj crowd begins before the trip; even during registration, 
authorities’ attempts to keep crowds from getting out of their control are visible. 
Nevertheless, Hammoudi also argues that the crowds of the hajj are leveling; 
that is, within the crowd, hierarchies are momentarily eliminated and people 
are equal among each other. This “leveling” is different from the riots Tambiah 
(1997) describes as destroying property and thus bringing different groups 
closer to equality, but both Tambiah and the contributors to this volume address 
how crowds deal with hierarchy. Steffen notes that the leveled status of people in 
the choreographed crowd and the spontaneous crowd appears in stark contrast 
to the rigid hierarchy of the cliques and circles that people form elsewhere in the 
PRC. During the Shanghai New Year’s Eve crowd, as people struggled to gain a 
better vantage point for an event that turned out not to exist, Mokowitz reports 
feeling a sense of competition within the crowd as people tried to get up the stairs. 
Chowdhury observes instead a hierarchy of crowds, where the online crowd of 
people trying to identify harassers in CCTV footage see themselves as superior 
to the crowd of men whose faces they fixate on. In Obadare’s case, the existence 
of a leader—even one performing humility—and noted dignitaries makes the 
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crowd inherently unequal. Hollan’s two cases remind us not to generalize too 
quickly, however; where George’s lack of power leads to his haunting by this 
crowd of unconscious ghosts, Nene’na Limbong’s haunting occurs because his 
superior position in the Toraja feast actually makes him feel vulnerable. Even the 
leaders of crowds may not necessarily feel as powerful as they appear. 
These questions of politics and hierarchy eventually intersect with questions 
of sincerity and experience, which can be addressed empirically, in terms 
of effects: What can crowds be said to actually transform? Throughout the 
chapters, we see a connection between physical crowds and physical spaces. In 
Sadana’s case, the creation of Delhi’s Metro as a modern space allows people 
to imagine themselves as transformed into the subjects of the modern metro 
crowd; however, the new Metro sociality Sadana’s interlocutors describe quickly 
breaks down in moments when the crowd is transformed into a mob, which 
then begins to destroy elements of the space. Thomassen suggests that even as 
people describe themselves as transformed by joining the Maidan crowd, they 
in fact end up transforming the space of the public square they occupy. Other 
previously occupied squares end up, to borrow Hollan’s term, being haunted by 
the crowds they once held. For instance, the 1989 student protests on Tiananmen 
Square in Beijing echoed the crowds of Red Guards who gathered to see Mao 
Zedong during the Cultural Revolution, and, following the clearing of the 
square through state violence on June 4, infrastructural changes—such as the 
elimination of aboveground crosswalks, the building of fences, and the clearing 
of the square on the anniversary of the massacre—both prevent the emergence 
of a similar crowd and make its continued absence conspicuous. By the end of 
Moskowitz’s account, the government has shut down the lights on the Bund in 
Shanghai in a similar attempt to erase the space that held the fatal crowd. As 
Hollan notes, it is precisely these kinds of ghostly crowds that people carry with 
them and may hinder personal—or, in this analogy, national—transformation. 
Encounters with imaginary crowds in minds and media 
Another way the contributors conceive of the ghostly crowds that follow, 
anticipate, or inspire actual crowds is in terms of images. Many of the chapters 
deal with the power of virtual or imaginary crowds. In her analysis of the Delhi 
Metro, Sadana focuses precisely on how people regard others in the crowd and 
how this sense of becoming one of these others might change the way they 
imagine themselves. Hollan’s interlocutors have troubling dreams about crowds. 
Thailand’s regime legally eliminated the image of crowds even as actual crowds 
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assembled and—in the case described by Haberkorn—succeeded in advocating 
for the release of prisoners. In Aleppo, Borneman’s first encounter with crowds 
is of a photoshopped, imaginary image of an orderly, identical mass in 2006; 
the need to produce this image indicates how threatening the idea of actual 
oppositional crowds is and prefigures the regime’s violent response to them 
years later. The spectacular elements of the prayer sessions analyzed by Obadare 
are meant to seize people’s imaginations, and in Steffen’s chapter, the similarly 
spectacular choreographed crowds create a concrete image that can stand for 
the idea of Chineseness or the Chinese nation. Images of crowds and imagined 
crowds have an eerie ability to call actual crowds into being. Thomassen’s 
interlocutors report being drawn to the Maidan Uprising by televised images 
of the faces in the crowd on the square. For Moskowitz, the deaths during the 
Shanghai New Year’s crowd are ironically predicted by authorities, who imagine 
the catastrophic crowd that might gather to watch an actual lightshow, which 
led them to cancel the event; however, the lightshow as collectively imagined 
crowd—who did not know it had been canceled—makes the imagined 
catastrophe into a reality. In Chowdhury’s chapter, it’s the images of actual faces 
in the crowd that draw the virtual mob together in Bangladesh; the fact that the 
crowd is a largely male and stereotypically religious crowd reinforces the sense 
of self-righteousness that fuels their vigilante actions. 
While this volume cannot answer all of the questions posed by thinkers 
associated with the Frankfurt School and elsewhere about what technologies 
do to create masses or change their behaviors, many of the chapters address the 
role new media plays both in their research and in the formation of crowds in 
their field sites. Chowdhury critiques utopian notions that the internet might 
create an enlightened, democratic space in Bangladesh by showing how quickly 
users circulate images of death without nuance and resort to mob tactics. In the 
PRC, Steffen argues, the social media platform similarly offers not a utopian 
respite from the hierarchy of actual sociality but rather a reflection of it that 
repudiates the leveling aspects of crowds. In Thailand, students are caught 
organizing because of the surveillance of their social media accounts. And 
yet, in the work of Thomassen, Obadare, Hammoudi, Sadana, Moskowitz, and 
Borneman, the circulation of crowd images crucial by new media is critical. 
Thomassen argues that the enduring crowd of the Maidan Uprising might never 
have lasted as long as it did without the intervention of television broadcasting, 
Obadare’s prayer sessions are similarly performed with a televisual audience in 
mind, and Hammoudi’s own ideas of what to expect during the hajj come from 
his familiarity with images from the media. Sadana’s analysis of the metro mob 
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is possible because of uploaded video recordings, and Moskowitz is only able 
to realize how deadly serious the crowd he escaped from truly was because of 
circulating news reports that come to him the next morning from relatives in 
the United States. Borneman similarly relied on uploaded videos, social media 
posts, and video calls to understand the way his interlocutors were feeling in 
2011 and how they came to feel in the years after. 
Te changing political signifcance of crowds 
In 2014, when I originally conceived of this volume and began soliciting essays, 
our task seemed simple. Because crowds seem to form everywhere people are, 
it appeared obvious that ethnographers would have something to say about 
the different characteristics of crowds in different places and that combining 
those accounts in a single volume could generate illuminating, theoretical 
commonalities. What also seemed obvious (to me) was that it was a great 
privilege to be writing about crowds at a time that was not characterized by fears 
of impending fascism, by a looming communist revolution, or by the chaotic 
violence that had generated so much of other thinking about crowds. I thought I 
could ask the contributors to focus only on the particular, embodied lower-case 
“c” crowds in their field sites and not on the significance of “the Crowd” with an 
uppercase “C.” Naively, in 2014, I imagined editing a book on crowds where the 
object of study—the crowd—could finally be treated as something politically 
neutral rather than a tool for the right, for the left, or for chaos. 
Writing just a few weeks after yet another fatal vehicle-ramming attack on 
a crowd of pedestrians in Toronto, Canada, on April 24, 2018, I find myself 
no longer able to write and edit as if that were the case. As I wrote above, to 
categorize a group as a “crowd” is to bring a host of other connotations into 
being; it can flatten, dehumanize, and objectify the people it describes. In this 
volume, the contributors take great care to define their terms while addressing 
group formation as it exists in their field sites; however, since I began collecting 
these essays, several trends have changed how I conceive of the significance of 
their work on crowds and of the figure of the Crowd. Among these trends are: 
Te recent efcacy of crowds to disrupt repressive regimes, and the subsequent 
increased fear of and regulation of crowds by remaining repressive regimes.
In 2011, the use of crowds by Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, and other 
similar movements seemed to indicate that bodies could be efectively 






mobilized in public spaces to demand real political change. Nevertheless, 
perhaps in response to the threatening efectiveness demonstrated by the 
Arab Spring protests, governments began responding to peaceful political 
crowds aggressively. Several chapters in this volume address the shifing 
meaning of crowding in public in the wake of efective protests. We can 
also think of the violence that broke out and then escalated in response 
to crowds in Syria in 2011 described by Borneman (this volume); the 
unprecedented use of teargas and pepper spray on protesters by the Hong 
Kong police during the Occupy movement in 2014; the increased display of 
military-grade weapons by police in response to the 2014 Black Lives Matter 
protests in Ferguson, MO, and elsewhere in the United States; and the legal 
banning of public assembly in Tailand afer the 2014 coup documented by 
Haberkorn (this volume). 
Te increased ascendancy of far-right authoritarian leaders appealing to 
groups of people during mass demonstrations by using divisive and explicitly 
xenophobic rhetoric. In the United States in particular, the election of 
Donald Trump appeared to herald, among other things, a renewed 
willingness of people to submit to leaders peddling race-based ideas about 
group psychology similar to Le Bon’s, and the “Unite the Right” rally in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, on August 12, 2017, revealed how attractive 
these ideas are even at a grassroots level. Elsewhere, marches and mass 
demonstrations by so-called far-right, neo-Nazi, and fascist groups in 
Poland and other countries across Europe also ft into this trend. 
An increase in attacks on crowds with deadly weapons. Large gatherings of 
people become “crowds” in the eyes of the media once they are transformed 
into targets for people who want to kill indiscriminately. Here we might 
think of the November 2015 Paris attacks where eighty-nine of the attack’s 
130 fatalities were audience members at a concert in the Bataclan Teater. 
Tere was also the Manchester Arena Bombing on March 22, 2017, that 
killed twenty-two people at a concert, and the massacre that occurred in Las 
Vegas on October 1, 2017, when a lone gunman shot into another concert 
audience and killed ffy-nine people. Even in countries without widespread 
access to guns, incidents of violence on large groups (or else an awareness
of such violence) are on the rise; for instance, in the PRC, thirty-fve people 
died when a small group of assailants attacked the waiting passengers at 
Kunming Railway Station with long knives on March 1, 2014. 
An increase in vehicle-ramming attacks on crowds. Te realization that 
cars are deadly weapons that can be turned on crowds has changed 
Crowds
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the social signifcance of being in a group that might become a crowd, 
particularly near famous landmarks. Some of the groups attacked by cars 
were assembled for political reasons, like the people counter-protesting 
the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, on August 12, 2017. 
Other vehicle-ramming attacks occur in explicitly political places, such 
as the vehicle that crashed into a group of tourists at Tiananmen Square 
in Beijing, the traditional locus of power in China, on October 28, 2013. 
However, many of the groups attacked by vehicles do not have an obvious 
connection to power or politics. For example, the attack on Bastille Day 
in 2016 in Nice, France, that killed eighty-seven people was a celebratory 
crowd; the truck in Berlin that killed twelve people on December 19, 2016, 
targeted shoppers at a Christmas market; and the group a van collided with 
in Barcelona, Spain, on August 17, 2017, was made up of pedestrians visiting 
a tourist site. Most recently, on April 23, 2018, a man purposefully drove a 
van into pedestrians on the sidewalk and killed ten people in Toronto who 
were likely not, it turns out, targeted for indiscriminate violence but because 
they were women. In many of these cases, the individuals attacked may not 
have considered themselves as part of a unifed “crowd” until they were 
objectifed, their bodies reduced to targets for their attackers and obstacles 
for others attempting to escape. 
Te heightened signifcance of counting the number of bodies in crowds 
during political events. Within hours of the Woman’s March on Washington, 
DC, on January 21, 2017, news outlets began covering the “controversy” 
over whether more people were in attendance at the protest or at the 
Presidential Inauguration the day before. Te political stakes of this debate 
were oddly transparent. Suddenly, questions whose implications are usually 
either logistical (how many people were there?) or theoretical (were the 
people there sincere?) became proxies for a wider, public debate about the 
legitimacy of the new administration. Even outside of the United States, 
questions about the authenticity of crowds and crowd imagery have become 
more urgent to leaders seeking to build their credibility; see, for instance, 
Zeynep Devrim Gürsel’s (2017) examination of the photos taken at the 2015 
Unity Rally in Paris. Tis public fxation on determining the exact number 
of living bodies afer political events is, in some ways, a mutated derivative 
of a much more familiar practice, which is arguing over the exact number of 
dead bodies in the wake of violent events. While the importance of keeping 
the number of dead bodies low is clear in a country like the PRC (where 
the number of dead bodies determines the ofcial status of an incident 
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as “serious” or not but “missing” bodies don’t count), it’s less clear what 
practical and political efects the tallying of living bodies in crowds will 
have on contemporary political life in diferent contexts. Particularly in the 
context of these other violent trends, counting living bodies with the same 
fervor and controversy that surrounds the tallying of the dead gives one the 
perverse impression that these bodies in the crowd are important to number 
precisely because they also make up a diferent category: the potentially 
dead. 
It’s possible that what I perceive as trends are merely an effect of changing media 
coverage; nevertheless, changing coverage can lead to shifts in how people think 
of themselves in relation to crowds. As one must be when within a crowd, the 
contributors to this volume are sensitive to such changes as they occur: in their 
field sites, among their interlocutors, and over the course of an encounter. They 
display the sensibility they’ve developed through ethnographic engagement 
and demonstrate what kind of sensitive, insightful scholarship that can be 
done when ethnographers trust themselves to carve their own research objects 
from life in their field sites. The crowds examined in each chapter differ from 
each other not only because they form in different contexts but also because, 
for most of the contributors, this ethnographic material is the result of long 
engagements with particular people and places. Being able to distinguish which 
kinds of groups are ordinary in a particular context and which are exceptional 
informs not only how these ethnographers write but also what things they 
notice in the field. Though contemporary circumstances may be calling for 
the type of polemics and instrumental texts that characterized crowd theory 
in the twentieth century, this volume does not build toward conclusive value 
judgments; nor does it offer tactical suggestions for those who might want to 
harness (or evade) the sometimes violent and often politically potent power of 
crowds. Instead, the authors of these essays reconsider crowds as concepts, as 
experiences, as symbols, as images, as political tools, and—most importantly— 
as they encountered them within a specific ethnographic context. As a result, 
this volume is crowded with insights I hope will continue to remain relevant 
even after this particular moment has passed. 
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Te Syrian Revolution: Crowds, the Political 
Field, the Political Subject 
John Borneman 
Revolutionary crowds 
The Syrian revolution that began in 2011 as an unexpected and creative uprising 
against an authoritarian government quickly morphed into an incredibly 
destructive, disintegrating force. In 2011, Syrians that I knew, across sectarian, 
religious, and ethnic divides, basked in a sense of joy and in the anticipation of 
freedom from political repression. As one friend from Aleppo put it in April 
2011, “Our fear is gone.” After slightly more than a year, however, the dominant 
experience of the revolution had changed. The image of revolutionary crowds 
was replaced with crowds of refugees in flight. Divisions overwhelmed all 
attempts at unity. Joy and freedom morphed into despair and dread. This friend 
from Aleppo had since fled to Beirut with his entire extended family. In the 
first two years of the uprising, people thought and hoped that things would get 
better. I strongly identified with their aspirations and experienced with Syrians a 
similar disappointment and dread as their hopes were smashed. 
Revolution may present itself as a sudden reversal in direction, but it is in 
fact a process of social transformation with a series of reversals and largely 
unanticipated outcomes. I will first recover the joyful experience of the early 
revolutionary crowds in the first year of the uprising, before concluding with 
some reflections on the experience of dread and the massive flight from Syria up 
to the present. I begin not with the revolutionary crowds, however, but with my 
first experience of something resembling a crowd or, more accurately, a mass, 
in 2006 in Aleppo, Syria. I hope to clarify the place of masses and crowds in 
forming and disintegrating the political field and the political subject of Syria. 
Crowds
















Recursively constituted masses, 1999–2006 
During my first visit to Syria in 1999, I observed that the median strip of the 
M5 highway, which runs north and south and connects Damascus to Homs to 
Hama to Aleppo, was punctuated with pictures of the authoritarian leader, Hafez 
el-Assad. The closer one approached the center of cities, the more frequently 
the pictures appeared on the median strip of the highways. People I met were 
obviously afraid to speak openly about anything of political significance in 
either public or private places, and as a result Syria was quiet and stable, with 
no readily visible conflicts. Gatherings in public of any size, except as kin groups 
or if organized by the regime itself, were considered illegal assembly. Even 
small groups of male acquaintances were suspicious in Syrian cities, whereas in 
Lebanon, which shares a population and culture very similar to that in Syria, I 
had observed such groups in public places everywhere. 
Jump ahead five years to 2004. I am living in Aleppo. Little has changed since 
1999, except that President Hafez el-Assad had died in 2000, and his son Bashar 
had assumed the presidency, formally elected, to be sure, but with the certainty 
of outcome that negates election as a democratic ritual. Now the enlarged photo 
mounted on a pole in the median strip of the road is of Bashar in the center, 
with his father and deceased brother, the heir apparent who had died in a traffic 
accident, in the background. The public atmosphere is still filled with fear, and 
there are still no public gatherings or crowds except those few organized by kin 
groups or by the ruling Ba’ath Party or regime. 
I ask members of the Ba’ath Party why I see no political activity—no clubs at the
university, no debates, no attempt to link current politics to the founders of and
the past socialist vision of the Party. And I find little or no enthusiasm for politics
among the students. Some Party members privately admit to me that the Party
today has nothing to do with its original socialist politics, that it is an accumulative
and distributive machine that in fact only manipulates public divisions for its own
ruling interests. Others get impatient or angry at my questions—some demand
facts, names of the dissatisfied students I referred to. Still others counter with
a list of activities in which they had personally, or in conjunction with a few
others, opposed something the regime had done or stood for. The one political
demonstration that I was told of occurred the year before I arrived in Syria, and
it was by students at the university protesting that the government had rescinded
the guarantee of jobs after graduation. The numbers were very small, and the
punishment was that two of its leaders, whom I met, were not allowed to finish
their degrees and banned from the university. Both had found work elsewhere. 
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Jump ahead another two years to 2006. I am visiting Aleppo for a month. 
The city is beginning its stint as the “Arab World Capital of Islamic Culture,” 
a designation awarded yearly since 1996, following an initiative of the Arab 
League, promoted by UNESCO. Despite the designation and planned festivities, 
Aleppo seems remarkably quiet. So quiet that it is not that easy to find out what 
events are taking place. People I ask either do not know or are uninterested 
in telling me. One day, as I wander into Aleppo’s central square, the large and 
aesthetically unremarkable Saadallah Al-Jabri Square adjacent to the Aleppo 
Public Park, I notice a huge metal ball and an artistic replica of a mosque made 
out of inflated balloons. 
For the first time since I began visiting Syria, I also see a crowd gathered 
there. My curiosity peaks. I ask a bystander what is going on. He explains that 
I have happened onto the opening ceremony of Aleppo as Arab World Capital 
of Islamic Culture. VIPs and lower-level public officials in business suits seem 
to outnumber private citizens. What makes this crowd so distinctive is the 
five-story poster that overwhelms it of a crowd pasted to the side of a building 
facing the square. The poster shows ordinary people densely packed into Al-
Jabri Square. These folks on the poster do not look purposeless or random, but 
I cannot determine for what purpose they formed a crowd. Knowing that all 
crowds in Syria are political, I ask when the photo was taken, but nobody can tell 
me. I have never seen such a mass in this square, the largest in Aleppo. 
On closer inspection, I see that the poster repeatedly duplicates images of 
the same people. It is not a crowd but an imagination of a crowd as a colorful, 
undifferentiated mass. It is an imagined crowd as a response to the specter of a 
crowd, intended to replace or preempt the apparition of an unpredictable crowd 
with a more pleasant hallucinatory group. The regime is staging its subjects as 
public actors, as “the people.” But all Syrians knew, even if they refused or were 
unable to acknowledge it in public, that the people distrusted anything the regime 
organized, including its images. The people, I thought, would surely not be able 
to recognize themselves in this picture except as reflections of the regime’s wish. 
They would see this picture for what it was, a defense mechanism of the regime: 
to prevent an image of a crowd of political subjects undoing and redoing the 
group. A hallucination of an already united and orderly mass took the place of 
unruly crowd, of the persecutory inner image of crowds that haunted them all. 
In 2006 in Syria the spirit or mood of the times, what in German is called 
Zeitgeist or Stimmung (public mood), was decidedly paranoid-schizophrenic. 
Paranoia and splitting were intentionally facilitated by the authoritarian political 
system of single party Ba’ath rule. I experienced this mood in daily interactions: 
Crowds
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everyone assumed at least two selves, one for public viewing and one hidden 
from view. And they seemed fearful of meeting people they did not already 
know. I was constantly told by people to be wary of others, and those other 
people would tell me to be wary of the ones who had initially warned me to 
be wary. Paranoia’s golden rule: trust no one. There was schizophrenia, too; 
people always had at least two public selves, if not more. Unable to trust others, 
it was difficult to integrate new experiences into one’s self. Best to dissociate 
and create a new self for each set of encounters. It follows that any public 
gathering was viewed with suspicion. Was it organized by the regime as a trap 
(to out those who dared to show disrespect) or a puppet show (to assemble the 
mass), or was it spontaneous? For the regime, crowds were groups of people to 
arrange and stage to legitimate its rule. Spontaneous gatherings were thus highly 
suspicious. People seemed to doubt there were such things, at least not in Syria. 
In this context, my initial assumption, informed by several decades of personal 
participation in rights demonstrations in the United States and all over Western 
Europe, was misplaced; crowds were not a means of producing political subjects 
with their own will and differentiated relation to language, hierarchy, and order. 
In 2006, what I saw in Syria was not a crowd but a recursively constituted mass 
whose only intent was to be together, united behind Assad and the Ba’ath Party. 
The idea that the people are a united mass without division is not part of 
a paternal imagination. In the paternal imagination, the figure of the father 
(whether it is a male or real father is beside the point) is conflictual and enters 
relationships from the outside. His first such entrance is between the mother 
and the child. Bringing dissensus and difference to this dyad, the father himself 
is always an initial disturbance, a third element in a triangle. Even though he is 
theoretically and ideally ascribed the role guarantor of order between competing 
children (not always male), the guarantor is an ideal that today the mother often 
performs. In theory and ideal, the father is also accorded the primary access 
to the mother’s attention and affection. When a child is born, it must compete 
with the father for the mother’s love—this is the essence of entering the Oedipal 
complex. 
I write this to dispel any notion that the authoritarian, highly male-dominated 
Syrian regime imagined its relations with citizens in a paternal register. Rather, 
political directives were to be followed like bees follow their queen, without 
thought or register of difference—and if such directives were followed, citizens 
would be taken care of (the Ba’ath Party nominally followed a socialist program), 
provided they did not dissent. That is all to say, before the uprising the regime 
presented itself not in the symbolic order of the paternal register (i.e., a 
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regime to be argued with and opposed) but in the imaginary of the maternal 
register: undifferentiated, embracing, nurturing (Borneman 2007, 2012, 2016). 
Moreover, in ruling through the mood of paranoia, the regime created political 
subjects who had to choose to submit to the regime’s perverted representation 
of reality or else risk harassment, imprisonment, or worse. What I saw on that 
day in 2006 was the regime’s representation of itself: a group of people acting as a 
mass on Al-Jabri Square facing a huge reproduction of how they were imagined 
to appear replicated on a poster. When I asked about this discrepancy between 
actual mass and replication, people viewed me suspiciously. Partaking of the 
kind of conscious dissociation typical of Orwellian doublespeak, they dismissed 
my question as a joke or an attempt to humiliate them. Was there, they asked, 
such a thing as a real crowd of political subjects? It would be foolish to dare 
challenge this regime-created illusion of crowd reality, this mass, with another 
(real) representation. The people were, I concluded, only acting as a recursively 
constituted mass. 
Syrian crowds, 2011 
Jump ahead another five years to Spring 2011. The first masses not orchestrated 
by the regime gathered in the small town of Da’ara in the south of Syria, near 
the Jordanian border, and only later spread to the population hubs of Homs, 
Damascus, and Aleppo to the north. For a time in 2011 and 2012, the idea 
spread like wildfire that one could organize crowds into political demonstrations 
against the regime, for reform, for the release of prisoners, and for freedom. 
“Hurriyah”—freedom—became a central call to encourage participation in 
what was then, primarily in Europe and the United States, optimistically dubbed 
the Arab Spring. Friends and acquaintances who in 2006 had no sense of their 
capacity to be political subjects suddenly contacted me through their Facebook 
accounts and sent me optimistic alerts through URLs pasted in emails about 
YouTube posts of their amateur protest footage uploaded on the internet. I was 
not there, but through this new social media Syrians shared their experiences of 
courage and joy with each other, with a world public, and with me within hours 
of the actual happenings, in a way that far surpassed in detail and in the multicity 
of perspectives the capacities of traditional reporting and television news. 
The crowd demonstrations throughout Syria morphed into an uprising, and 
the uprising morphed into a violent regional civil war. Ethnically organized 
resistance and Islamist and jihadi-motivated organizations defeated and overtook 
Crowds
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the initially more secular-dominated opposition groups. As of this writing, in 
May 2017, six years after the uprising began, the war has displaced more than 
half the population—experts estimate there are 5 million refugees outside the 
country, 6.6 million internally displaced, and some 470,000 killed.1 We should 
not let this outcome efface the fact that the uprising was inspired by a wave 
of anti-authoritarian actions and crowd protests throughout the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region to reclaim a sense of political subjectivity by 
undoing and redoing the political field. The first of these protests was in Tunisia, 
when, on December 16, 2010, the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi engaged 
in self-immolation in protest, precisely because of his lack of political agency. 
Large-scale uprisings in Egypt and Yemen nearly immediately followed, and two 
months later, in early March 2011, an open rebellion began in Syria, in the city 
of Dara’a. The sequence of events is itself important, but for my purposes here, 
I want only to emphasize that by early May 2011 the crowds and mass protests 
were already met with arrests and killings throughout Syria, not only in Da’ara 
but also in Deir al Zour, Homs, Kiswa, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.2 
Counting on the help of a large number of informers, the Syrian regime’s 
security apparatus, Mukhabarrat, countered these crowds by anticipating their 
presence in particular places and, publicly representing itself in a paternal 
disciplinary register, often viciously attacked those gathered. Early on, some 
demonstrators responded to these disciplinary measures through tactical 
swarming: spontaneous and accidental gatherings in smaller squares, which 
drew many participants not because they were informed or coordinated ahead 
of time but simply through the contagion of massing. The regime assumed, 
in turn, that every mass was a potential crowd with oppositional intent and, 
acting according to this logic, refused to negotiate in good faith about proposed 
reforms. This refusal facilitated the transformation of every mass into what was 
most feared: a crowd of chanting or placard-holding demonstrators. 
As police and regime-sponsored militias began to fire on the crowds, the 
uprising took on a revolutionary fervor, radicalizing participants in a way specific 
to the Levant and Syria’s place within it. Fighters from the Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars, from Chechen and Bosnia, flooded in, with recruits from the European 
and Western world Arab/Islamic diasporas, destabilizing the precarious power-
sharing mosaics of local communities. They also began fighting with each other 
while opposing the secular Syrian opposition. The disciplinary instruments 
of the state—police, army, Party, Mukhabarrat—became even more sectarian-
identified and reacted with a brutality that later was matched by the religious-
motivated oppositional militias. 
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For its part, the regime used every violent means at its disposal, reigning 
death first with aerial bombing and chemicals until that received international 
condemnation, then resorting to crude instruments like barrel bombs (metal 
containers filled with high explosives), and later, with Russian protection, 
renewing its chemical war on the population. It first hit select Sunni 
neighborhoods considered oppositional before expanding to whole cities 
and regions throughout Syria. In calling every form of opposition a “terrorist 
threat,” the regime adopted an international language that found adherents both 
within and outside Syria. Every crowd again presented a challenge to its rule. In 
denying any meaningful political agency to its own subjects, the regime reacted 
to crowds with parental rage: of a vengeful father betrayed by its children and a 
tenaciousness mother trying to protect those still in the nest. Privileged business 
elites across sectarian divides, the ruling Alewite minority, and members of 
those minorities (i.e., Christian, Kurd, Druze) who felt increasingly threatened 
by the radical Islamist groups, united behind this regime, granting it liberty to 
express and act out their visions of violence. 
Although events in Aleppo are obviously tied to those in other cities and 
states, let me focus on this city, which I know best. In Aleppo, as throughout 
Syria, the uprising instigated a pervasive reimagination of the political field— 
of voicing opposition, demonstrating, confronting the police, being arrested— 
especially among young people. On May 12, 2011, in Aleppo, police made mass 
arrests of students who had protested, and on May 29 students organized the first 
large demonstration of estimated 1,000 people. On June 10, fifty student activists 
were detained following scattered demonstrations. On June 17, the first death 
by shooting was reported in Aleppo. On June 30, Aleppo experienced its first 
large coordinated demonstration, in many different squares and city districts. 
On July 1, there was a demonstration of 10,000; on July 15, it reached 20,000. 
On August 19, thousands protested in Saadallah Al-Jabri Square, the site of the 
orchestrated crowd in 2006. And in response, on October 19, 2011, the regime 
itself organized a huge demonstration in the square—for no purpose other 
than to demonstrate unity, to try to sway the opinion and perceptions of the 
uncommitted masses and of foreign audiences. But in this show of unity it also 
demonstrated, for the first time, the divisions within the people that the uprising 
had made visible, that the “terrorists,” as the regime called all opposition, had to 
be acknowledged and fought openly. 
Throughout the protests, the regime wanted to retain control, at any cost, of 
the central symbolic spaces of its major cities, especially Damascus and Aleppo. 
In Aleppo, this space was Al-Jabri Square. The fighting quickly spread there 
Crowds
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and, eventually, the square became the victim of a suicide car bomber, most 
likely of some opposition group. Today there are no more crowds in Aleppo. 
There are now sections of Aleppo that the regime controls and sections that 
opposition groups control and sections in-between, like the largely Christian 
district al-Jdeideh where I had once lived, not fully in control of either. But in no 
section of the city are there crowds. The destruction in many of these districts 
is overwhelming. Suffice it to say that the regime also attacked and severely 
damaged the twelfth-century Great Mosque adjacent to the old al-Medina souqs, 
where I lived for the largest part of my fieldwork, which had been painstakingly 
reconstructed with the help of the regime and rededicated in one of the many 
inaugural events planned during the year of Aleppo as Arab World Capital of 
Islamic Culture in 2006. 
In many ways crowd behavior took on the specific characteristics of Syrian 
culture and society, radicalizing latent and often unconscious social divisions 
and antagonisms. The transformation of crowds into political demonstrators 
mandated the reflexive and largely unconscious appearance of the paternal 
function. The regime quickly eliminated the space for massing of any sort. Even 
those fleeing the conflict were shot at as the regime tried to delimit if not stop 
all movement of peoples it had no prior knowledge of. The time for ideas such 
as deliberation, debate, and consensus building was quickly eliminated, though 
the crack in the window for negotiation with opposition groups had been small 
to begin with. The accumulation of dramatic events demanded immediate 
action on all fronts. Initial ideas of regime change gave way to motives ranging 
from the revenge of a murder to risky defense of friends or neighbors, from 
organizing “humanitarian” aid to the fight for individual survival, from 
democratically refiguring Syria to replacing the state of Syria with a caliphate 
that extended into Iraq. Most importantly, the time necessary to think through 
an alternative political solution disappeared. The inability to unite behind a 
single leader, a sovereign, became an accusation of ineffectuality against the 
democratic opposition and an excuse for the West to largely withhold support 
to oppositional groups. 
Te specter of the failed revolution 
The stakes in the revolutions in the Middle East hinged on the capacity to 
transform the authoritarian political field into a democratic one. We imagine 
crowds as an integral means to achieve this transformation, and we imagine that 
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we must participate in them by either joining or opposing to become a political 
subject. The very idea of a crowd forming and its intervention has the potential 
to unsettle the political field. Crowds unsettle because they appear to have a 
purpose, and that purpose is often to change, at its most radical, to revolt. Crowd 
participation in itself can collectively transform individuals. In a revolution, 
crowds promise more than change: they will turn the political field upside down. 
Hence rulers are correct in treating crowds like dynamite, useful if not essential 
to clear the field but also unstable, volatile, dangerous. 
What Marx and Engels (2005: 1) in 1848 in the Communist Manifesto called
“the specter of revolution” haunting Europe is, in 2016, the specter of failed 
revolution in the Middle East. A specter is something that has not yet appeared 
but is nonetheless already present. The experience of a specter is uncanny, 
similar to an experience of déjà vu, a revisit of something not totally unfamiliar 
coming from the past. A specter comes to us in the form of an apparition or 
ghost, a being with an incorporeal spirit, a presence with no clearly delineated 
body. In other words, the specter of the failed revolution in Syria is a presence in 
the mind already there, an inner object that contains within it associations with 
fright, or dread, or terror. These objects appeared in Syrian daydreams related to 
me already more than five years before the revolution (Borneman 2011). More 
often than not, such specters become persecutory objects. 
A specter of revolution contains two kinds of fantasies of political subjects: 
joyful fantasies—of the just, the comic, of turning the political field upside 
down; and persecutory fantasies—disintegrating, paranoid, sadomasochistic, 
fearful. If a revolution fails, its specter differs from that of a successful revolution 
in that there is no joy. Persecutory fantasies of attack and coerced change 
overwhelm the joys of inversion. While all revolutions contain elements of both 
kinds of fantasies, and all seek to transform the political field into something 
unrecognizable, a failed revolution, or a revolution that cannot participate in the 
joy of inversion, risks creating the specific kind of subject who feels persecuted 
and may turn persecutory. 
The specter of revolution of which Marx wrote was to bring about a new 
historical subject: an emancipated one, free of illusion, capable of deciding his or 
her own fate. This joyful vision of the subject, which Marx shared with some of the 
proponents of the French and American revolutions, comes out of the European 
Enlightenment. Despite the failure of the 1848 uprisings, the dream of the joyful 
political subject did not die with this failure. It reemerged in Germany again in 
the early twentieth century alongside the fantasy of fascism, and it reemerged 
after the destructive frenzy of the Second World War, motivating Third World 
Crowds
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national, anti-colonial emancipatory movements. The successful Russian 
Revolution of 1917 also embraced an emancipated subject, free of illusion, but, 
in its Leninist-Stalinist versions, it resisted the democratic subject. As Claude 
Lefort (1986) and others have argued, revolution's persecutory outcomes and 
its constant search for inner enemies were integral to its structure. Nonetheless, 
up until the 1989 “velvet” revolutions in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, the vanguard one-party Soviet model competed on a world 
stage with the democratic Enlightenment model in fantasies about revolution. 
A key demand of the revolutionary crowds in 2011 in Syria was to end the one-
party rule of the Ba’ath Party, whose slogan “Unity, Freedom, and Socialism” had 
served to enforce unity at the expense of freedom. The revolutionary crowds 
were largely inspired by the democratic ethos. 
Political subjects 
Most theory since the latter nineteenth century has argued implicitly if not 
explicitly that crowds are an intermediary or liminal form between masses 
and political subjects in groups. Whereas masses are pre-political gatherings 
of people with no conscious purpose, crowds are the transformation of these 
gatherings into groups with particular cultural meanings. Masses come together 
without knowing what they want. Crowds, by contrast, are signified as having 
a particular collective intent not reducible to the sum of individual aims; they 
are ascribed a meaning in a dialectic between collective self-definition and 
designation from the outside. 
Massing is one extreme of sociability, as close to the instinctual as possible in 
collective human behavior; political subjects are at the other extreme, culturally 
constructed with no necessary relation between need (instinct) and the specific 
intent of the collective gathering. The forming of a mass is an atavistic behavior 
like the “swarming” of bees, the “flocking” of birds, or the “shoaling” of fish, a 
process of aggregation, conglomeration, and mutual attunement found at times 
in all human groups. Such swarming in humans is motivated by and results in 
affect; it is largely unconscious, and it is the dimension of “submergence” that 
Gustave Le Bon (2002) appealed to as the first step in the formation of a crowd. 
But we might depart from Le Bon by pointing to the positive as well as the 
negative or destructive tendencies of massing. Because human intelligence and 
cognitive capacities are dissimilar if not technically superior to those of other 
animals, humans use submergence not just for survival but also for specifically 
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human ends, creative and destructive, rational and irrational. That is, humans 
might also submerge for the joy of losing themselves or for symbolic aims not 
tied to utility among which is to create oneself collectively as a political subject. 
Along these lines, Holger Briel extends insights from scholars working on the 
particular capacity of “swarm intelligence” to a creative analysis of the new kind 
of human activity of “blogging” (2012: 168–182, cf. Kennedy et al. 2001).3 
Massing implies an instinctual longing to be with others in a particular way, 
to be with others to experience what Freud (1921) called the “oceanic feeling,” 
a return to being one or being contained by the mother, the pre-symbolic, 
pre-rational, pre-hierarchical, non-differentiated. Longing to mass would be 
in the register of what Jacques Lacan (1998) dubs the Imaginary, an originary 
experience that one must have had but cannot remember. Massing is not, to keep 
with Lacan’s categories, in the register of the Symbolic; it is not the mediation 
of experience through language, hierarchy, difference, and social order. The 
Symbolic, in contrast to the Imaginary, includes those aspects of human 
existence that are necessary to become a political subject, for instance, speech and 
differentiation. Freud (1913) identified the Symbolic with the father function, 
including the archaic father. Massing, then, often appears to us as unplanned, 
surprising, accidental, unintentional, apolitical, lacking in a purpose, or as an 
undifferentiated group. 
What of the political subject? Most recent attempts in anthropology to theorize 
this subject have grown out of engagement with social movement theorists. Three 
of the most prominent—Alan Badiou, Georgio Agamben, Ernesto Laclau—take 
surprisingly similar lines of analysis though each creates his own language to 
describe the coming together of a crowd. Badiou (2013: 182), departing from 
his earlier Maoist frames, proposes “unbinding” (déliaison) in “evental sites” 
as central to social bonds. He connects this unbinding to a mathematical or 
set-theoretical ontology that is non-denumerable and unrepresentable, fully 
disregarding the relational nature of being. Agamben (1993: 65) proposes 
“singularity without identity,” that is, singularity without being an instance of a 
particular identity as a condition of a “coming community.” Such philosophical 
reformulations are useful for utopian thinking but they do not take into account 
the actual demands for political identity made on actors, for example, in the 
ongoing dissolution of community in Iraq and Syria today. Laclau (2005: 41) 
proposes tension between “original particularity” and “representing an (absent) 
totality.” Like Agamben, Laclau moves quickly to abstractions that rename and 
serve as substitutes for the particularities of the subject and its relation to diverse 
Symbolic orders. 
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In this question of the subject, I prefer to take my initial cue from Heidegger’s 
(1962) distinction between the ontic and ontological. For him, the “Dingheit” 
or thinghood of an ontic being—which for my purposes here would be the 
person who gathers in a mass—must be distinguished from Dasein, a being 
that is capable of ontology, that is, one who can recursively comprehend the 
properties of the very fact of its own Being. Put another way, the person capable 
of becoming a political subject is one who can perform a particular kind of 
symbolic transformation: to turn from part of a mass, or the longing for a mass, 
into being part of a crowd of a specific kind, a crowd with a political intent. 
To become political means minimally to move out of the ontic to the
ontological, out of the domain of what simply is to the intention to transform
a mass into a crowd of a particular type. That conscious intention is always
nonetheless shadowed by the unconscious, which contains an unarticulated
imagination of thinghood, of longing for a non-differentiated, pre-political
state. Crowds, this necessary intermediate form between mass and political
subject, are therefore experienced as uncanny for containing appeals both to the
atavistic longing for the unity of the group and to the conscious particularizing
tendencies within groups. As in a ritual process, crowds are both expressions
of Symbolic orders and potentially destabilizing of them. To become a political
subject in and through a crowd is both to understand oneself as a particular
human capable of self-transformation as well as of transforming others and to
grasp that only by acknowledging and recursively comprehending the collective
nature of being—including longing for the non-differentiated mass—can one
become more fully human. This paradox is similar to what Kant (1963: 44) in
his Fourth Proposition on Universal History dubbed the “unsocial sociability”
of human nature. 
Finally, how might this understanding of the relation of crowds to the “political 
subject” inform our account of the failed Syrian revolution? Participants in the 
Syrian uprising whom I knew widely envisioned a democratic subject that they 
expected would arise from the struggle to create and sustain a differentiated 
and pluralistic political field. They had in fact moved from the ontic to the 
ontological, joining crowds, reimagining and also often reshaping relations with 
intimates, friends, and political officials. 
As a civil war overtook the uprising, however, a remaking of the political 
field by nondemocratic groups foreclosed the possibility of acting on these 
imaginations. A civil war is a chaotic political field, and in Syria outside forces 
with money and resources that had a stake in the outcome began very early in 
the uprising to co-opt and shape internal processes of collective self-definition. 
Some countries, led by Saudi Arabia and the United States, sent money and troops 
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to local allies to oppose the regime; other countries, led by Iran and later Russia, 
sent money and troops to support the regime. Mercenaries from sectarian groups 
such as Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon and Iranian Revolutionary Guards 
also played a critical role in propping up the Assad regime. As a result of this 
external support for the regime, secular groups initially active in the early anti-
regime opposition, and united around the “Free Syrian Army,” found themselves 
lacking the resources for a long fight. Secular ideological commitments proved 
also difficult to sustain in the face of the more firm commitments of Islamist 
groups opposed to the regime, who soon proliferated. Neither type of opposition 
recruited anymore from crowds. The Islamist groups of various stripes—working 
sometimes regionally, sometimes nationally, sometimes together, sometimes 
alone or in opposition to others—demanded of civilians complete obedience 
and engaged in increasingly violent action in this shifting political field of civil 
war; many imagined an alternative authoritarian order based on Sharia law and 
began enforcing this order in areas under their control. It is no wonder, then, that 
faced with this literal anarchy of fight-to-the-death struggle between regime and 
opposition, within a year of the uprising’s start, many civilians and conscripts in 
the Syrian Armed Forces began to flee Syria to neighboring countries, and many 
noncommitted residents sought protection from Assad’s army. 
This explanation differs from our understanding of the relation of crowds to 
reform-minded social movements. Social movements want merely to change the 
political field; revolutionary movements want to turn the political field upside 
down. That difference may be crucial to both the appeal of some contemporary 
movements and their failure or success. With more at stake, revolutions tend 
to radicalize both opponents of change and those who want to sustain the 
status quo, and this radicality of stakes attracts outside actors to join the fray. 
Loyalty and obedience become more critical to a revolutionary struggle over 
time than the imagination and freedom of local actors, the key motivations for 
the initial uprising. The more limited goals of social movements, in contrast to 
revolutionary goals, make it more possible to incorporate different goals into 
enduring political structures. 
To summarize my major arguments to this point: 
1. Swarming is an unconscious appeal to sociality, but it can be made 
conscious and utilized as a political tactic. To understand how afective 
communication, like swarming, is an every-present potential, more 
attention must be paid to how afect (unconscious feeling) can trump 
cognition (identifcation with a category) (Borneman and Senders 2000; 
Parkin-Gounelas, ed. 2012). 
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2. Collectives take shape in a temporal process that appeals to both maternal 
and paternal registers, both horizontal and vertical registers, which assume 
diferent balances and functions over time. 
3. Te maternal function—the recovery of an imaginary unity, desire for 
a return to wholeness or dissolution into a mass—is omnipresent in the 
formation of crowds, but unarticulated. 
4. Identifcation with the leader or father fgure is not essential to create the 
crowd as a group with political intent, but it is ofen crucial to make this 
crowd politically efcacious. One of the major reasons that democratically 
oriented crowds have been of limited efcacy in Syria is because, unlike 
their more authoritarian competitors, the diferent sects and interest 
groups allied with democratic interests refused to identify and submit to a 
single father fgure or commit to a common vision of order. 
Te political feld and the political subject 
Crowds in Syria in 2011 partook in a struggle to undo the political field.
They massed in towns and city centers and relied on new social technology
to befriend strangers and to create new networks beyond their kinship ties for
political purposes. Crowds were essential to undoing the political field, but this
undoing has not eliminated the authoritarian field defended by Bashar al-Assad
and the ruling Ba’ath Party. The new political field, in turn, no longer resembles
what the early revolutionary crowds envisioned. It is as of this writing a political
field of civil war, still dominated by Assad but also filled with competing
authoritarian groups and small remnants of the early democratic movement
motivated to continue fighting. Civil war has undone the potential for a Syrian
democratic subject by forcing those so motivated to seek refuge abroad. Most
are unlikely to return. The specter of failed democratic revolution is perhaps
the greatest legacy of the 2011 Syrian crowds. Although the Assad regime is the
major instigator and object of the war, it also—like the participants in the early
protesting crowds—is not in control of the civil war, which would continue in
some form even if (or when) Assad stepped aside. Of the 23 million permanent
inhabitants of Syria before the war, nearly half have been displaced, driven into
exile, or killed—desubjectivized, denied any ontological continuity. Moreover,
a quarter of the children in exile are fatherless, which means that if they return
to Syria they have no claim to citizenship (which is granted only through the
father). 












37 Te Syrian Revolution 
The wars in Iraq and Syria have led to a dissolution of state borders between 
them. This points to the end of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided 
and distributed the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire to England and 
France (with the assent of Russia), creating “Syria” and “Iraq” as territorially 
discrete countries. This dissolution has opened the space for competition 
between religiously extreme groups, such as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria), which at one time conquered one-fourth of Iraq and much of the north 
of Syria. ISIS’s promise of a new Caliphate is likely to fail, but it has nonetheless 
succeeded in propagating a new vision of a pan-Arab political subject that unites 
around Islam. Its initial territorial victories were dependent on the failure of 
democratic revolution, but its future victories are likely to be in the domain of 
the imagination. 
That the Islamic State seeks to reach its goals through terror is one of the 
causes of the current refugee wave. Its policies of terror do not negate its appeal, 
which is to present itself in this chaos as a “transformative object.” Such an object 
offers an existential experience in which internal and external environments are 
transformed. One seeks a relation with such objects not to control or master 
them but to have an experience that promises to radically alter the self. ISIS 
offers a vision of return to mythic time, inspired by the time of the Caliphate in 
the eighth and ninth centuries. Mythic time is not subject to any reality testing; 
it is a dreamscape imagined as one of purity and pleasure. For followers, the idea 
of an Islamic state entails not domination but submission, including through 
death and martyrdom. Submission to ISIS promises to transform them and their 
environment, to give them a reason to live and a reason to die. ISIS enables 
this transformation by creating a new political field, imagined as one no longer 
marked by the disunity and the indignities that Muslims have experienced since 
the end of the mythical Caliphate. 
There are of course other competing visions for this field, but none (at
present) so powerful as that of ISIS. The many radical (religious) competitors
to ISIS also compete on its terrain of terror and religion but with less mythical
appeal and less generalizable visions. The current Syrian government has no
vision other than to stay in power. Bashar al-Assad cynically presents himself
as the Syrian Sovereign who will redo the social, restore its illusion of unity,
and guarantee the order of the masses, an order in the maternal register,
undifferentiated, without crowds, without democratic political subjects. For
most Syrians, Assad’s vision is both a promise of peace and an inner object
of dread—authoritarian, angry, resigned, intolerant, and cruel—too grotesque,
too frightening to think. What Assad’s vision actually portends is not a future
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but a return to the recent past, to the fighting among male heirs for leadership
that marked the pre-Assad family rule. 
What of the vision identified with social democracies of postwar Western 
Europe, constructed around the idea of the Enlightenment subject—free, 
secular, tolerant? It is, regrettably, mirrored nowhere in Syria today. Most of 
its articulate proponents were forced into exile even before the 2011 uprising. 
It would present a challenge both to Assad’s government and to the various 
opposition groups like ISIS if there were a military that backed it up, but there 
is not. The democratic vision, one should emphasize, has been integral to the 
imagination of Syrian subjects for nearly a century; even the political field in 
Syria has afforded few opportunities to citizens to actualize it. 
The exodus of Syrian citizens to new places enlarges the territory and 
imagination of the Syrian political field while dispersing the possibilities to 
become a political subject. Statelessness is hardly conducive to agency of any 
sort. Millions have already risked the flight to Europe and the West to find 
legal security, nurturance, and care. Millions of others are stuck in refugee 
camps in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, where the experience of arbitrariness 
and uncertainty augments the desubjectivization begun while living in the 
maelstrom of war within Syria. 
By the summer of 2015, of all the European countries considered destinations
for flight, Germany had become the preferred country—geographical place,
society, and state—safe and stable enough to promise a future. The hundreds of
thousands of refugees who arrived in Germany in 2015 found an initially warm
welcome. Upon arrival many held up a photo of Chancellor Angela Merkel. The
chancellor criticized for her coldness and lack of vision during the Greek debt
crisis negotiations had made the unpredictably bold decision to suspend legal
protocols and let the masses approaching German borders in. German society
responded in kind with massive volunteer support. This action surprised— 
and pleased—me, also, and my German friends. We were deeply moved. It
was spontaneous, unsolicited, not a result of opinion polling, not a marketing
device. I would think it was largely unconsciously motivated. What Syrians flee
is a crisis in paternal authority, and what they seek above all is an economic
future. What they see in Merkel, I suspect, is someone who promises a holding
environment and can assume the paternal function, now radically redefined
for Germany and Europe as a whole. In this very unexpected turn of events,
Germany offers for many Syrians the political field that Syria would be if turned
upside down: democratic, free from persecution, with rights, and a vision to
live in peace. 
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Te Disappearance of the Crowd and  
the Rise of Dissent in Tailand 
Tyrell Haberkorn 
Immanent analysis of protest under a coup regime 
On May 22, 2014, led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, a junta calling itself the 
National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) carried out the twelfth successful 
coup in Thailand since the end of the absolute monarchy on June 24, 1932.1 The 
May 22, 2014, coup was immediately preceded by six months of extended street 
protests and a roving occupation of key parts of Bangkok by a network of groups 
that called itself the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), yet was 
neither democratic nor of the people. The PDRC opposed the elected government 
of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and instead desired a more authoritarian 
government led by unnamed “good people.” The leaders of the PDRC claimed 
to engage in civil disobedience and to speak for the “great mass of the people” 
(muan mahachon), but they more accurately represented an increasingly violent 
protest composed of an elite few. The PDRC worked to generate sustained 
chaos that would topple Prime Minister Yingluck’s government and create the 
conditions for a coup. Reading Hannah Arendt’s writings on totalitarianism in 
light of the PDRC protests, historian Nidhi Eoseewong warned that they were 
creating the conditions for repression in excess of their stated desires.2 He was 
correct. 
Rather than only a regime in which their opponents were removed from 
politics, or participation in the imagination, debate, and rule of the polity, the 
only figures who participate in politics without risking arrest and imprisonment 
are those clad in military khaki and green. The coup by the NCPO inaugurated 
a dictatorship that employs tactics revived from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s as 
well as those that mark a new era of repression. In the remainder of this essay, 
Crowds
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I examine the founding protests organized by the New Democracy Movement 
(Prachathipatai Mai, NDM) and the arrests that followed as an instance of what 
Judith Butler, following Hannah Arendt, calls “the right to appear, and to claim 
to be part of the people of the nation in public space” (1966: 153–154). I joined 
the solidarity movement surrounding the arrest of the NDM members as a 
scholar-activist who writes about the history of state violence and has been at 
the fringes of struggles for social justice in Thailand for the last twenty years. 
I draw on that experience to trace the series of events leading to the release of 
the NDM activists. Despite the possible consequences of arrest, detention, and 
prosecution for coming together to form crowds in public, activists continue 
to do so. At moments when the number of those massed remains small and 
contained, the expected arrests have followed. But even the most repressive 
and arbitrary junta orders and legal instruments, it seems, may bend under the 
possibility of the expansion of protests and the development of a crowd. What 
might be called the tipping point, the magic number of people needed for the 
authorities to allow a crowd massed in public to remain, cannot be discerned. 
Instead, the power of the crowd as a formation of protest seems to be its unknown 
potential to grow in number or frequency and, in so doing, demonstrate a form 
of politics both against and in defiance of the regime. Throughout, I am also 
concerned with what it means to write an immanent analysis of protest against 
dictatorship during a time when the dictatorship remains in power. Unlike 
most of my research, which is oriented toward understanding the changes and 
continuities between the recent past and present, this essay is instead about the 
incomplete relationship between the present and a possible future. The temporal 
unboundedness of this essay means that it is impossible to gauge the success or 
failure of the NDM protests or the broader movement of which they are a part, 
but it is also an invitation to contribute to the imagination of opposition. 
Te emergence of the NDM 
I begin with the strictures placed on public assembly, let alone protest, by 
the NCPO, to highlight the very significance of the existence of the NDM. 
Suppression of political freedom is central, rather than incidental, to the NCPO’s 
rule. Martial law was declared two days prior to the coup and it remained in 
force until April 1, 2015. At that time, it was replaced by the use of Article 44 
of the 2014 Interim Constitution, which provides the junta with the power to 
take any action deemed necessary to preserve order and then makes it de facto 
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legal.3 The military placed itself in control of the executive, the legislature, and 
the judiciary. 
There are significant restrictions on freedom of speech; these restrictions are
delineated and maintained through both extensive use of the law and ongoing
threats and intimidation of students, resource rights activists, journalists, and
others who criticize the institution of the monarchy, collaboration between the
military and capital, or the coup regime itself. If the number of court cases can
be read as an indicator of the regime’s concern, the form of political expression
that most concerns the NCPO is neither criticism of the monarchy nor the junta
but the occupation of public space itself. The NCPO aims to prevent precisely
the kind of protest successfully used by the PDRC to create the conditions
for regime change. Two junta legal instruments, NCPO Announcement No.
7/2557, announced on the day of the coup, and Head of the NCPO Order No.
3/2558, which replaced it a year later, criminalize any public gathering of five
or more persons and make them punishable by imprisonment, a fine, or both.4 
Between the coup and the end of 2016, at least 254 individuals were charged
with violation of these instruments.5 
For the first three days following the coup, citizens poured out into the streets 
of Bangkok to protest with little concern of being arrested. After the prior coup, 
on September 19, 2006, there was a swift transition to a nominally civilian 
government and there were no prohibitions on protests or public discussions. 
Protests against the coup and calls for a return to democracy began immediately 
and continued until the emergence of the red shirt movement, which included 
supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, ousted in the coup, as 
well as a heterogeneous group of others, including radical democrats. Protests 
continued intermittently and the movement grew until elections were held in 
July 2011.6 But after the May 22, 2014 coup, police and soldiers began very 
quickly to arrest those who protested in large groups as being in violation of the 
prohibition on public gatherings of five or more persons. The forms of protest 
therefore had to change from large gatherings in usual locations of protest in 
the commercial and tourist areas of the city into forms of protest that eluded or 
confounded the authorities. The new protests were carried out by ad hoc groups 
of students, human rights activists, and citizens, including groups of aunties.7 
They used symbolic actions—reading 1984 in public, performing the three-
finger Hunger Games salute in public, and eating sandwiches—to protest the 
illegitimacy of the coup.8 In nearly every instance, the authorities responded by 
pulling the individuals engaged in these protests off the streets, but most were 
not charged with violation of the law. 
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During the first few months after the coup, I met observers outside Thailand 
who lamented the lack of a broad-based movement against the regime visible in 
the streets, but my response was always to wait and give it time. The lack of crowds 
in the streets was a combination of the fear of likely arrest and the ongoing overt 
support for the regime whose existence was indicated by the PDRC protests 
that preceded the coup. By the one-year anniversary of the coup, the protests 
transformed from diffuse and symbolic protests comprised of small groups of 
individuals into a new collectivity that went beyond calling the legitimacy of the 
coup regime into question to demanding an end to dictatorship and a return 
to democracy. These protests were led by the group of students and youth who 
formally established the NDM on June 24, 2015, the eighty-third anniversary of 
the end of absolute monarchy. This day is celebrated annually both in order to 
honor democracy and, also, given that the monarchy remains an anti-democratic 
influence in politics, to call for a greater fulfillment of democracy. The NDM’s 
platform is organized around the five broad principles of democracy, human 
rights, justice, public participation, and nonviolence, and remains fluid. During 
their first year of existence, which coincided with the junta’s second year of rule, 
the NDM held public seminars that pushed the boundaries of what can be said 
in public, organized a commemoration of the two-year anniversary of the coup, 
led solidarity campaigns for political prisoners, and campaigned around a draft 
constitution. The NCPO allowed most of the events to take place, albeit with 
unease and a heavy surveillance presence.9 
But there was a striking instance in which the NCPO put an abrupt end to 
the NDM’s initial activities. Activists who participated in a protest marking the 
beginning of the NDM in June 2015 were quickly arrested and charged in military 
court. The military court remanded all fourteen arrested activists for an initial 
period of twelve days of detention. Had the activists requested bail, the response 
of the military court in other cases indicates that it is likely that it would have 
been granted. But all fourteen refused to do so. They did so on the basis that 
their protests were an exercise of their fundamental rights and not in violation 
of the law. This claim was at once in opposition to the junta and aspirational in 
its imagination of a different definition of the people. Even though the protestors 
were small in number, the junta could not abide their sheer presence on the 
streets because they signaled the possibility of the occupation of the streets, and 
the polity, by a much larger group. 
The NDM activists were only held for one period of detention before the 
military court decided to release them. They were released because their 
detention prompted forays into protest by other groups. If the NDM activists 
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were not released, an even larger number of people might venture into the 
streets—better to release them. The criminal accusations remained, but the 
activists were no longer behind bars. I now turn to this initial NDM protest and 
the futures it may make possible in order to trace the NDM’s reimagination of 
society in defiance of the NCPO and the concomitant precision of the NCPO’s 
intolerance for the crowd. 
Into the streets in 2015 
Refusing the authority of the laws against protest, student activists in Bangkok 
and Khon Kaen, a provincial city in northeastern Thailand, held protests on the 
first anniversary of the coup, May 22, 2015. They were all swiftly dragged away 
and arrested by the police but released on the same day and ordered to report 
themselves to the police in June. On June 24, 2015, fourteen students attempted 
to go to the appointed police station in Bangkok but not to report themselves 
in relation to their arrests the prior month. Instead, they intended to file a 
complaint of police brutality in relation to these arrests. Ongoing surveillance by 
the regime of social media, where the planned event was announced, meant that 
the police knew they were coming. The police blocked off the station and would 
not allow the students, journalists, and others to enter. The fourteen students 
held a press conference outside the station and announced the formation of the 
NDM. They and several hundred supporters massed outside the police station 
for several hours, making speeches and singing. Many expected the police to 
quash the protest and arrest everyone present, or at least the organizers, but 
the police remained on the sidelines. As darkness began to fall, the crowd 
dispersed. The members of the fledgling NDM went to Suan Ngun Mi Ma, an 
activist gathering space in Thonburi, across the Chao Phraya River from the 
commercial and tourist areas of the city, to continue discussions and sleep. The 
authorities knew where they were staying and intelligence officials were nearby, 
but the night passed without arrests. 
Late afternoon on the next day, June 25, 2015, NDM members and their 
supporters crossed the Chao Phraya River and made a small circuit around 
politically significant locations close to Thammasat University, the site of 
both the birth of a student and people’s movement against dictatorship on 
October 14, 1973, and then a brutal repression of student activists on October 6, 
1976. The students’ first stop was the memorial sculpture garden to the October 
6, 1976 massacre on the Thammasat campus, and then they marched a short 
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distance down Ratchadamnoen Avenue to a monument to the October 14, 1973 
movement, before concluding at the Democracy Monument, an oddly difficult-
to-access monument in the middle of a six-lane traffic circle on Ratchadamnoen 
Avenue. At each stop along the way, they spoke briefly about the NDM and 
chatted with onlookers. Although there were intelligence officers present, by 
7:00 p.m., the NDM members had boarded a public bus to go back to Suan Ngun 
Mi Ma for the evening without any arrests taking place. 
The authorities did not wait to see what the fledgling NDM might do, where 
they might go, or whom they might talk to on the third day. Around 5:00 p.m. 
on the afternoon of June 26, 2015, over fifty military and police officials went to 
Suan Ngun Mi Ma and arrested the fourteen students. The students were first 
taken to a local police station to be accused of violating Head of the NCPO Order 
No. 3/2558 by assembling in a group of five or more persons and Article 116 of 
the Criminal Code, or sedition, a vague charge used against a range of those 
who criticize the junta. In the late evening, they were then taken to the Bangkok 
Military Court for an order for their remand to be issued. Although the arrest of 
the students just after the end of the workday on a Friday was clearly designed 
to impair their ability to access legal counsel, this had no effect and lawyers 
from Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, an organization established during the 
first few days after the coup to defend those targeted by the junta, were present 
throughout the proceedings.10 Just after midnight, the court ordered the students 
to be remanded for twelve days while an investigation was carried out into their 
crimes. All fourteen maintained that their actions were not crimes and refused 
to request bail. They asserted that they merely exercised their rights to freedom 
of expression and freedom of assembly, rights that are given in a democracy. In 
insisting that they possessed these rights, it may seem as though the NDM failed 
to notice that they were living in a dictatorship rather than a democracy. But 
their actions, and willingness to go to prison, were a claim to the very missing 
democracy that circumscribed their actions. 
Under the NCPO, prison, and even the sheer possibility of confinement, 
“remains the limit case of the public sphere, marking the power of the state 
to control who can pass into the public and who must pass out of it” (Butler 
2015: 173). Protests since May 22, 2014, are powerful because each person who 
chooses to protest risks prison. Sometimes spoken, sometimes joked about, 
sometimes left unsaid, this risk is always present when public protests take 
place. The military court judges did not agree with the NDM’s assessment that 
their actions were not crimes. Between midnight on 26 and dawn on 27, thirteen 
men were sent to the Bangkok Remand Prison and one woman was sent to the 
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Central Women’s Prison. Both prisons are located within the same complex 
on the northern edge of Bangkok filled with a range of prisons and detention 
centers for different categories and ages of detainees, canals, straggly bushes, and 
only a few trees to interrupt the blazing sun. 
Rather than suppressing dissent, however, the remand of the students had the 
opposite effect. By Monday morning, groups of faculty from universities across 
Bangkok and the surrounding provinces began to visit the detained students. 
Prior to the coup, anyone with a Thai citizen identification card or a passport 
could visit any prisoner as long as s/he was willing to wait in a long queue of 
visitors. Following the coup, the Department of Corrections instituted a rule 
that each prisoner could only be visited by a list of ten individuals s/he specified 
in advance. Faced with the rounds of academics, and then as the twelve days of 
remand ticked by, other groups of concerned citizens, the prison wardens elected 
not to enforce this rule. The prison visits were complemented by a flash protest 
at a BTS Skytrain station in which participants wrote messages of solidarity 
with the students on post-it notes and attached them to the station walls. The 
protest took place in a crowded station at evening rush hour, which made it easy 
for the participants to quickly leave the area and difficult for the authorities to 
distinguish between participants and commuters on their way home from work. 
The culmination of the protests calling for the students’ release, which posed 
risks first for the participants and then, it seems, for state officials, came on the 
late afternoon of July 7, 2015, the eve of the students’ appearance before  the 
military court for their second remand hearing. For the first time since the initial 
days following the coup, several hundred people assembled on the Thammasat 
University campus. I went with a group of activist friends and felt nervous at first. 
This was the first protest I went to after the coup—partially because I was worried 
about the risk that my own visibility as a foreigner would increase the possibility 
of being arrested and partially because I did not want to subject my friends and 
colleagues to that risk. But my fear soon evaporated in the atmosphere of the 
protest, which felt like a festival. Several hundred student activists, progressive 
academics, journalists, lawyers, human rights activists, and other interested 
people mingled and listened to music performances and speeches calling for the 
release of the fourteen activists. The events were clustered around the memorial 
sculpture garden to the October 6, 1976 massacre, one of the sites visited by the 
NDM less than two weeks prior. There were no uniformed police or military 
present, although members of various intelligence units were visible with their 
T-shirts advertising gun brands, ironed jeans, severe haircuts, and ostentatious 
photographing of everyone present. 
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The rainy season was well underway in July, and as dusk turned into night, 
it began to pour. Everyone present ran quickly for the cover of the overhang 
provided by the Faculty of Law, which adjoins the memorial sculpture garden. 
As soon as the audio equipment was up and running again, the speeches and 
music continued. Every conversation I had that evening centered on the same 
two topics: why we were being allowed to hold the protest and what would 
happen at the hearing the next morning. The police could have arrested everyone 
present since there were many more than five people present. Or they could 
have simply cut off the electricity to that part of the university campus, which 
they had chosen to do previously in order to prevent lectures and seminars on 
various topics. The atmosphere and sheer number of people massed together 
who were critical of the arrest of the NDM activists and the military regime in 
general made it feel, almost, for a moment, as though the clock had been turned 
back to the relatively open period prior to the coup when anyone could go out 
into the streets to protest. There were no guarantees that there would not be 
vigilante counter-protestors or that state officials would always respond justly 
to all protestors, but the streets themselves could be occupied without a baseline 
fear of being imprisoned for violating the law for doing so. The present came 
back forcefully that evening at Thammasat every time conversation turned to 
the possibility that the students’ detention could be renewed for another twelve 
days. There was no confidence that they would be released, and we talked about 
what kinds of actions and campaigns could be sustained through the next twelve 
days of detention if they were not released. As the night wore on, and rain 
intermittently fell, the crowd of supporters of the students and the intelligence 
officers all drifted home. We went home without daring to conclude what would 
happen the next morning. To assume that the students would be remanded for 
another twelve days was to adopt too hopeless a stance. But to be confident of 
their release seemed foolhardy. 
The next morning, the military court was fully blocked off so that supporters 
of the students could not enter the complex and instead stood under the blazing 
July sun outside the Ministry of Defense. The students stood firm in their refusal 
to request bail, but the surprise came when the investigating officers declined to 
request their further remand. The military court judges ordered the students 
to be released the next day. The release came as a surprise to many, myself 
included, because we assumed that the initial remand of the students reflected a 
willingness by the NCPO to take repressive action against its critics. The NCPO 
could have facilitated the release of the students at any time during the twelve-
day remand period, but they did not. During the days following the students’ 
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release, activists (and myself) reached a consensus about why the students were 
released and why the protest the night before their second remand hearing had 
been permitted. The most likely reason was because the NCPO feared that if 
the students were kept behind bars, more and more people would go out into 
the streets. The released students, as well as some of those who led the support 
campaigns for them, were visited and questioned by military officials over 
the coming weeks and months. The regime felt comfortable in harassing and 
intimidating people in private but remained unwilling, and perhaps afraid, to 
take any action, which might again push citizens out into the streets or onto the 
university campuses. If, as Butler (2015: 185) notes, “every claim we make to the 
public sphere is haunted by the prison, and anticipates the prison,” then every 
instance of imprisonment in coup-era Thailand may perhaps be haunted by a 
further possible claim to the public sphere. 
Toward the future 
As if unaware of the symbolism of the day, the authorities once again arrested a 
group of NDM activists on June 24, 2016, the eighty-fourth anniversary of the 
end of the absolute monarchy. During the intervening year, NDM carried out a 
series of protests and seminars and published a regular newsletter, To Overcome
(Kao Kham).11 Although several of their activities during the year led to arrests, 
in many cases, remand was not requested by the authorities and the activists 
always chose to request bail in the cases in which it was possible. The authorities 
obliged, perhaps wishing to avoid a repeat of the swift expansion of protests 
during the twelve days during which NDM activists were remanded in June 
2015. But both the remand of activists and another expansion of protests became 
unavoidable in June 2016. 
When the NCPO launched the coup on May 22, 2014, they also abrogated the 
existing constitution, put a short interim constitution into place, and began the 
process of drafting a new constitution. The first Constitution Drafting Committee 
(CDC) produced a draft in early 2015, which was not to their satisfaction, and 
so a second CDC was appointed that produced a draft viewed by the NCPO as 
viable in April 2016.12 Notably, both CDCs were comprised entirely of members 
appointed solely by the NCPO. This means that the people—those who would 
have to live under the constitution—did not have any input into its contents. 
The NCPO dealt with criticism of the drafting process by arguing that the 
people would have a chance to express their opinion about the draft by voting 
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on it in a referendum in August 2016; however, a Referendum Act passed by the 
NCPO-appointed National Legislative Assembly prohibited anyone other than 
the CDC or others designated by the NCPO from circulating information about 
the draft constitution. For example, seminars on the constitution organized by 
law or political science professors, workshops organized by nongovernmental 
organizations, and dissemination of information by previously active political 
parties to their membership were forbidden. Violation of the Referendum Act 
carried a possible punishment of up to ten years in prison. 
The NDM activists’ view was that the draft constitution was fundamentally 
dangerous to the possibility of future democracy in the polity and they were 
uninterested in the possible punishment.13 They produced a two-sided one-page 
flyer with a summary of the lengthy constitution and its concrete implications 
and, on June 24, 2016, went with a group of women workers’ rights activists 
to distribute the flyers in a market near an industrial estate. The authorities 
allowed them to do so for several minutes and then arrested thirteen activists. 
They were taken to the local police station and then transferred to the Bangkok 
Military Court for a remand hearing. News and video clips of the brief protests, 
their swift dispersal, and the transfer of the activists to custody immediately 
circulated via the social media accounts of the NDM and various journalists 
who were present. Six activists decided to request bail, which was granted by the 
court, but seven—all male student activists with the NDM—decided not to do 
so and were immediately sent to the Bangkok Remand Prison for twelve days of 
detention. 
Initially, the atmosphere following the arrests felt very different from the 
previous year. Instead of hundreds of people visiting the detained activists, 
visitors only numbered in the tens. After the first day, during which the prison 
authorities allowed all of the academics and activists who came to visit the 
activists to do so, including one foreign person (me), they decided to enforce 
the ten-person rule. Although small actions were held on university campuses 
across the country calling for the release of the seven NDM activists, they were 
not on the scale of the previous year’s actions. As the end of the first remand 
period began to draw near, many were concerned that the relative lack of 
public protest meant that the students would likely be held for another period 
of twelve days. As one colleague commented, the possible punishment of ten 
years’ imprisonment under the Referendum Act, as opposed to the six months 
for public assembly, may have been one of the factors. If one called for the release 
of those who had violated the Referendum Act, might one also be accused of 
violating it? 
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But another event at Thammasat University two days before the hearing
again seemed decisive. The hearing was scheduled for July 4, 2016, a Tuesday,
and the event was held on a Sunday afternoon so that more people could attend.
This time, anticipating possible rain, activists reserved a large auditorium on
the campus. Several hundred people gathered for an afternoon of impassioned
speeches by other NDM activists (including those who were granted bail)
calling for the release of their friends, political songs, and other critiques of
the regime and appeals to justice. NDM T-shirts, leftist books, and other
progressive political kitsch were sold outside the doors to the auditorium. Once
again, although many intelligence officials were present, there was not a large
presence of uniformed or armed officials and the electricity remained on for
the entire event. The program inside the auditorium ended shortly after sunset,
and everyone walked outside. We were given pale purple balloons to release
into the air. If we turned right, then we would walk off the campus and across
the street to Sanam Luang, a big grassy circle, and if we turned left, we would
reach the edge of the campus that borders the Chao Phraya River. News came
that there were phalanxes of police massed on Sanam Luang, and so we turned
left and walked to the edge of the campus next to the river. After another brief
speech calling for the release of the imprisoned activists, everyone released their
balloons at the same time and the reflections of the lights, balloons and river
were quietly beautiful. Similar to the year prior, everyone then drifted away back
to their lives. A friend and I caught a ferry across the river to eat rice porridge
and muse on why the protest event was allowed to take place without arrests
and what would happen at the remand hearing. The outcome seemed even less
certain than a year before. 
But again, the NCPO seemed unwilling to risk the expansion of protests. On 
the morning of July 4, 2016, the military court ruled that the students should 
be released while the investigation continued instead of holding them for 
another period of remand. All thirteen activists, along with another 194 people, 
have been charged and face criminal prosecution for allegedly violating the 
Referendum Act for speaking in public about the draft, sending analysis about 
the draft via mail, and other forms of dissemination of information about the 
draft deemed to be criminal. A little over a month after the release of the NDM 
activists, the draft constitution was passed in the referendum on August 7, 2016. 
Although there were no reports of overt tampering with the voting process, the 
prohibition on anyone other than the CDC or other NCPO appointees from 
distributing information or publicly discussing the draft means that it is difficult 
to assess the referendum as anything other than unfree. 
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At the beginning of 2017, as the third anniversary of the May 22, 2014 coup 
approaches, the visible opposition to the regime remains faint. The NDM and 
other small groups continue their opposition, but ongoing harassment and 
intimidation, and the threat of imprisonment and other forms of violent sanction, 
function to limit their growth. But if the specter of suppression limits opposition, 
so too does the specter of the emergence of an oppositional crowd suggest the 
NCPO’s possible future downfall. Despite the NCPO’s attempts to disappear 
the crowd, and even the possibility of the crowd, through the criminalization 
of public assembly, they have been unable to do so. Instead, latent potential 
crowds await the contingent moment(s) of their emergence. A crowd or crowds 
may be called forth by continued overt repression, the emergence of frustration 
with the local effects of NCPO policies, or another as-yet-unknown reason. It 
is impossible to predict if and how the regime of the NCPO will fall, but this 
is one clear possible fault line. As the moment approaches, or in preparation 
for it, documenting and considering the crowd’s potential can change how we 
understand assembly, dictatorship, regime change, and the multiple forms of 
politics animating dissent in a repressive polity. 
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Spectacles of Piety: Prayer and the Politics of 
Mass Arousal in Democratic Nigeria 
Ebenezer Obadare 
Preamble: Praying against enemies of state in Ekiti 
In December 2015, a few days before the Christmas holidays, Governor Peter 
Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti State hosted a prayer session on the grounds of the 
state’s government house. It was a difficult time in Ekiti, consistently ranked by 
commentators as one of Nigeria’s most politically turbulent states. It was also 
Fayose’s second tenure as governor. He took the reins from Dr. Kayode Fayemi in 
May 2015 after decrying the latter’s purported elitism and promising the state’s 
civil servants a return to the ostensibly happy era of his first tenure from May 
2003 to October 2006 when, he boasted, salaries were paid as and when due. 
But December 2015 saw Fayose clearly struggling to deliver on his campaign 
promises. For instance, by the time he convened the prayer session in question, 
civil servants in the state had not been paid their salaries for three months. It was 
not entirely the governor’s fault, of course. As the global price of oil cascaded, 
Nigeria, reliant on oil revenue to a sickening degree, was taking in considerably 
less cash, which meant that the federal government’s capacity to disburse funds 
to the state was hampered, which also meant that the state of Ekiti had no 
“allocation” from which it could discharge its own obligations. Ekiti’s situation 
was therefore not unlike that of other states across the country, and what the 
An earlier version of this chapter was presented as part of an invited panel on “Anthropology of 
the Crowd: Te I, the We, the US” at the American Anthropological Association (AAA) Annual 
Conference, Washington, DC, December 2014. Financial support for research that the paper draws 
on was provided by the New Directions in the Study of Prayer (NDSP) program of the Social Science 
Research Council (SSRC), New York, and the University of Kansas General Research Fund (GRF). 
I thank Megan Stefen for her close reading and helpful comments. I am grateful to Taline Cox, 
Wei Zhu, Candace West, Nancy Myers, Whitney Onasch, Janelle Williams, and Corinne Butler for 
sundry logistical support. For, among other things, her generosity with her time and ideas, this 
paper is gratefully dedicated to Joane Nagel. 
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governor did—paying the workers a percentage of their basic pay as “Christmas 
bonus”—was in fact what majority of the cash-strapped state governors had 
done. Still, critics of the state governor charged that the convocation of a special 
prayer session within the premises of the government house at that point in 
time was nothing but a ruse by the governor to distract attention from the state’s 
economic problems, particularly the state’s inability to pay its workers’ salaries. 
Whether the critics were right or not, a mere look at the cross section of
dignitaries at the special prayer session suffices to confirm that the governor
intended at least to have many of the state’s most prominent citizens at his side.
Among those in attendance were the state’s deputy governor, Dr. Kolapo Olusola;
the First Lady, Mrs. Feyisetan Fayose; the wife of the deputy governor, Mrs. Janet
Olusola; Secretary to the State Government, Dr. Mrs. Modupe Alade; Chief of Staff
to the governor, Barrister Dipo Anisulowo; and Special Adviser to the governor
on political matters, Alhaji Ademola Bello. But this being no ordinary prayer
session, there were also in attendance high-ranking naval officers, all suited up in
their official navy uniforms, police officers, a cross section of some of the leading
clerics in the state, several prominent politicians, and ordinary citizens. 
The capstone of the event was the special prayer for the state and against 
its “enemies.” Given the situation in the state, there were only a few surprised 
glances when a clearly emotional Governor Fayose, clad in all white buba and
sokoto, went down on his knees in the middle of the yard, his right hand clenched, 
the left holding on tightly to the voice microphone. This was his favored “prayer 
warrior” pose, and as he inveighed against the state’s “detractors” and invited 
“God’s judgment” on them, the crowd, numbering in hundreds, followed his 
cue. There was a collective charge even as individual supplicants embraced 
their idiosyncratic poses—some stamped on the ground insistently, some raised 
both hands, a few (like the governor) sank to their knees, while others spoke 
passionately in tongues. In short order, a strident clamor of supplication tore the 
solemn air of the government house premises. 
Spectacles like this have become very common since Nigeria returned to 
civil rule in May 1999, a period that coincided with the explosion of Pentecostal 
Christianity in the country. One legitimate way to view such spectacles is 
as ordinary proof of the manner in which Pentecostal forms have become 
rapidly insinuated into official ceremonies all over the country. For instance, 
the modality of the Ekiti special prayer session—its orgiastic emotionality 
and sensationality—is a recognized fixture of African Pentecostal devotional 
performance. So, also, is the event itself: the resort to prayer emerging here as an 
expression of Pentecostal belief in the power and efficacy of prayer. 
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What do these religious ceremonies—which I describe in this chapter as 
spectacles of piety—typically convoked at the instance of leading public officials, 
signify? How do such ceremonies advance our understanding of what I call 
religious politicality, meaning the ways in which those occupying formal political 
office manipulate religious symbols and performances for political purposes? 
What insights into the religiopolitical economy do they afford? Who is the 
audience for these spectacles? What implied and unwitting ideological effects 
do these spectacles have on that audience? Finally, what can we learn from these 
spectacles about crowds and about this animated but ultimately rather peaceable 
crowd in particular? In what follows, I will try to pursue these questions, using 
the Ekiti prayer session as my immediate empirical material, but also, where 
necessary, drawing on similar examples from contemporary Nigeria. 
Contending trajectories 
These spectacles are undeniably freighted with political and symbolic meaning. 
For instance, the image of “a whole governor” (as the Nigerian expression goes) 
kneeling down in public can be seen as a demonstration of calculated humility, 
ostentatiously staged to curry acceptance in a social context in which humility, 
especially by highly placed public officials and the “powerful” in general, is seen 
as a virtue. In going down on his knees, Governor Fayose was merely following 
the path of ostentatious humility well trodden by other state dignitaries, most 
notably former president Goodluck Jonathan, who, on at least two occasions in 
2012 and 2015 respectively, publicly knelt down for prayers before the General 
Overseer of the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), Pastor Enoch 
Adejare Adeboye. It goes without saying that insofar as ostentatious humility1— 
what Jean-Pascal Daloz (2006) describes as “conspicuous modesty”—is inspired 
by the performer’s need for acceptance by the public; it must be linked to their 
designs on political survival. For instance, President Jonathan’s diligent, if 
unpolished, courting of Pastor Adeboye, and indeed the cream of the Pentecostal 
elite throughout his tenure, has to be seen as part of his determination to leverage 
the latter’s enhanced social status and control over large congregations. 
No less analytically fruitful is the space in which these spectacles are hosted, 
considering that it is almost impossible to contemplate global Pentecostalism 
as an “aesthetic experience” (Largier 2009) or indeed its entire presentation as 
a “sensorium” (Meyer 2012) without thinking about space. Olufunke Adeboye’s 
work on the conversion of cinema halls in urban centers across Nigeria into 
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spaces of worship highlights “how Pentecostals ventured out of conventional 
church halls into general open grounds, and their appropriation of spaces 
hitherto demonized as ‘abode(s) of sin for worship’” (2012: 146). For her, 
“Pentecostals need to register their presence publicly and symbolically possess 
such public sites for Christ as a way of publicly asserting their identity” (156). 
While I think she is correct, it is equally plausible that common logistics and 
economic calculations (the crowd for the average open-air crusade is usually 
tremendous, often numbering in the hundreds of thousands) rather than a 
simple desire to sanctify or “symbolically possess” account for the fact that an 
increasing number of Pentecostal mega events tend to take place in “demonized 
spaces” like sport stadia. 
At any rate, given the symbolic interest in sanctification, the hosting of a 
blatantly Pentecostal ceremony within the premises of a government house must 
feel like mission accomplished for Pentecostals who believe that the physical space 
of the government house is in fact one in special need of cleansing. This belief 
is intelligible in a cultural paradigm in which not only are power and politicians 
seen as innately amoral, government houses in particular are associated in the 
public mind with shady deals, oaths, cultic ceremonies, and all sorts of dark 
rituals. In addition, a Pentecostal ceremony convened by the symbolic “father of 
the state” himself must be especially gratifying for Pentecostals, who may rightly 
point to the governor as a unique “capture,” a “symbolic possession” no longer 
available to both the denominational and nondenominational competition. 
When spectacles of piety are convoked elsewhere—in a stadium, say—the 
associations can be more poignant, perhaps because the visual backdrop is 
usually strikingly different. No matter the dark monsters supposedly lurking 
in state houses and government offices, at least they (the state houses, not the 
monsters) are easy on the (naked, not spiritual) eye, what with their carefully 
manicured lawns, freshly painted walls, and an unmistakable air of wealth and 
good living. One can hardly say the same about most soccer stadia in Nigeria, 
many of which, in their gross dereliction and utter neglect, afford a different 
sort of testimony to the failings of Nigerian politics and politicians. For example, 
on February 15, 2013, Emmanuel Uduaghan, governor of Delta State at the 
time, convened and led a two-day “prayer retreat” at the Stephen Keshi stadium 
in Asaba, the state capital. An estimated 30,000 citizens of the state filled the 
stadium for an event that promised the “Power to Recover All.” Unwittingly, 
photographs of the event tell the story of an uncompleted stadium, the victim 
of a contract wrangling. The governor did not miss the opportunity to ask for 
prayer against “the spiritual inhibition stalling the progress of the project.” 
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Nevertheless, whether held in a swanky official residence or a dilapidated 
stadium, such prayer sessions are wonderful avenues for an elaboration of what 
Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift in their work on the affective machinery describe as 
“affective proximity” or “momentary neural binding” between state officials and 
the electorate (2013: 15, 168). This happens as, even if only for a fleeting moment, 
both the governor and the governed occupy the same physical space, join hands 
in prayer, press flesh, and find temporary unity in a “relation of conviviality” 
(Mbembe 1992: 24). Yet, even as voices are raised in prayer, furtive glances and 
complimentary cards are exchanged between social agents eager to “connect,” 
placing such events firmly within the currents of Nigeria’s omnipresent patron-
client networks.2 
As an instance of what David Morgan (2011) has described as a “community 
of feeling,” these spectacles provide evolving illustrations of how the political 
shades into the religious and vice versa and how the notionally “political” or 
“religious” are dynamically constituted. The political nature of these events is 
unquestionable. But what is even more fascinating within that political context 
is the variety of specific political uses to which, depending on personal taste and 
social circumstance, various public officials put these events. For instance, Udom 
Emmanuel, the governor of Akwa Ibom State, chose the June 2016 monthly 
prayer meeting to announce both the conclusion of plans to dissolve the state’s 
Local Government Transition Committee and news that three new refineries in 
the state would soon begin operation. By collapsing any assumed distinctions 
between the religious pulpit and the official platform, Governor Emmanuel 
guides us into the unstable conglomeration that is the evolving agency of the 
state governor: part public official, part social engineer, part moral guardian, 
part theologian. 
A note on context 
A better appreciation of these public prayers might be gained by situating them 
within the evolving theologico-political milieu of Africa. Scattered references 
have been made supra, but I make the following two observations as a way of 
further underscoring the context. The first observation is to note the emergent 
social ecology that has seen Pentecostalism make significant inroads into power 
and the social imaginary across the continent and particularly in countries like 
Nigeria, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Ghana, and increasingly, South Africa. Amid what 
seems like a “democratization of charisma” (Asamoah-Gyadu 2004), not only 
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do state and society continually crisscross but also the religious idiom is all-
encompassing, which reinforces the accepted wisdom of the literature on the 
conjoining of the scared and the profane. More to the point, such is the power 
of the emergent religious public that, for political leaders and other secular 
authorities, an open declaration of religious allegiance or, more specifically in 
certain social contexts, an ostentatious affirmation and performance of one’s 
“born-again” status is fashionable, which confirms Pentecostalism’s emerging 
status as “a prestige good” (Daloz 2006). 
The second, and closely related, observation is that the emerging identity and 
popularity of prayer is perhaps the most compelling element within the nascent 
religious formation in Africa. In David Maxwell’s study of the Pentecostal 
movement in Zimbabwe, prayer is an inalienable element in the transformation 
of Pentecostals into a community of believers and the means through which “their 
struggle for betterment is acted out” (2006: 197). Other studies have addressed 
prayer as “a means of reconstructing nationalism as a spiritual obligation” (Oha 
2005); ritual prayer as a means through which Pentecostalism creates modern 
consumers (Lindhardt 2009a); prayer as a tool of deliverance from “occult forces” 
(Lindhardt 2009b); and prayer as an instrument of democratic mobilization by 
a resurgent civil society (Obadare 2012). In a recent study (Obadare 2016), I 
have formulated prayer as the centerpiece in a new organization of devotion 
by Christian and Islamic groups and as an interesting sign of convergence 
in the “dialogic constitution” of Christianity and Islam (Larkin 2008, 103; cf. 
Hirschkind 2006; and Mahmood 2005). In this latter regard, prayer practices, 
forms, and performances are sites for the staging of interfaith struggles and at the 
same time conduits for the incorporation of exogenous forms and modalities. In 
this chapter, a specific form of public prayer—what I’ve been calling spectacles 
of piety—is analyzed as an aspect of the complex political repertory of political 
elites in Nigeria. 
Te argument 
We owe the resurgence of interest in religious crowds partly to growing scholarly 
interest in Pentecostal megachurches (see, for instance, Stevenson 2013). Birgit 
Meyer’s work in this regard focuses on their affective dimension, particularly 
the “kinds of religious sensations, in the sense of feelings … generated when 
religions adopt new sensational forms such as the spectacle” (2008: 713). 
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This chapter draws attention to an important but largely neglected political 
dimension of such gatherings. To do that, I note the specific pedigree of the 
public prayer sessions in question here as ecumenical (by invocation, if not 
in practice) spectacles “ordered” by important public officials.3 This sets 
them apart from conventional religious gatherings organized by particular 
religious denominations. Paradoxically, however, it makes them sociological 
cousins of other state-directed crowdsourcing activities directly targeted at the 
“manufacturing” of civic solidarity. A good example is the series of one-million-
man marches organized to drum up support for the ultimately abortive efforts of 
the late Nigerian military despot, Sani Abacha (1993-–1998), to transform into a 
civilian president (Obadare 2005). 
My three main arguments flow directly from this initial postulation of such 
spectacles as politically laden events as follows: 
I argue, first, that these events constitute rituals of demobilization propelled by 
the desire to create “an obsequious flock” (Canetti 1984). This can happen through 
the performance of what I have already described as ostentatious humility. The 
claim here is that insofar as it entails a politician actually repudiating the very 
basis of his authority (as seen for example in various “humble” admissions that 
only God can actually do what they were statutorily elected to do, in short by 
confessing to incapacity), ostentatious humility becomes effectively a project of 
avoidance, the staging of a ruse that subtly extends the ideology of the state, 
disguises its impunities, and hence furthers its legitimation. Furthermore, the 
cause of demobilization may be advanced through constructed transparency, 
as when a public official puts before a sympathetic crowd “all the facts” of a 
controversial subject as a way of preempting public discussion of them and 
legitimating the official position on them. This was arguably the case with 
Governor Uduaghan of Delta state (discussed above) in the matter of the 
uncompleted Stephen Keshi stadium. In the end, the governor succeeded in 
selling the idea that delay over the completion of the project had nothing to do 
with financial mismanagement, as his critics alleged, but with an unspecified 
“spiritual inhibition.” 
Second, I argue that spectacles of piety have a target audience by which I 
mean that they are ideological “plays” intended for a clear group of “consumers.” 
That audience may include not only the immediate participants but also, and 
perhaps more importantly, distant observers who are invited to behold the piety 
and humility of the governor. In actual fact, one may rightly surmise that it is 
this combined piety and humility that is on “display” in such spectacles. In this 
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way, the staging of public prayer falls within the complex described by Peter 
Sloterdijk (2013) as the “psychotechnics” of power. 
Third, because spectacles of piety are ideological “plays,” they are political
scripts staged in anticipation of definite ideological effects, with the most
desired effect being the production of manipulable political subjects. They
are, therefore, technologies of governance, similar to other activities political
leaders engage in (like starting a foreign war) with the aim of distracting the
public. 
Crowds: Between irrationality and pose 
The argument staked out thus far on the uses of spectacles of piety for political 
manipulation would seem to place me firmly within the camp of authors who 
have taken a rather dim view of the crowd and mass audiences in general. For 
such authors, what stands out about the crowd—and indeed its distinguishing 
psychological attribute—is its irrationality and suggestibility. The pioneering 
work in this regard is the French sociologist Gustave Le Bon’s The Crowd: A 
Study of the Popular Mind, originally published in 1896. For Le Bon, something 
happens when an ordinary—and ordinarily rational—individual becomes part 
of a crowd: 
By the mere fact that he forms part of an organized crowd, a man descends several 
rungs in the ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in 
a crowd, he is a barbarian—that is, a creature acting by instinct. He possesses 
the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism 
of primitive beings, whom he further tends to resemble by the facility with 
which he allows himself to be impressed by words and images—which would be 
entirely without action on each of the isolated individuals composing the crowd- 
and to be induced to commit acts contrary to his most obvious interests and his 
best-known habits. An individual in a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains 
of sand, which the wind stirs up at will. (2002: 8) 
Le Bon’s view of the crowd as “irrational,” “conservative,” even “dictatorial,” was 
apparently justified by events in pre–Second World War Europe where German 
Nazism and Italian fascism caught fire amid delirious crowds. The sight may 
have informed the English writer and philosopher Aldous Huxley’s Le Bon-
esque view of crowds as a herd (cf. Ward 1924), an irrational lump susceptible to 
the whims of malevolent authority. Wrote Huxley: 
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When crowd-delirium is exploited for the beneft of governments and orthodox 
churches, the exploiters are always very careful not to allow the intoxication to go 
too far. Te ruling minorities make use of their subjects’ craving for downward 
self-transcendence in order, frst, to amuse and distract them and, second, to 
get them into a sub-personal state of heightened suggestibility. Religious and 
political ceremonials are welcomed by the masses as opportunities for getting 
drunk on herd-poison, and by their rulers as opportunities for planting 
suggestions in minds which have momentarily ceased to be capable of reason or 
free will. (Huxley 1952: 319) 
Le Bon’s and, ipso facto, Huxley’s approach to understanding crowds and crowd 
psychology has been criticized by other scholars, notably Rudé (2005), who 
followed very closely in the footsteps of Georges Lefebvre (1934), in particular the 
latter’s eagerness to draw “a sharp distinction between ‘crowd’ as an involuntary 
social gathering, e.g. people queueing for food or talking after church, and 
‘assembly’ as a more deliberate voluntary association, e.g. political meeting” 
(Holton 1978, 220). Nonetheless, skepticism about the agency of crowds and 
specifically their presumed susceptibility to “political seduction” has continued 
to echo in work that addresses democratic populism (see, for instance, Vincent 
2011; cf. Furedi 1973). 
A rejection of the presumed innate savagery of the crowd and a more positive
appraisal of its radical potential seems to be the guiding motif of recent critique
of neoliberal hegemony. The key work in this regard is Multitude: War and
Democracy in the Age of Empire (2004) by philosophers Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri. Working in the same register, Mazzarella pursues “the social
potential of group energies that relies neither on the fortress of the autonomous
liberal subject (crowd theory) nor on a principled but critically disabling
attachment to immanent, unmediated potentiality (multitude theory)”
(2010: 698). And, as it turns out, AbdouMaliq Simone’s analysis of “people
as infrastructure” in urban South Africa (2004) is in part, if not indeed, an
invitation and a philosophical nudge toward a sympathetic understanding of
massed bodies. 
A similar rejection of a simplified understanding of the crowd as an irrational 
horde seems to undergird Achille Mbembe’s (1992) notion of “intimate tyranny.” 
Mbembe appears interested less in affirming the reasonableness of “ordinary 
people” in Africa than in underscoring how complex their social and political 
practices are. He begins by acknowledging that “people are always trapped in 
a net or rituals that affirm tyranny, and secondly, these rituals however minor 
are intimate in nature” (1992, 22). However, this loop of tyranny is never closed 
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because “ensnarement” is always counterbalanced and undermined by “evasion” 
or “avoidance.” As a result, what he refers to as “the simulacrum” is in fact 
the dominant modality of transactions between the state and society, or between 
the rulers and those who are supposed to obey. Tis is what makes postcolonial 
relations relations of conviviality, but also of powerlessness par excellence—from
the point of view either of the masters of power or of those whom they crush. 
(Mbembe 1992: 24, italics in original) 
Taken with the ethnographic encounters described above, we are led to the 
conclusion that such occasions are a “dance” in which all participants, from 
the state governors through the religious clerics and the military officers to 
the ordinary citizens, are cognizant of their “roles.” Such a conclusion is not 
unreasonable. After all, the way in which such events are also an occasion 
or opportunity for political networking has been acknowledged. However, 
Mbembe’s point actually precedes that, as he seems to be suggesting (at least in 
my reading), ultimately, participation in these spectacles cannot result in a net 
loss for ordinary people who are merely feigning docility as part of the smokes-
and-mirrors economy of “the simulacrum.” On this view, not only is the crowd 
aware of its being manipulated, it is also simultaneously carrying on its own 
manipulating. 
Now, there is great value in not seeing ordinary people as effete subjects totally 
lacking in agency or invention. But we should be anxious about the analytic and 
philosophical implications of a social flattening in which there are no winners 
and losers – such a flattening means that the real consequences and intentions 
of elite repertoires and technologies to deflect dissent are overlooked. The 
overriding aim in this chapter is to show how religious belief and feelings can be 
mobilized to deflect attention, create a discursive smokescreen, and eventually 
mold a specific kind of political subjectivity. 
Conclusion 
Because crowds are protean phenomena with heterogeneous pedigrees and 
constantly changing forms and behaviors, it is difficult to speak of a “typical” 
crowd. Not only are no two crowds ever the same, as a matter of fact the same 
crowd, altering in nature and form, may exhibit contrasting features in the 
course of its evolution within a period of time. This is why, historically, crowds 
have been a moving target, analytically speaking. We see confirmation of this 
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inherent fluidity in the examples referenced here—all unquestionably political, 
yet deployed in alliance with various local political permutations. 
Nevertheless, and as already shown, we can identify certain commonalities 
that speak to their coherence as carefully staged spectacles of piety. To this end, 
these spectacles afford us some tentative and rather limited insights into the 
construction of a narrow category of religious crowds. As already emphasized, 
the backdrop to these, and arguably the social register within which such 
spectacles are elaborated, is the explosion of Pentecostalism as a denominational 
force. Kramer’s work in a Latin American context (2005) and Texas Governor 
Rick Perry’s 2011 “Days of Prayer for Rain in the State of Texas”4 show that the
Nigerian scenarios are hardly unique, that Pentecostalism is no stranger to this 
sort of “staging of power,” and that some of the conclusions from Nigeria may 
well find resonance in seemingly alien regional and cultural contexts. 


















Crowds and Transformations: On the  
Pious Crowds of the Hajj 
Abdellah Hammoudi 
When I started the preparations for my participation in the hajj in March– 
April 1999 (Hammoudi 2006: 25–36), I was familiar with the pilgrimage crowd 
scenes in Mecca. By then those scenes had been a must for the world media 
for many years. Alongside pictures of the throngs, there was the omnipresent 
image of the dense circles of white-clad pilgrims moving around the Kaaba, now 
a planetary feature. Before joining the mass of pilgrims, I had—like everyone 
else—participated in numerous crowds, many organized, many spontaneous. 
In this chapter I focus on the phenomenon of the crowd as I experienced it
first in Medina and then in Mecca, during my participation in the hajj. I will
call it, for want of a better word, “pious crowds” and use the plural form, as in
the title, because this crowd often divides in several ones. The hajj starts as an
organized crowd, yet it frequently turns into a spontaneous one. My aim is to
look closely at the passage from the organized to the spontaneous in order to
describe the process of transformation. I borrow the notion of the spontaneous
from Elias Canetti’s famous work, Crowds and Power (1984). In this book the
author devotes a large section to the hajj. He approaches it through a mechanistic
paradigm he derives from the dynamics of crowd gathering. However the kind
of transformations I describe during the passages from the organized to the
spontaneous leads me to question Canetti’s approach by privileging processes
with moments of practical reflexivities. This enables a move away from
Canetti’s unconscious mechanics, influenced as they are by the functionalist
and structuralist worldviews prevalent at the time he wrote his work. 
Many thanks to Megan Stefen for the editing of this draf. August 14, 2015 
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Documenting the passage from the organized to the spontaneous, I 
reconsider a number of Canetti’s assumptions, particularly his pendulum-like 
swing between individual separateness and crowd as liberation. There is a 
mechanical shifting that goes with his notion of “discharge.” The first section 
of the chapter develops these points; the second examines the transformations 
of the hajj crowd. It is my aim to show how a large crowd morphs into several 
different ones, that is, how a crowd becomes multiple and multidirectional. This 
multiplicity and multidirectionality can only be understood, I think, if we look 
at it through the idea that processes are open-ended phenomena in spite of the 
usual formalization of ritual by traditions. The hajj crowd follows strict ritual 
rules yet undergoes many transformations; its very movements are animated by 
unceasing becomings. Moreover, change and transformation here occur within 
and despite the government of the pilgrimage and the very material conditions 
in which the rituals are performed. In the last section of this work, I make some 
brief remarks on the use of the concept of becoming in anthropology. Specifically 
I want to raise questions regarding rules and material strictures. 
Reconsidering some premises 
Te pendulum swing between separateness and merger 
The hajj is the most organized and most surveilled mass event I know of 
firsthand. Because of the scale of the expected crowds—some 3 million 
pilgrims—and also perhaps because of the surveillance, a fear of being alone 
in the pilgrimage was palpable in the very early stages of the preparation for 
the trip. The hajj bureaucracies, it is true, required that we form groups of six 
for manifold purposes, chief among them were lodging and supervision—both 
spiritual and managerial. But the fear came to the open in the (relatively small) 
crowds that gathered around the offices in charge of the administration of this 
complex journey. Logistics and security were paramount for the Saudi state and 
for every state that sends a significant numbers of people to the Holy Lands of 
Islam. Also, the inculcation of the rituals before the trip was crucial. We were 
drilled on how to perform the complex actions of worship, staggered on several 
days, and performed in several places (Hammoudi 2006: 45–46 and map 69). 
So I had to join several crowds for this preparation. One of them for the
constitution of “the pilgrim file” gathered in front of the Governor’s Office
in the city of Temara in Morocco, where I had to register. Here everybody
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came for the same purpose and hoped to leave as soon as possible. However
we also lingered for other purposes: many of us, and especially those who were
unable to read and write, searched for information (Hammoudi 2006: 32–33).
As I mentioned before, we had to form a group of six without which it was
impossible to proceed. Soon enough I realized that the men who approached
me for that purpose did it with the same preoccupations. Beside obvious
conveniences like companionship, trust, and so on, it was good, I was told, to
be together, among people who know each other: “One never knows, with so
many people there ….” 
Each of us, it seems, wanted a nucleus to retreat to after the crowd, even as we 
also envisioned doing things alone. Here I must say I was probably the one who 
went it alone more often, in forays around town. My work as an anthropologist 
was an important reason for this. However, the people in my group, like myself, 
didn’t feel as strongly the urge to avoid touch and closeness, a compulsion 
Canetti insists on, in contrast to an equal compulsion, according to him, to 
jump in the crowd, as a form of liberation (Canetti 1984: 15–16). Indeed, the 
compulsion to avoid touch, to guard distinctions and hierarchies never was as 
stringent for us as the one he depicts, perhaps largely due to his Austrian and 
European experience. From this perspective, Canetti’s premise of experiencing a 
pendulum swing between guarding the frontiers of the self on the one hand and 
jumping into the crowd as liberation from separateness on the other hand seems 
unduly universalized. Among Moroccans, and indeed many pilgrims from other 
parts of the world, that premise, at least in the way it is formulated, did not hold. 
What does “discharge” deliver? 
I departed with scores of others from a crowded special hajj terminal in Rabat. 
There were a few sporadic and rather timid collective protests about delays, but 
a pilgrim must avoid “quarrelling” as we were constantly reminded. We landed 
in the very crowded Jeddah airport and were immediately sent to Medina by 
bus, a long journey. However, as soon as we were settled in the room assigned to 
us, we went out to reach the Prophet’s Mosque. We were immediately in a crowd 
streaming from all the streets and boulevards toward the same place of worship. 
This streaming was slow, powerful, and serene. “The entire Muslim community 
is here, what a day! And here, the Mosque!” Abbas exclaimed, overcome with 
joy as his eyes welled up with tears. I was deeply touched too. The white human 
flood filled the gigantic plaza around the building and the immense mosque. 
Like Abbas and Salah, I felt utterly free within this togetherness. As many others 
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have said, one feels like a child “relieved from the chores (soucis) of life,” or “what 
a feeling of happiness, free at last [from everything else] to worship (ibada).” 
This liberation however also came with hyper shopping. The crowd instantly 
transformed from a worshipping crowd into a shopping one, and vice versa. One 
could feel the energies deployed in both (Hammoudi 2006: 67–93). Shopping, 
I came to realize, was part of a spending in excess. Calculation was defied in 
both worshipping and shopping. Spending in excess went with the sense of 
being returned to youth and spending one’s forces within the crowd. Finally this 
expense in excess (to borrow a familiar word from Georges Bataille) and this 
spending of energy ran across the spectrum of all manners of living: walking, 
running, worshipping, shopping, staying awake, going to sleep late at night, 
getting up very early—all of it was deemed “sacrifice” (tadhiya). 
This brings us to Canetti’s notion of “discharge.” Should we want to keep the 
term, we would have to include in it actions, which break through after exertion 
in the crowd, for example, utterances, which are quite personal and unusual. I 
quote one instance from our leaving Medina, in the bus bound for Mecca: 
Abbas, who had chosen to sit next to me afer putting his wife next to a lady 
we had met, jumped and strained every time the mosque appeared. He would 
exclaim loudly, then burst into tears which quickly turned into sobs, “Tere it 
is, your mosque, O Prophet … O my love, O Messenger of God!” Abbas wept 
anew each time he glimpsed a wall or minaret of the mosque. “Tere it is, O my 
brother, there it is.” He was inconsolable and called on me forcefully. (Hammoudi 
2006: 125–129) 
Here, it seems, a space opens up, within the crowd and simultaneously removed 
from it. It was a space in which Abbas called on me to witness some givens 
of a pious self. The word “given” should be taken to mean what was given to 
perception: movements, words, and sentences uttered in voice, in specific forms 
(injunctive, exclamatory, demonstrative). Also sobs: sounds and body quakes 
in rhythmic and random succession. And perception includes vision, audition, 
tactility, smell, conjunctive and disjunctive motility; all coalesced in a sort of new 
dimension as Merleau-Ponty evokes: “Do we know whether tactile experience 
and visual experience can be joined without an inter-sensory experience?” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012: 228). The philosopher frames the question here in the 
context of intersubjectivity, but at this stage he already notes, “Perhaps there are, 
either in each sensory experience or in each consciousness, some ‘phantoms’ 
that no rationality could explain away” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 228). Further on, 
in The Visible and the Invisible (1969), he would deepen this idea and outline/ 
sketch out a new dimension: that of being beyond the duality of subject/object, 
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precisely in the phenomenon of feel-see-touch, that is, of seeing beyond the 
unity of being. 
This is the space that opened up: intensely illuminated walls or white minarets 
suddenly appeared against the staggered chiaroscuro of the city planes, only 
to disappear, then reemerge at different angles and vanish again and again, in 
the reverse motion of our bus, until we reached the highway. Such an opened 
space encompassed much more: it encompassed us as well, Abbas, myself, the 
half-asleep pilgrims in white, the driver, the roaring and rolling machine in that 
night. In fact, the opened space, in this instance, is virtually unlimited and—this 
is crucial—amplified by the work of death. Indeed the hajj is sacrifice and, as 
such, a gateway to death. This being so, Abbas’s voice called for the slice of crowd 
riding the bus to witness it. It escapes the mechanics Canetti, after many others, 
adjudicates as a permanent attribute to crowds. For that very reason, the crying 
and sobbing spread to many pilgrims, who entered and left the crying circles at 
their own pace. A mute sort of reflexivity appears, contingent on moments and 
transformations, here from big to small, and a fast moving, exhausted crowd of 
seated people in a hot bus. 
Crowds and intensifcations 
A crowd of 3 million breaking into crowds of difering size: Te 
organized and the spontaneous 
We arrived in Mecca well ahead of the hajj proper to perform Omra: basically 
Circumambulation around the Kaaba in the center of the Great Holy Mosque and 
the running (sa’ye) between two adjacent places, Safa and Marwa. Afterward, we 
got out of the ritual white garb to lead an “ordinary” life of praying, reading the 
Koran, and following sermons. We lived in a room assigned by a hajj company. 
Our life was mostly devoted to worship but also—for me—to contemplating the 
Kaaba and the human circular waves. And frequenting the gigantic market, as 
we did in Medina. We went to the hajj proper ten days later by redonning the 
white garb and heading toward Mina and Arafat. 
The 3 million pilgrims gathered there. In a sense, it was the same crowd. 
However, apart from this gathering, the hajj “pious crowd” subdivides into slices 
of crowds because not all pilgrims accomplish all rites at the same moment. 
During the Circumambulation, Sacrifice, and Stoning of the Pillars, pilgrims 
may separate and complete these rites at different times. However, the station of 
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Arafat gathers all pilgrims at the same place, on the same day, and at the same 
moment. This is a mandatory rule. In what follows, I will successively address the 
three major concentrations of pilgrims: crowds at the Kaaba and Great Mosque, 
crowds at Mina, and third, the concentration at Arafat some 10 miles further 
East. In the order of ritual succession, the stoning and sacrifice have to take place 
after Arafat. For the sake of clarity, I will recount the Stoning before that crucial 
station. I briefly present Circumambulation, Stoning, and our stay in Mina, and 
dwell in some detail on the “Standing upon Arafat,” the sine qua non of the hajj. 
Before proceeding further, let me quote Canetti’s quasi-mythological 
evocation of the spontaneous crowd to throw in sharp relief the contrast with 
the organized crowd of the hajj: 
Te crowd, suddenly there where there was nothing before is a mysterious and 
universal phenomenon. A few people may have been standing together—fve, 
ten or twelve, not more; nothing has been announced, nothing is expected. 
Suddenly everywhere is black with people and more and more come streaming 
from all sides as though streets had only one direction. (Canetti 1984: 16) 
The packed circles around the black-clad cubicle (ka’ba) never stop; they are fed 
by constant arrivals who replace people who leave once their rite accomplished. 
However everyone presses to arrive at the cubicle and the black stone encased in 
one of its corners. So the crowd is both organized and spontaneous. Although 
everyone presses toward the center, this crowd never disbands, since it feeds on 
the millions who come at different times for the same purpose. Also, many more 
people come back to watch it. Unlike Canetti’s spontaneous crowd, the hajj is 
expected as both a rite and a sight. 
The move to Mina collects everyone for some days in a city of tents and gated 
compounds before the day of the “Standing at Arafat.” Here it is again: life in 
the biggest crowd, but a sliced one, between camps and markets under constant 
supervision, assistance, health care, and surveillance (Hammoudi 2006: 192). 
The most spontaneous, and potentially deadly crowds, formed at the “stoning” 
(rajm) of each of the three pillars. Although vast works of infrastructure facilitated 
access such as guards directing pilgrims, spontaneous movements occur and 
propagate like powerful natural forces with multidirectional and unpredictable 
currents (Hammoudi 2006: 228–229). Around the pillars everyone pushes to 
get as close as possible in order to hit every pillar and not miss. The circular 
movement of the thousands in many circles accelerates in such a way that I 
myself compared it to a gigantic “whirlpool” and a “tornado” (Hammoudi 2006: 
228). Many die; others get injured—as I myself did—or suffer from exhaustion. 
The Pious Crowds of the Hajj
9781350002340_txt_print.indd  69 29-08-2019  21:14:19
69 
Here the crowd pushes toward a center. Everyone knows they have to 
get there in order to accomplish a valid hajj. However, unlike in Canetti’s 
spontaneous model, there is no unconscious fear of disbanding, which would 
keep the crowd swelling. The crowd swells because everyone knows they have to 
reach an objective before the specific times for that ritual run out (one day for 
each pillar). This is a given, which, it seems to me, comes first; the mechanics 
of the crowd that give its own inexorable will and direction comes second, as a 
perverse consequence, so to speak. 
I have noted the attraction that the stoning had on everyone even though it 
wasn’t the most important part of the hajj. For example, one could miss it and 
make “reparation” for it through sacrifice, while missing Arafat invalidates the 
hajj and cannot be substituted through “reparation.” The conjunction of sacrifice 
and stoning is clear: the first stoning has to be effected after sacrificing in the 
early part of the day. As I participated in both, we performed them the day after 
our return from Arafat on March 27, 1999 (Hammoudi 2006: 207 and 225–227, 
and also Chapter 1). 
Reflecting on this scene, an important set of relations becomes clear between 
power and death on the one hand and life and power on the other hand: 
sacrificers go from giving death to animals to the deployment of uncommon 
energies in the midst of the deadly risks of the stoning crowds. However that 
set of relations is better approached if we map them in comparison with what 
happens in the biggest pilgrimage crowd: the standing in Arafat. 
Mechanics and refexivity in the biggest religious crowd: 
Juxtaposing two narratives 
Three million pilgrims gathered at Arafat for the “Standing” (wuquf) on 
March 27, 1999. I was one of them with only four of my companions, Haj Abbas 
and Hajja Zohra his wife, Haj Salah, and his wife Hajja Fatima. We were joined 
by another couple; I had known the man years before and only met him again 
in Medina. Since transportation was taken care of by the same hajj company, 
our segment of the Moroccan crowd was unloaded in the same cluster of tents. 
Other Moroccan segments were nearby, and all not too far from the Mount of 
Mercy (Jabal al-Rahma). Our bus left Mina at night, and the traffic was so slow 
that we put in many hours to travel the ten miles. I went to sleep, exhausted 
like many others. We got up early the next morning for ablutions and prayer. 
Although the crowd was covering most of it, the Mount of Mercy was still visible 
in tiny patches. Many people were coming and going, shopping for things to 
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be taken home from Arafat. Others were taking pictures. Soon the dense white 
crowd covered everything. I could contemplate the barren mountains far away, 
surrounding the Arafat plain. 
We stood up many times for prayer and invocations for silent meditation, as 
well as individual introspection asking for God’s pardon and mercy. Preaching 
came to us at very high pitch from loudspeakers from the Namira Great Mosque 
and elsewhere. Preaching and shouts of talbiya—“I surrender to Thy call, O 
Allah”—came out repeatedly from millions of throats, filling earth and sky. The 
mighty sound enveloped the white crowds. 
However there also were moments of repose and rest and discussions and 
conflicts about the proper manner to pray or demand forgiveness. One such 
conflict was provoked by a small group of youth who roamed the camp to teach 
pilgrimage or force people to perform in what they thought was the right way. 
The incident involved the segment of crowd with whom I did the “Standing.” 
Some people supported the roaming group; one of them was the young man 
who joined my companions and myself with his wife. 
After the noon prayer, which coincided with the Friday office, followed by 
a little rest, we were motioned by our imam to stand up for the “Wuquf.” This 
was the single most crucial moment of the Arafat station. I described it in the 
following terms: 
Te station immediately followed prayers. I couldn’t see beyond the camp, but 
standing up like everyone else, I could feel deep within me the astonishing 
energy of a worshipping people: dedicated, devout, devoted. Te shouts and 
cries came in endless waves, followed by spells of silence. Collective invocations 
alternated with individual prayers and supplications, murmured and inaudible 
when we sat, turning inward. […] We stood for a long, long time … until the end 
of time … we remained in silence. Ten at a fnal signal we broke rank and lef as 
quickly as possible. (Hammoudi 2006: 212, 213) 
We had been instructed, before the pilgrimage, and all along, to leave Arafat at 
a fast and steady pace. This is called “ifadha.” The word evokes, among other 
things, a flood. In any case, this is how it looked like to me on that day, as I 
watched it through the window of the bus I had boarded with the rest of the 
multitude who had decided not to travel on foot: 
Around eight o’clock in the evening we lef Arafat for Muzdalifah. We did so 
quite quickly, at a rate described as “overfow,” as we were spreading like a 
food. Millions of people on foot turned their backs on Arafat and ran toward 
Muzdalifah like a great river that had fooded its banks to spread through the 
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neighboring valleys and ravines. Nothing could compare to this spectacle, which 
we watched through our boiler on wheels, moving in twenty-meter spurts, then 
stopping, interminably it seemed, in an uproar of motors, heat, and exhaust 
fumes. (Hammoudi 2006, 214) 
It was impossible to compare the size of the masses who boarded busses (as I
myself did through a push-shove of Homeric proportions) to the masses who went
on foot. Both were of the biggest size I have ever seen, and they saturated space.
At this juncture I want to juxtapose my narrative of these masses with Canetti’s.
This will help push my reflection on the Muslim pilgrimage crowd and beyond— 
specifically, on crowds in worship. Rather than proceed to a detailed comparison,
I will highlight the following points, which deserve particular attention. 
Canetti translates ifada as “flight,” a key word in his narrative. Although I
used the verb “running” in my account, it was rather to suggest a fast pace,
and I prefer “overflow” because there exist two verbal forms in Arabic from
f.r. and h.r.b.: farra and haraba for “flight.” These have no link to f.dh, from
which comes ifadha, with the meanings of “flood,” “surplus,” and “abundance,”
but also “fast moving.” In fact, Canetti talks unduly about passionate flight,
as though people were “possessed.” This ties in with his translation of talbiya, 
the repeated loud utterance of the word “labbayk” as “at your command.” This
translation goes well with a frequent militaristic interpretation of Islam by many
Orientalists. As I see it, one could alternatively translate, “I answer Thy call, O
Allah.” But Orientalism usually prefers the one-sided militaristic image. I quote
from Canetti’s book: 
Te most important moment of the pilgrimage to Mecca, its real climax, is 
the Wukuf, or “standing upon Arafat” … An enormous number of pilgrims— 
sometimes as many as 6–700,000—are gathered there, “standing before Allah.” 
Te crowd responds with the cry “Labbeika ya Rabbi, labbeika”: “We wait 
for your commands, O Lord, we wait for your commands.” Tis cry is repeated 
continuously throughout the day, mounting to frenzy. Ten in kind of sudden 
crowd-fear, called Ifadha, or torrent, everyone fees as though possessed, until 
they come to the next place, Mozdalifa, where they spend the night, setting out 
from there the following morning for Mina. People run headlong, pushing and 
trampling on each other. (1984: 313–314) 
Canetti goes on to state the crucial point, in his opinion, about the relation 
between this crowd and power. He does this, first, by stating the notion of what 
he calls “the expectation of command” and, second, by claiming that the original 
character of the command is “the compulsion to flee” (313 and 314). The latter, 
according to him, unconsciously breaks through in this crowd. 
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Canetti insists on the density of the crowd, and on what he says is the incessant 
repetition, which “expresses the situation clearly” (314). The people “think of 
nothing but the lord’s commands and beg for them passionately” (314). He then 
comments on fear and flight thus: 
For the sudden fear which overcomes them at the given signal, there is a 
cogent explanation, namely that here the original character of the command— 
the compulsion to fee—breaks through, although without the faithful being 
consciously aware of it. Te intensity of their collective expectation increases 
the efect of the divine command to such an extent that it reverts to what all 
command originally was: a command to fee. God’s command puts men to 
fight. (314) 
Canetti insists that the fear is not exhausted at the Muzdalifah—the next stop 
where the pilgrims spend the night. He claims that the flight continues the next 
day until the pilgrims reach Mina, adding that it is not exhausted until “they try 
to escape [from death] by passing it on to the animals they slaughter in Mina” 
(314). However, he doesn’t mention the collecting of the stones at Muzdalifah, 
a collection ritually destined for the stoning of Satan in Mina. The conclusion 
Canetti reaches is intended to drive his point home: 
Tere is no other religious usage which so forcefully illustrates the nature of a 
command as this Wukuf, the “Standing upon Arafat,” with the ensuing Ifadha, 
or mass fight. Islam is in any case a religion whose ordinances retain much of 
the original immediacy of commands, but in the Wukuf and Ifadha expectation 
of command and the command in general fnd their purest expression. (314) 
First, there is a wording gap between this narrative and my narrative. I heard 
nobody crying, “labbeika ya Rabbi.” The utterance we repeated was “labbyka
allahumma …, allahumma … ” since this was the proper language form of 
invocation as I was instructed, and we cried in unison. I felt we did not so much 
“cry” or shout as sing those words. The difference between the two narratives 
reaches a crucial point when it comes to the key words used by Canetti: 
“command,” “commands,” “we wait for your commands, O Lord.” I use “I answer 
thy call, O Allah, I answer,” with a possible rendering as “here I am … ” And 
no “Lord,” for the simple reason that Muslims never call Allah “Lord” in that 
invocation. 
We were instructed to leave in the direction of Muzdalifah in fast and steady 
pace. I describe ifadha with the metaphor of flood. What I saw was a very 
powerful collective movement, not what Canetti calls a “torrent,” and running 
headlong as though people were “possessed” or a “mass flight.” Leaving the scene 
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of death, leaving death, “escaping” from it, as Canetti says, certainly gives its 
energy to the movement. Indeed, many a pilgrim likened the Wuquf to the “Day 
of Judgment.” 
Canetti’s knowledge of the hajj is from reading only and reading mostly
orientalist accounts. There is no evidence he had ever spoken to any Muslim. So
what about his “mass flight,” “trampling,” etc.? For my part, I haven’t seen any in
that massive movement toward the next station. To be sure this may have happened
in places far from where I was, lost in the crowd. I haven’t heard of it, though,
and if so, it would be better understood as another spontaneous transformation
of the crowd, similar to the ones that happen at the Stoning in Mina. Where I
was, after Wuquf, I lived through such a transformation: a protracted sort of huge
battle scene in which everyone—who tried to board a bus—engaged, for almost
four hours (Hammoudi 2006: 213–214). The crowd ceaselessly broke up into
unpredictable waves of people, running mindlessly in unpredictable directions,
following rumors about where the available buses stood. 
Finally, there is a factual gap between Canetti’s narrative and my narrative. I 
have described our journey to Muzdalifa sitting or standing quietly in our packed 
busses. More importantly, I wrote of our stopping there to collect stones for the 
next step of hajj and spend the rest of the night before heading, early, to Mina 
(Hammoudi 2006: 214–215). This was the return back to Mina after Arafat: a 
return in two stages. Canetti, I already noted, omits the actions of worship in 
Muzdalifah. Most importantly, perhaps thinking of nothing other than “mass 
flight” and of fear of not being exhausted until sacrifice in Mina, he fails to see 
that the “haste” was related rather to the necessity of performing sacrifice and 
stoning the very next day, and in a limited window of time, this being prescribed 
by the ritual rules. 
In conclusion, I note that, for Canetti, power dynamics is to be accounted for 
by an unconscious pendulum swing: between distinctions and hierarchies on 
the one hand and crowd as liberation from those constraints on the other hand. 
The correlative power dynamics in his view is a disposition he calls “expectation 
of command” and “flight.” It is important to keep in mind that in his opinion 
command inherently contains a “death sentence” and an original compulsion to 
flee. Canetti finds illustration of this in the roaring lion and correlative flight of 
the animals, which are potential prey (Canetti 1984: 303–304). Finally, command, 
death sentence, flight—all these connect in the “survivor” (231–233), Canetti’s 
model for the paranoid and/or schizophrenic ruler, the despots and modern 
(European) mass dictators (424, 434, and epilogue 465). Be that as it may, I hope 
I have shown that Canetti’s “expectation of command” (311, 313) and “flight” at 
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Arafat suffer from a systemic flaw and from a poor knowledge of the succession 
of the hajj rites and the rules, which govern them. Especially problematic, in my 
view, is the mechanical character of the dynamics he suggests. It is inconsistent 
with the many moments of what I would call pockets of reflexivity, conflicts, and 
the transformations of the pious hajj crowd. 
To be sure, the hajj crowd, a pious crowd, looks quite like what Canetti 
calls “closed crowd” insofar as it accepts limits (17). However, transformation 
indicates that it breaks away from the set limits imposed by the ritual and ethical 
norms, as well as the bureaucratic management. Panics break into speeding 
clusters, and unpredictable coalescences and dispersals, yet these movements 
include stopping and reflecting groups, which can have influence and give new 
direction to the crowds. I have seen that happen not only in confused struggles 
around busses at Arafat, at the stoning in Mina, but also during a panic I lived 
through in the great Mosque of Mecca, the beating heart of Islam. 
Life, liminality, immanence: Some remarks 
My aim is not to comment on what the almost unlimited array of things life, 
liminality, and immanence stand for in anthropology; nor is it to dwell on their 
philosophical histories. Life is one of the most powerful catchwords from Michel 
Foucault’s genealogies to biomedicine, science, and cultural studies. Immanence, 
a venerable notion in philosophy, has been revived, especially by the work 
of Gilles Deleuze. In a kind of replica of the earlier Foucauldian move, some 
anthropologists have been recently putting immanence to work together with 
related notions, such as ontology as becoming. In contrast, I note that the notion 
of the liminal has been elaborated by well-known and influential anthropologists. 
It can be summarily traced back from Victor Turner to Emile Durkheim via 
Arnold van Gennep. Its influence is evident in the massive literature on religion 
and politics in non-Western and (later) in Western formations. 
The idea of life as immanent force, which knows no direction or meaning
but only multiplicities of manifestation and formation, including human ones
is a basic Nietzschean insight reformulated by Deleuze in particular. Also life as
“repetition” in manifold forms, a re-elaboration of the famous “eternal return” by
Deleuze is a well-known idea. Canetti’s metaphor of the roaring lion and the flight
has its roots in this concept of life. It is also a similar notion of the unconscious
that we find in all these interpretations based on “life.” An unconscious that works
as “absolute memory” in the words of Foucault and Deleuze: unrecoverable, yet
determinant, because it is as “immanent” as life itself. 
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Here I want to suggest that the liminal might be a more productive notion 
to work with. Transformations and becomings are central to liminality. Also, 
central to it is the notion of process. The latter to be sure admits of multiplicity 
and transformation, yet these transformations happen within structures and 
institutions. This aspect is either downplayed or quasi absent in the works 
centered on becoming. Let me go back to the hajj to illustrate the point. 
Hajj crowds are transient. Pilgrims know they are there for a limited time. 
These crowds are also very much on the move until everyone returns home. By 
definition they are liminal: their moment, place, and life here are liminal, much 
in the way Turner described liminal phenomenon (1969). For many whom I 
encountered this was a lifetime journey that engaged faith and fate. Although a 
number of them pursued other objectives—such as trade, knowledge, religious 
reform, or revolution—all these were included within a most distinctive journey: 
one with special promise regarding salvation. 
Because movement, space, and time were no longer in conjunction 
producing clear and fixed coordinates, Kaaba became a most potent anchorage, 
a marker of space-time concentrations. Other such markers were Mina and 
Arafat. Nevertheless, the movement and intensity of worship threw the crowd 
into a sort of fourth dimension. For this reason, a sui generis disorientation in 
varying degrees affected scores of pilgrims, including myself. Many were found 
wandering, lost in the desert. A man came back to our camp, after we had—with 
members of his family—performed prayer of the dead for the sake of his soul. 
Indeed, he was deemed dead in the desert for several days. 
Turner in particular also signaled changes in the direction and in the process
toward limited insubordination. Others, such as the historian Emmanueal Le
Roy Ladurie (1979), wrote about moments of piety followed by carnavalesque
celebrations, which ushered in civil war. For my part, I have attempted to
recast the notion of process to include potential multidirectionalities by
emphasizing how differing paces of change affect with differing impacts the
overall forms through which every formation articulates itself (Hammoudi
1993, 2009). 
This multidirectional conception of process helps illuminate the frequent and 
sometimes unexpected passages from organized to spontaneous crowds I have 
tried to describe in this chapter. While I insist that I deal here exclusively with a 
religious crowd and arguably the biggest pilgrimage on the planet, I submit that 
these passages may be useful for the study of other crowds. On the other hand, 
I leave out for the moment how this crowd works through globalized social 
media. A study of synergies between the hajj as global image and other crowds 
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worldwide would be especially crucial. Leaving this point aside, I will end this 
section by some brief remarks on process and politics. 
In the hajj crowd, I find many features of masses as Canetti characterizes 
them: big quantities, concentration, divisibility, a global style of sociality here 
encouraged by piety, centralized organization, and equality. Equality is paramount 
in the Islamic discourses about hajj. Also, the masses here create signs through 
their sheer movements and fluctuations. Within this mass, I have noted roaming 
groups of preachers and reformers who do not belong to the organization that 
runs the pilgrimage. These can also work in the form of networks, of loosely 
connected individuals, each operating within different slices of the big crowd. 
These groups show similarities with what Canetti calls “band” or “pack.” I do 
not, however, agree with the frequent ethological-like grounds of Canetti’s 
developments. For one reason: the hajj crowds evince moments of reflexivity, 
something I also have attempted to show in my discussion of “discharge.” This 
frequently incipient reflexivity often becomes explicit. Argument and fights 
about creed and the right practice broke out from time to time and were settled 
by pilgrims themselves. Imams and officials mediated settlements. And the 
Saudi forces were always in the background. 
So, back to process: anthropology after the so-called critical turn seems to have 
confined many earlier works and ideas into a kind of “epistemic unconscious” 
only to reach for them again as if they were just invented. This is the case for the 
notion of “process,” among others, particularly as it has been treated by some 
ontologists. Advocating yet another turn—anthropology as ontology—process 
and “becoming” play a key role in their writing. To be sure, the accent on change 
and transformation, including self-transformation is welcome (for example in 
Biehl 2013). But here the parallel process of the “metamorphosis” of subjectivities 
of the anthropologist and his interlocutor remains unclear. Time and again we 
are incited to witness the proliferation of the metamorphoses of peoples and 
places in the Deleuzian mode of the rhizomatic (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 
1–37, 46 49, 333–37; see also Biehl and Locke 2010). Yet we witness little in 
the manner of ethnographically documented processes. Moreover, immanent 
becoming is sketched in such manner as it looks rather like a solipsistic business. 
For even when places, institutions, material environments, and strictures are 
evoked, their impressionistic presence relates little to peoples’ becomings (as in 
Biehl and Locke 2010, 323–324 and 333; Biehl 2013, 581, 584, and 585). 
This seems the more so when becoming is locked in from the point of view 
of self and enemy, or self and predator. One wonders who becomes a subject 
through “the cannibal cogito” and if the devoured one nevertheless achieves 
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subjecthood by being assimilated by the other (for more on this problematic 
“becoming,” see De Castro 2004: 477–78 and 479). Such a transformation— 
and this is the problem—seems to be entirely predicated on the status of 
representation and the subject/object divide in Western knowledge. Sure, one 
can rethink those categories through the alterity of non-Western practices and 
categories; nevertheless, “monism” and “immanence” are simply alternative 
Western categories through which the other is reinterpreted and put to work in 
Western epistemic discussions. In the end, alterity seems to dissipate altogether. 
A particularly telling case of this predicament can be found in Martin Holbraad’s 
“ontographic” re-elaboration of anthropological truth (2009). Here, we are told 
that the truth of divination is radically other, one that is incommensurable with 
traditional anthropological truth predicated on falsifying and representation. 
So, for example, when the diviner says, “I am bewitched,” the “oracle transforms 
me from a person who stands in no particular relation to witchcraft into a 
person who is bewitched” (Holbraad 2009, 88). Holbraad is at pains to show 
just how that happens. Ultimately, he relies on a thought experiment involving 
what I would call the notion of immanence, a plane on which words, things, and 
other beings coexist and can made to combine as to redefine him as bewitched 
(Holbraad 2009, 89). Here, life as flux of energy, an idea so dear to Deleuze, 
appears to be lost on the anthropologist, so concentrated is he on his “thought 
experiment.” The transformation of someone into a bewitched person, it would 
seem, happens in time, and it often takes a good amount of time of work with 
diviners in changing circumstances and environments. One would have to follow 
the ways in which elements become assembled and evolve in the metamorphosis. 
A regime of truth in and of itself does not generate actual becomings. 
What for Deleuze and Guattari, with others, was an experiment in anarchist 
philosophy and action, after the failure of revolution, is now at the heart of an 
ontological and disparate group of anthropologists who have rallied around 
the master word “becoming.” Deleuze and Guattari wanted to do away with 
all institutions, starting from family all the way to the state, via the university. 
Ontology as anthropology often chooses to simply ignore those institutions. I 
have shown how hajj masses and bands move within institutions and often break 
through them. Transformations happen and recede. Creativity opens up new 
and unexpected possibilities, but institutions endure and are either destroyed 
or change at their own pace. In anthropology, it seems, we do not have a way to 
account for change once we break away from representation and meaning. For we 
fall back on the many sorts of unconscious concepts the discipline has invented 
(production structures, structures of the mind, formation and structures of the 
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Ego and so forth) or else on a conceptual creation divorced from the lives engaged 
with suffering, the difficulty of knowing, and the impossibility of deciding the 
ultimate reasons for a course of action. So much so that life and immanence are 
often evoked by the anthropologist pretty much in the same way that Canetti 
evokes the life, which animates the roaring lion’s flight. When Deleuze and 
Guattari invoke “life” as reality, they map it in terms of some universal, energetic 
(and unconscious) mechanism, where the prime mover is desire. Theirs is a 
metaphysical engine of change and revolution, immanent in the energetic flow 
itself. How ethnography might work with that set of notions may not be all that 
clear. For one thing, immanence, while conceivable, remains a pure if powerful 
philosophical intuition. In anthropology, it frequently operates in modes of 
performance, which only mimic induction or the analysis of language. 


























“Too Many People”: Crowds and Cliques in 
Contemporary China 
Megan Stefen 
Even in the dark, the crowd was visible from blocks away. I was passing a busy
intersection around ten at night, later than I usually dared to be out on my bike. People
in front of me in the bike lane were slowing, then stopping, and then finally either
continuing on or else dismounting to watch the spectacle blocked from my view by
a mass of bodies. Without the crowd there, I might never have realized what I was
approaching, even though I was in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to study the
unpredictable and its most visible manifestation: accidents. The crowd was the thing
that transformed the site of the traffic accident into a scene. This scene in particular
was especially bad—the driver had abandoned the car, which had no license plate
and whose front end had crumpled after colliding with a pedestrian, who at that
moment lay motionless on the ground outlined by a wreath of glass and blood. The
chain of cause and effect seemed clear, and yet I knew from experience that should
more than one of the parties reemerge after the accident, each of these artifacts—the
inert man’s battered body, the crumpled car, and the long-departed driver—would
become the focus of angry contestations, which was one reason why the police
officer on the scene was diligently taking photographs from a set of predetermined
angles. I, too, dismounted from my bike and joined the crowd. Later in this chapter,
I’ll return to this accident, which featured what I’m calling an unintended crowd: a
crowd whose formation is unplanned and whose purpose is uncertain. I will also
discuss more broadly the aesthetics and social implications of group formation in the
PRC and specifically three types of groups: the unintended crowd, one of which I’ve
just described, cliques or quanzi, and the choreographed crowd. 
I am grateful to Steven Chung, for posing many of the questions this essay attempts to answer in his
“Critical Trespasses” seminar, to John Borneman, Samuel Williams, Pablo Landa, and Moises Kopper
for their comments on an early draf of this essay, to Neal Allar and Saiyin Sun for their careful and
critical feedback on this fnal version, and to Miyabi Goto for talking me through the event itself. 
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The choreographed crowd is what we’re used to seeing in the PRC during
its periodic public displays of national unity and strength. Think back to the
2008 Beijing Olympic Opening Ceremony, which is probably the most widely
watched example of the PRC’s choreographed crowds. The Opening Ceremony
began with 2008 drummers dancing and chanting in unison; later, a new set of
performers hid inside a set of human-sized movable type blocks moving up and
down in an extremely coordinated display until finally emerging from the top
to smile and wave at the audience (Figure 5.1). This sudden shift both breaks
the fourth wall by demonstrating the method behind the spectacle and forces
the audience to have a revelation reminiscent of Charlton Heston’s character’s
disturbing epiphany at the end of the film Soylent Green (1973): This impossibly
complicated routine is made out of people! And indeed, that seems to have been the
intended effect. Throughout the ceremony, thousands of performers showcased
what director Zhang Yimou called a “human performance” where “uniformity
brings beauty” in a 2008 interview with Southern Weekend.1 Zhang argued
that this uniformity reflected something particularly Chinese: an ability to be
disciplined, hardworking, and obedient unparalleled by all other nations (besides
North Korea). 
Figure 5.1 Performers emerge from the top of moveable-type blocks afer a long 
routine during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Opening Ceremony 












81 Crowds and Cliques in Contemporary China 
To say that Zhang’s comments are troubling is a wild understatement, and to 
think that his probably purposefully inflammatory opinions reflect the reality of 
actual life in the PRC would be a grave methodological error for an ethnographer. 
Nevertheless, Zhang—who bragged in the same interview that the Opening 
Ceremony “had the highest level of political review since the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China” with orders coming from the Central Committee 
itself—is on to something. He is describing the logic underlying what I think of 
as the aesthetics of legitimacy in the PRC; he is explaining why, in the twenty-
first century, the PRC has largely chosen to represent itself abroad as an obedient, 
anonymous mass of uniform objects who can, as Zhang says proudly, “do it like 
computers.” These displays invite Chinese viewers to imagine themselves as one 
of the anonymous units in the performance and simultaneously remind them 
that this is how the rest of the world sees them: as just one more Chinese person 
within an undifferentiated and intimidating mass. 
The aesthetics and political implications of crowds—both choreographed
and unintended—have troubled thinkers inside and outside of China for nearly
a century. Lu Xun, one of the most important Chinese intellectuals of the
twentieth century, famously made the decision to become a writer after seeing
a photograph in which a crowd of Chinese spectators gathered to apathetically
watch a Japanese soldier execute a Chinese spy. This is a spontaneous crowd
drawn by a scene of gore whose moral and political implications Lu Xun believes
they ignore. “The people of a weak and backward country,” he wrote in 1922,
“can only serve to be made examples of, or to witness such futile spectacles”
(1960[1922]). Again, this statement is problematic; it operates within the logic of
a type of chauvinism that assumes the failings of Chinese people are particularly
Chinese rather than symptomatic of broader problems in the modern world.2 
That said, Lu Xun’s observations and concerns about crowds are very much in 
line with his contemporaries from Europe and North America. In his essay “The 
Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility,” Walter Benjamin 
described the social significance of people increasingly being conditioned 
to gather in large groups to consume art at museums, in movie theaters, and 
through the type of newsreel photographs that would eventually drive Lu Xun 
to become a writer (2008: 22). For example, Benjamin argues that the “cult of 
the movie star” creates a “cult of the audience” in which the people who would 
otherwise be becoming class conscious instead are becoming “masses”—a group 
formation he identifies as more “useful” for fascism than for communism (2008: 
33, 20, 41). Notably, Benjamin’s examples of the proto-communist crowd map 
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better onto the international viewers of the Beijing Opening Ceremony than they 
do onto the coordinated performers themselves, who, at the center of collective 
adoration or at least attention, become more like the movie stars and museums 
than like the Chinese masses they’re meant to stand for metonymically. 
Writing in 1936, Benjamin’s main concern was fascism, which at the time was 
a very real and tangible threat. At the outset, he defines his mission as an attempt 
to “neutralize a number of traditional concepts—such as creativity and genius, 
eternal value and mystery—which … allow factual material to be manipulated in 
the interests of fascism” (Benjamin 2008: 20). It’s useful here to turn away from 
Benjamin for a moment and toward Susan Sontag. In “Fascinating Fascism,” 
her takedown of Leni Riefenstahl (another choreographer of Olympic crowds), 
Sontag (2002: 96) presents a similar list of concepts fascism stands for: “the 
ideal of life as art, the cult of beauty, the fetishism of courage, the dissolution of 
alienation in ecstatic feelings of community; the repudiation of the intellect; the 
family of man (under the parenthood of leaders).” Fascist aesthetics, she writes, 
are characterized by 
the massing of groups of people; the turning of people into things; the 
multiplication or replication of things; and the grouping of people/things 
around an all-powerful, hypnotic leader-fgure or force. Te fascist dramaturgy 
centers on the orgiastic transactions between mighty forces and their puppets, 
uniformly garbed and shown in ever swelling numbers. (Sontag 2002: 91) 
Think now of the parades held in Beijing to celebrate the Sixtieth Anniversary of 
the People’s Republic of China in 2009, when hundreds of thousands of people 
created designs with their assembled bodies and supported gigantic portraits of 
Chinese leaders. Like Benjamin, Sontag saves her harshest critiques for right- 
rather than left-wing movements (though it is worth noting that at the time of 
its writing in 1976 accounts of the death and destructions at the hands of the 
left were not as available as accounts from the Nazi death camps). Although 
she acknowledges that there are similarities between communist and fascist 
aesthetics, she attempts to distinguish between the two by saying communist art 
reinforces a “utopian morality” while fascist art displays a “utopian aesthetics” 
(Sontag 2002: 92). Nevertheless, it’s difficult to read Sontag’s (2002: 91) statement 
that in fascism “masses are made to take form, be design” and not also hear 
Mao Zedong’s (2007: 19) assertion in 1958 that the masses are “poor and blank” 
like a “a blank sheet of paper free from any mark” on which “the freshest and 
most beautiful characters can be written.” Indeed, it’s the legacy of the PRC’s 
aesthetics of legitimacy—both the crowds of the Cultural Revolution and the 
mass political performances of today—that haunts and troubles Benjamin’s and 
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Sontag’s attempts to separate the aesthetics of extreme right-wing movements 
from those of the putatively left. 
This is where Jacques Rancière makes an intervention. Writing in 2000, 
after which the sins of what were once perceived as communist states could no 
longer credibly be denied, Rancière seeks to distinguish his theory of aesthetics 
from Benjamin’s. To resist Benjamin’s (2008: 42) idea that fascism “aestheticizes 
politics” while communism “politicizes art,” Rancière maintains that aesthetics 
are already political because “politics revolves around what is seen and what can 
be said about it” and aesthetics is a series of “regimes” that defines what can be 
art and how it can be reflected upon (Rancière 2004: 13). I am not interested in 
answering the chicken-and-egg question of whether the sensible was suddenly 
distributed differently—which allowed for humans to imagine technological 
reproduction—or whether, as Rancière insists Benjamin argues, a work of art’s 
technological properties come with certain political or aesthetic properties 
(Rancière 2004: 31). Instead, I want to focus on Rancière’s determination to 
rehabilitate the aesthetics of crowds for the left. 
In The Politics of Aesthetics, Rancière (2004) makes a long digression into the 
work of Rudolf Laban. He writes, 
Let us consider as well the contradictory destinies of the choreographic model. 
Recent research has evoked the metamorphoses undergone by Laban’s notation 
of movement. It was developed in a context favoring the liberation of bodies 
and became the model for the large Nazi demonstrations before regaining, in 
the anti-establishment context of performance art, a new subversive virginity. 
Benjamin’s explanation via the fatal aestheticization of politics in the “era of 
the masses” overlooks, perhaps, the long-standing connection between the 
unanimous consensus of the citizenry and the exaltation of the free movement 
of bodies. (Rancière 2004: 18) 
It’s difficult to parse exactly what Rancière means in this passage, especially if we 
read his invocation of “consensus” here with an eye to his work on dissensus. What 
remains clear is that, unlike Benjamin’s historically situated argument, Rancière’s 
position is intentionally reductive. Family resemblances between aesthetic forms 
need not, he argues, correspond with political similarities. To redeem the crowd 
for leftist political action, Rancière would discard the notion that any particular 
form must carry an inherent political property determined by its context or its 
deployment in history. Thus, we should disregard any formal visual similarity 
between performances by Laban’s dancers (and their wild, Dionysian context) 
with the famous shots of coordinated aerobics from Riefenstahl’s Olympia (and 
their rigid, fascist context). Although these political movements share formal 
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similarities, Rancière argues later in the essay, these forms are all they share
(2004: 19). In other words, the intention behind the use of a visual form at a 
particular moment should not be considered when that form appears at other 
moments; contemporary context, not historical precedent, is king. 
In theory, this argument could be convincing. In reality, in this particular 
historical moment and in the PRC, Rancière’s position is much more difficult to 
justify. Because the state insists its authorship of spectacles like the 2008 Olympic 
Opening Ceremony is absolute, any interpretation that discards allusions to 
the choreographed crowds of other historical contexts seems naive. A more 
nuanced understanding of choreographed crowds in the PRC would have to 
include Laban and Zhang as well as Mao and Riefenstahl. Echoes of Olympia
might linger in 2008 alongside echoes of the Cultural Revolution’s mass rallies 
alongside still fainter echoes of Laban and Riefenstahl, who is perhaps the most 
obvious influence on Zhang outside of the North Korean mass performances 
he cites as inspiration.3 Both the formal visual and the contextual historical 
evidence are against Rancière in this case. 
So much, then, for the emancipatory properties of the choreographed crowd in
the PRC—though I might add that this doesn’t preclude it from having liberating
properties at other times or in other places. Let’s return, though, to the time and
place I’ve promised to talk about: today’s PRC. Between March 2013 and March
2016, I conducted twenty-five months of fieldwork in Zhengzhou, the capital
of Henan Province, which at the time was the second most densely populated
province in the country. When he was writing about the “poor and blank”
masses, Mao Zedong bragged that at 600 million the PRC had one of the largest
populations in the world; today, there are over 1.36 billion people in the PRC, and
the only thing nearly everyone I met during my time in Central China could agree
on was that there were simply “too many people” in China: ren tai duo. 
This phrase of “ren tai duo” gets repeated all over the PRC and has become 
a kind of blanket excuse or explanation for almost any situation or problem.4 
“Ren tai duo” has become an acceptable idiom to describe situations that would 
otherwise be unacceptable. In the same way that an American might shake off 
an unpleasant social experience by saying “well, it’s a free country”—to indicate 
that the behavior of others is both endemic to the national character and also 
something they have no control over and thus shouldn’t worry about—so 
someone in the PRC may turn to the idea of there being “too many people” to 
justify, explain, and ultimately relinquish responsibility for everyday hardships. 
Perversely, the knowledge that there are too many people may inspire many 
people in the PRC to view strangers almost as a different species than their 
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friends and family. Strangers are not relevant social actors in the way one’s family 
members or work colleagues are. People I worked with often admit to acting 
according to two completely different codes of behavior: one for people they do 
not know, and one for friends, family, and people they do know—people who 
exist within their quanzi, which literally translates to “circle” but which I here 
translate as “clique” to highlight its exclusionary qualities. My interlocutors in 
Zhengzhou define their quanzi as all their friends, family, and coworkers, as 
either everyone they know or else as all the human resources at their disposal; 
however, all these people do not necessarily mix. People may have many quanzi, 
and they often speak about each one as being used for a different purpose. This 
quanzi is for business; that one is for socializing; this one is for their children; 
that one is for buying things online. And yet quanzi are more than just groups 
of like-minded acquaintances. People spoke of quanzi as being determinative, 
as either limiting someone’s potential or else enabling it. During my interviews 
with entrepreneurs, they would frequently cite a person’s quanzi as one of the 
most important factors leading to their success or failure. As one coffee shop 
owner put it: “If you don’t have successful people in your quanzi, you can’t even 
imagine what success is, much less achieve it.” This quote—with its unquestioned 
assumption that already established and successful people would naturally 
be interacting with people just starting out within a given quanzi—reveals a 
crucial characteristic of quanzi. Unlike guanxi (connections), in which people 
tend to alternate between hierarchical roles (as either supplicant or patron) 
during their encounters, quanzi not only bring people at different stages of life 
together but also create contexts in which their respective hierarchical positions 
are momentarily leveled so that important information—like advice—can be 
exchanged freely (see, e.g., Chumley 2016: 172). 
The increased popularity of the word “quanzi” is perhaps due to its use on 
WeChat or Weixin, a social networking tool used by almost all of the people I 
work with in Zhengzhou.5 The area of WeChat known as “Moments” in English 
goes by the name of Pengyou Quan or literally “Friend Circle” in Chinese. Within 
their Pengyou Quan people post pictures, links, poems, videos, long emotional 
(but abstract) confessions, items for sale, and pleas for help or advice. This 
last genre of post generally begins with an apostrophe to this new, seemingly 
omnipotent crowd: “All-powerful friend circle (wanneng de pengyou quan), who 
can tell me how to do X?” People also comment on each other’s posts, but these 
comments are only visible to people who are mutual friends on WeChat—in 
other words, to people who are already an existing part of a person’s particular 
quanzi. This is in stark contrast to the exposure-driven algorithms of platforms 
Crowds























like Twitter or Facebook, which will sometimes lead users to look at strangers’ 
posts if a friend has liked them or commented on them. 
WeChat hasn’t been popular for more than a few years, but its effect on social 
life among people in Zhengzhou has been tremendous. Unlike Google Plus’s 
now defunct “Circles” or Facebook’s elaborate (and often unused) methods of 
sorting social network contacts, WeChat’s formulation of the quanzi virtually 
mimics the groups my interlocutors actually formed. WeChat has approximated 
a type of preferred social interaction, which is intimate because it is exclusive 
and has given its users the ability to distinguish the people they know from the 
anonymous masses: a way of taking the otherwise overwhelming social and 
separating the figure—in this case, a quanzi or circle—from the unfamiliar 
ground. The difficulty of entering a quanzi is to become a familiar in the first 
place, and, at its heart, this is the essential difference between quanzi and guanxi. 
Much has been written about guanxi—translated literally as connection
or relationship, but practically meaning something closer to one’s social
and professional networking connections.6 So much has been written about
guanxi, in fact, that it’s now become a sort of albatross hanging around the
neck of scholars who can’t deny the importance of having connections and a
wide social network in the PRC but who are weary of its reductive and one-
size-fits-all use. I often heard expats and Chinese interlocutors alike speaking
about guanxi the way seventeenth-century scientists spoke about phlogiston:
as an elemental substance that had mysterious properties (e.g., “Oh he didn’t
have enough guanxi” or “Oh his guanxi was not strong enough”). Like the
phlogiston theory, this folk theory of guanxi is comforting but not accurate.
Even though it’s true that in Mandarin one speaks of guanxi as something
you can possess (we have guanxi or women you guanxi), guanxi is less like a
substance and more—as fire would turn out to be—like a reaction. Guanxi
is not finite, not a resource that you can monopolize to the dismay of your
adversaries. Like relationships, guanxi is not fixed. Whatever connections
one may have, linguistic conventions cover up the fact that these too are in
motion, that all guanxi is a process, a verb masquerading as a noun. Especially
in the wake of what will probably end up being called President Xi Jinping’s
Anti-Corruption Campaign, when your connection in whatever government
ministry you relied upon to do business might be there one day and gone the
next, people in Zhengzhou admitted that guanxi was frequently fragile and
always a little bit beyond one’s total control. 
Quanzi, on the other hand, are thought to be more reliable because the people 
who make up your quanzi are, in general, your friends. While your network 
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of relationships-as-resources or guanxi grows stronger by expanding its reach 
toward the outside and including more and more people, your cliques or quanzi 
grow stronger by closing in what’s already there and creating intimacy through 
exclusion. A person who is good at managing her quanzi can emerge at the 
center of a powerful network of guanxi, but she cannot treat them the same way. 
Nothing about one’s quanzi should be spontaneous or accidental; everything 
should be carefully coordinated and choreographed. Creating a strong quanzi is 
less like a crowded political rally and more like a careful tango or maybe even a 
piece by Laban. 
Let me give you an example. Olivia was one of my most powerful friends in 
the field. Even though she was not originally from Zhengzhou but a small city 
near Zhengzhou, she had the largest number of quanzi in the city of anyone I 
knew, and often I would sit with her for hours as she ignored me in favor of 
sending countless WeChat messages, connecting people she knew who needed 
something to the person she knew who could give it to them. As someone else’s 
salaried employee, Olivia herself did not occupy a particularly powerful official 
position, and people would not automatically seek to cultivate a relationship 
with her to gain specific favors; however, people understood that she had access 
to a large number of powerful quanzi and could act as a conduit to people with 
power. Through the various cliques she maintained, Olivia could do anything: 
change a visa, get a permit to open a school, rent an apartment, get an invitation 
to dinner or refuse an invitation to dinner (an even more delicate task), help 
a friend get a job, set a friend up on a blind date, or find out if someone had a 
reputation for being corrupt or not. 
Olivia often complained that the employees she managed did not understand 
that one could not “just treat work business like work business.” “If you meet 
someone through work, you have to be willing to be friends with them,” she 
explained to me while simultaneously driving and sending off a WeChat message 
to a reporter who was also, she claimed, a friend, 
If you go out to eat with them, chat for a bit, and then become friends, you’ll fnd 
that all your work business becomes easier. If you treat it like a duty or difcult 
work task, though, people can tell and it will make work business more difcult. 
My coworkers do not understand that being friends and doing business are not 
two separate things! 
Olivia’s boss, however, did understand this, and she was free to leave the office 
to socialize even during the workday. Whatever money Olivia’s boss lost in the 
salaried hours she spent drinking tea with wealthy housewives or lunching with 
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Fujianese businessmen, he knew he would make back eventually in the new 
clients, programs, and contracts Olivia’s numerous quanzi provided. 
Just before I left for nine months in October 2014, Olivia offered to host a
dinner for me. She told me to invite anyone I had met through her; when I began
naming the various entrepreneurs and officials I’d like to see, her nose scrunched
up—a sign that I’d displeased her. “Those people are all from different quanzi,”
she told me. “They are my friends, but they are from completely different quanzi,
and it wouldn’t be appropriate to eat together with them.” In the end, she decided
I could not be trusted and made the guest list herself. To be honest, I understood
why this was a delicate procedure, and I had been deliberately testing the limits
of her generosity; I knew the people I wanted to see were from radically different
backgrounds from those she’d already invited, and I wanted to see how they’d
interact with each other. Olivia, to my anthropological chagrin but personal relief,
valued the integrity of her quanzi more than she worried about offending me. 
It’s the primacy of the quanzi in today’s Zhengzhou that makes the unintended
crowd I described at the beginning of this paper so interesting. There are so few
situations where people form groups—even temporary ones—without thoroughly
understanding in advance the backgrounds of the people will be involved.
Usually, the people one joins in crowded, group settings have already been vetted
through personal introductions (as at large banquets like weddings), through
their access to institutions (as in schools) or their shared economic profiles (as
in commercial events like the ones that take place at malls or during real estate
development promotional events). There are exceptions to this, of course. Train
and bus stations, tourist sites on national holidays, and temples during festival
days were crowd situations that “had all kinds of people” (shenmeyang de ren
dou you), and because of this (and the general discomfort of being in a crowd)
many of my urban interlocutors would try to avoid them or find themselves
embarrassed to have exposed me to them.7 While crowd situations in the PRC
are often necessary to endure, they are not necessarily desirable. 
So it was with great surprise that I noted how many people willingly joined the 
crowd at the scene of the accident that night. The crowd, as I said, was composed
of people like me—strangers who had happened to be passing by and decided to
stop. Some of the people were clearly voyeurs. “Is he dead yet?” yelled a visibly
drunk man who flailed his way out of a black Audi before taking pictures with the
victim’s prone body in the background. Horrified and confused, I started asking
people in the crowd why they were watching. “It’s exciting and stimulating (hen
renao),”8 one replied. “Because we have no other things to do right now (yinwei
women xianzai meiyou biede shiqing),” said another. Finally, an older woman gave
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me an answer I could live with: “We’re all caring for him (women zai guanxin
ta). Once the ambulance arrives, we’ll all relax.” This woman may have been
performing for me, since I was an obvious foreigner—she continued to tell me
that she was going to United States the next month and even gave me her business
card as we watched the victim bleed on the asphalt, an attempt, perhaps, to
create some guanxi with me—but her assessment was also, on a superficial level,
accurate. After the victim had been carried to the ambulance, the crowd of people
dispersed without a word. Maybe people left because the gore and excitement was
gone, but then again, there was still plenty of destruction to dwell on—the car,
with its concave bumper and bloody shattered window, was still present. 
What seems more likely to me is that people left because without the victim 
there, no emotional or social gravity remained. To interpret the scene a little 
more bluntly, the woman I spoke to may have been right, and people may have 
left because they had achieved their unarticulated and perhaps even unconscious 
goal. Forced to perform before a crowd of twenty or more witnesses, the traffic 
policeman had acted professionally and with a sense of genuine urgency. A 
crowd of strangers had united and by doing so ensured the safe transit of an 
unidentified and unfamiliar person; an accident had allowed the victim to 
separate himself from the social ground and, even if only for a few moments, to 
become an important and legible figure to those who passed by. 
Think back, now, to the photograph that inspired Lu Xun to save the so-
called backward people of China and become a writer. Like the crowd he saw 
apathetically watching a Japanese soldier execute the Chinese spy, the crowd 
that I’ve described here is not choreographed but unintended—formed 
spontaneously, without plans or directions. Were I only to have looked at their 
faces, these people too would have seemed quite indifferent—only when I began 
asking them questions did their expressions change and their interpretations of 
the scene become clear. Far be it from me to correct a thinker like Lu Xun, but 
at least in this case, a crowd that might have looked voyeuristic and in fact had 
contained some individuals with voyeuristic intentions succeeded not just in 
futilely witnessing violence but also in calling an agent of the state to account. 
Unlike in quanzi, where curated individuals submit to known figures within a 
closed circle in order to gain resources, or Sontag’s fascist aesthetics, where the 
anonymous masses submit to a superior leader out of a longing for romantic 
ideals, here assembled individuals willingly and serendipitously submitted to an 
anonymous victim whose uncertain fate allowed him to separate from the social 
ground. If fascism is, as Sontag argues, “history become theatre,” then this was 
life-and-death “become theater”. 
Crowds
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An alternate interpretation of this crowd as a diversion of otherwise 
ineffectual political energy exists. After all, the members of the mostly silent 
crowd—excluding the black Audi full of drunk men that pulled over to stop, 
gawk, and comment loudly—were on electric scooters or pedal bikes. This mode 
of transportation united them, either through shared economic constraints or 
else shared risk profiles. They did not have the liberty of declaring, as Olivia once 
did from the comfort of her car, that they did not like scooters and found them 
to be dangerous. They were not, like the driver of the car that hit the pedestrian, 
able to scramble away mostly unharmed from whatever incidents awaited them 
on the road. Instead, they whirred through the city with their bodies exposed 
to larger vehicles, sometimes in the designated sidelanes but sometimes— 
particularly when cars parked in the street as they often did—in lanes meant for 
cars. It is an interpretive reach to say that the people who eventually made up the 
crowd stopped because of some unspoken class solidarity among the vulnerable 
walkers, bikers, and scooter riders of the city. 
Nevertheless, in a social context where relating to others through quanzi—a 
social formation enabled by the censorship of outsiders’ claims to personhood— 
is more and more common, an event like this stood out to me. I am aware that 
I may be choosing the explanation that is the easiest for me, personally, to 
live with; however, I also think I have chosen the most empirically defendable 
interpretation. The collective effect of the each subject’s absorption into the 
so-called “audience”—and their separation from a default national community 
defined by having “too many people”—was to ensure the fair treatment of the 
victim, regardless of their own intentions. This crowd and the control it exerted 
mattered not to the nation within whose borders it formed, or to the “too many 
people” who called it home, or to the politics of aesthetics on the right or left, but 
to the man who that night lay prone and unresponsive in the dark, surrounded 
by a crowd of onlookers comprised of people whose importance he will never 
socially recognize, whose names he will never know. 




Regarding Others: Metro Crowds, Metro 
Publics, Metro Mobs 
Rashmi Sadana 
On the Metro, there is a potential frenzy to the crowd, and yet, over the years I have 
been riding Delhi’s, attempting an ethnography of this confined, multifarious set 
of spaces spread out across the city in at least a dozen directions, I have come to 
see crowds and infrastructure as a highly managed affair. It is this management 
that is part of the marvel of the Metro. There are no stampedes; people seem 
to “get” the technology and their place in it. There is little unpredictability. 
And when things happen in excess of what planners and designers might have 
expected, the crowd is redirected by shifting physical barriers or sometimes just 
by a change in signage. In the ladies’ coach, I can often get a seat since it’s always 
less crowded compared to the rest of the train. It’s not that I don’t feel comfortable 
in the general coaches—I do—but I sometimes have a nagging sense that I could 
go elsewhere, that I should be elsewhere. 
Many had been against the idea of a ladies’ coach when the Delhi Metro Rail 
Corporation first announced they would start having one back in October 2009.1 
In the early years of the Metro, part of the wonder of it was just how men and 
women coexisted in this new, confined public space. The “metro crowd,” people 
said, was different from the “bus crowd,” which was a way of talking about the 
class of the men who rode the much-maligned buses. The crowd you get on the 
Metro, so many women told me, was a different crowd. It is true that the Delhi 
buses are notorious sites for the sexual harassment of women. And it is hard to 
find a woman who has grown up in this city or especially gone to college here, 
who has not been harassed in some way, often repeatedly, on the city’s buses. 
Nevertheless, the men I see on the Metro and on the buses do not seem radically 
different. On the Metro there are more office workers, as many students, 
and plenty of working-class men, from shopkeepers to day laborers. What is
Crowds
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markedly different from the bus is that the Metro is an enclosed space, a system 
with heavy security and CCTV cameras. If I noticed those formal features, then 
surely others did too. So, in those early years, the sight of women and men sitting 
and standing together on the Metro seemed to herald a future where men would 
be more accepting and respectful of women in public places, and where women 
would feel they had as much right to be in those spaces as men. It seemed a 
practical way forward in the endless debates about the greater numbers and 
expanding roles of women in public, their safety, and their legitimacy to be in 
such spaces at times of their choosing. 
Hence, there is the crowd as physical entity, with physical properties, and 
then there is the discourse on the crowd, the ways we talk about it. In regard to 
the Metro, it’s not the crowd itself that is of utmost interest but rather how the 
crowd, or elements of it, may be identified all of a sudden, or in parts, as a public, 
or how the crowd in certain moments can change into a mob. These shifts have 
to do with the physical parameters of the Metro itself, as public transport, built 
environment, and high-technology, but they also have to do with the image and 
idea of the Metro and how they might reflect on the crowd or be reflected upon 
by the crowd in critical moments or junctures. The question therefore is not 
“What is a crowd?” but rather “What might the crowd become or be taken for?” 
* * * 
In the Metro, small crowds gather and disperse at all times, all over the city. 
Although this is a new routine and discipline, it also carries the energy and 
force that comes from repetition. One winter morning at Nehru Place station, 
I am absorbed by Drishti’s description of the crowd. She has come from 
Vishwavidyalaya station, in the north of the city. She studies at a college in Noida 
to the east and takes the Metro there each day with her sister.2 They want to 
be designers, and Drishti wants to design kitchens, specifically. It has been her 
dream since childhood, she tells me. She has come here, to Nehru Place in south 
Delhi, to buy thread and materials. We have just come off a crowded train in the 
mid-morning rush and are sitting outside on the station premises, on a small 
ledge near a landscaped lawn where people sit eating from tiffin boxes. The 
Bollywood actor, Deepika Padukone, looms large above us on a billboard, selling 
a new brand of mobile phone. We are now, Drishti and I, away from the metro 
crowd, but we still can’t help talking about it. I am struck by how her description 
of being in the crowd differs from the rest of what she has to say. Her Hindi 
gains speed and stress as she goes along. It is already a language that relies on 
repetition for emphasis, and her speech plays this feature up by repeating whole 
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phrases in quick succession. It is as if her words are running into one another, 
pushing up against each other, or maybe just spinning. 
“Sometimes there’s a big crowd there,” she starts, 
people don’t give others the way (rasta) to come and go, you don’t get any 
space at all and no one gives you the right of way. In the morning there’s such 
a crowd that people don’t let people get of; frst they push; the safety guard 
who is there tells them that they have to stay behind the yellow line, and they 
say this announcement so many times, but however many times they say the 
announcement, people don’t stay behind the yellow line. 
There is a kind of desperation and plea in her voice by this point, but also 
a sense that you do not not ride the Metro, you don’t give up, you endure it. 
“Sometimes people bang into each other,” she continues, 
and sometimes someone even gets hurt (chotte bhi lugtha hai). Tey don’t give 
people space to get out at the station they need to get out at. Tey don’t let you go 
forward; they say, “Stay behind, Stay behind. You have to stay behind the doors.” 
Tey tell people to stand behind the doors, but what they don’t understand is 
that people can get stuck behind it (pus jathay). People will say, “Let us out frst,” 
but no one lets the people on the train out frst. 
The way she describes it, there is a back and forth between speech and 
movement, what people assert through speech vis-à-vis the limits of what their 
bodies can do. “In the evenings,” she concludes, “when people get out of work, 
there is such a crowd and they don’t stay behind the line, when the doors open, 
everyone pushes; they don’t stop, then they push.” 
At the end of the description, Drishti is out of the crowded space of her own 
language. She becomes more relaxed and her tempo slows as we move on to 
other topics—her college, her sister, her uncle. Anyone who rides the Metro in 
Delhi knows what she is talking about when she describes the way people push 
into each other or push people aside when entering or exiting trains. The crowd 
is a physical sensation; one is either in it or not. Being on the edge of the crowd is 
to be out of it. Watching a crowd, as people often do on platforms as trains go by, 
is to regard the crowd, often with resignation, sympathy, and occasional longing. 
Indian cities may not have had metro systems on this scale before, but they 
have long had crowds.3 What is perhaps novel in Delhi is this meeting of a 
managed, hyper-modern space like a metro with those crowds. It is a kind of 
working out of past and future. If mobility is modernity—and the Metro is no 
doubt a crucible of that—the crowd nonetheless remains an impediment to that 
vision. It is a kind of relic, representing chaos and unpredictability (Mazzarella 
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2010). A crowd can turn into a mob. And yet it can also be an indication of a 
public or a new way of thinking about the people who live in the city. People 
don’t ride public transportation to enter crowds purposefully; they do so out 
of necessity. A crowd may be a passing nuisance, and yet, once in one, it is 
impossible to avoid the experience. The promise of the metro crowd, with all 
its compressions and contortions, is its link to (and performance as) a form of 
mobility that “does” or even accomplishes modernity. It might therefore be a 
crowd worth enduring. 
Writing about the crowds of Calcutta in the early 1960s, Claude Levi-Strauss 
(1962) described his very personal reaction to what for him was the shock of 
the Indian city. “The great cities of India are a kind of wasteland,” he writes and 
yet also notices that the “blight” he sees—among the post-Partition hungry and 
displaced of that city—is “the ultimate expression of urban living.” Here “urban 
living” is not merely the proximity of people to one another but also a quest 
and demand for life itself. It is not the kind of aspiration that we speak of today 
in regard to the Indian middle masses but rather something more elemental. 
Levi-Strauss is shocked and disgusted by the crowd, by its neediness, by its 
questionable humanity, and with himself and what he represents to them as a 
white European. It is a crowd that he will always stand apart from and, as he sees 
it, be subject to (on beggars, he writes: “they debase you by their veneration”). 
The crowd, then, as form and locus of desire, sparks a moral questioning for 
both the observer and the observed. 
For Elias Canetti (1984: 75–90), fire, river, sea, rain, and other elements
all recall the crowd in one way or the other. The natural elements symbolize
attributes of the crowd: the way a fire spreads, the river flows, the sea changes,
or the rain discharges. The elements highlight a crowd’s changeability. In the
Metro, the crowd is alternately rivulet, stream, and eddy; it collects, passes
through, and disperses. It does so to the rhythm of departing and arriving
trains and to the tempo of foot traffic during different times of day. It is the
movement from one form to another that is significant, I realize one afternoon
while talking with Anuraag Chowfla, whose architecture firm designed some
of the early metro stations in Delhi. This movement—allowing for it and
predicting it—is what goes into the “science of sizing” in station design. “You
have to create a scenario,” he explains, “where there are three missed headways,
meaning three trains don’t show up on time, which means when the train is at
full capacity—the crush load—there could be 9,000 people on the platform.
The station has to be designed in such a way so that people can be evacuated
in four minutes.” 
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In this explanation he captures something I often feel while riding the 
Metro—the possibility of the range of scenarios that could play out. As in every 
metro system, late trains on one side of the platform means a crowd will collect, 
a kind of stagnant crowd, hemmed in by the train, the platform, and time. When 
the train finally arrives, the crowd still has no space to expand since the train will 
arrive with new passengers, some of whom will want to get off. This is when the 
push and pull begins and when space and matter will come into conflict, when 
bodies themselves will become part of the architecture of the station. How much 
can people be pushed? 
* * * 
Delhi has a population of 16 million people, but it is not a crowded city in the
way Mumbai, Hong Kong, or New York is. Or at least it doesn’t feel like it is one
in the way those other cities do. It is not bounded by oceans or bays but rather by
a dwindling river, and even then, one that merely traverses the city rather than
creating a hard-and-fast border around it. It is spread out. There is no natural limit
to it, only other cities at its far perimeter—Gurgaon, Ghaziabad, Noida, Faridabad,
Bahadurgarh, and Sonipat. It is a desert city, in a bowl, in the vast Gangetic plain.
And perhaps it is for this reason that the Delhi Metro, over the last dozen years, has
given not only shape and new definition to the ever-expanding megacity but also a
greater awareness of those who live and work and depend on this city. Because the
Metro is a system in a set of linked, enclosed spaces, it gives a kind of cohesiveness
to the city, even if it is illusory. Its crowds, then, stand for something. 
The central areas of Delhi have always been for the city’s rich—politicians, 
bureaucrats, lawyers, and the like. These areas form an elite geography 
cordoned off by large roadways and roundabouts, big bungalows, and imposing 
monuments. On the streets you see hawkers and office workers, but it is clear 
they are there to do the bidding of others more powerful than them. Older 
market areas like Karol Bagh or the lanes off Chandni Chowk in the old city 
are markedly different in that they teem with people, activity, and a vast array 
of specialized markets for spices, paper, cloth, and electronics—all domains far 
from the office crowd. The Metro connects these two realities: the older markets 
and the newer malls. Riding it can be a revelation of not only who you see—the 
people, the crowds—but also how they connect to different parts of the city and 
the new cultural geographies that are laid bare. 
Some are surprised that the Delhi Metro feels so crowded, as if they knew 
that the city had a large population but did not realize what that felt like. It is a 
“car” city, not because most people have cars—they don’t—but because so much 
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of the city’s acreage is given over to them. Since the liberalization of the Indian 
economy in the 1990s, cars are attainable like never before. If reaching the 
middle class used to be marked by the possession of a refrigerator and a scooter, 
it is now marked by having a car. The Delhi state government, meanwhile, has 
virtually no restrictions on or costs for parking; it quite literally gives the city 
up to being occupied by cars. Maybe it is not surprising that in this city of crass 
power symbols, the size of one’s car has become the measure of one’s worth and 
sway on the road. The bigger car can always “honk down” the smaller, and the 
smaller usually gives way. Moreover, Delhi has more cars than the four other 
largest Indian cities combined.4 As a result, traffic jams are everywhere, but you 
don’t feel the crowd when you are in a motorized vehicle, since you don’t move
with it. Instead you are in a traffic jam, fuming in your own space or stuck in 
place, metal to metal. You are not in a crowd. 
* * * 
The Metro is, if anything, a study in crowds. It is a leader-less crowd, a collective
of a sort, yes, but one that obviously and regularly submits to the authority and
regularity of the state and the machine. It is also a locatable crowd, one with a
potential of having a common goal or purpose beyond transportation.5 This goal or
purpose has an organizational aspect to it, through the Metro, with the Metro. The
Metro identifies individuals and enables crowd formation all over the city. Kapil, a
Delhi youth organizer, describes it to me this way as he recounts his involvement
in the 2011 anti-corruption protests led by activist Anna Hazare. It is hard for Kapil
to conceal his passion about what he sees as his political awakening. “This was not
about ordinary politics but a revolution,” he explains to me two years later as we
sit in a Café Coffee Day near Lajpat Nagar Metro station in Delhi. It is the kind of
idealism that the Anna Hazare movement was known for, and it fueled people’s
passion for politics in the lead up to the 2013 Delhi state election of the Aam Aadmi
Party (Common Man’s Party) as well as the 2014 national election leading to the
victory of Narendra Modi. “There was a fire inside us,” Kapil continues. “‘Let’s not
waste this opportunity,’ we told ourselves.” The Metro, he believes, formed part of
this awakening of consciousness or at least set the stage for it. It made him see that
he could connect to others—right on the platform, it turned out. He continues: 
On August 14 [2011] I went to the Hauz Khas metro station and met some 
friends from IIT [Indian Institute of Technology] there. I had a tri-color band 
in my hand and so did they.6 We boarded the Metro for Civil Lines. Afer a few 
stations we came to know of other people. When we got to Central Secretariat to 
change, we met a group of people on the platform—about twenty-fve people— 
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coming from Gurgaon. Tey were all carrying fags. Te crowd kept on growing, 
and then we got down. People were there painting faces, fags were being sold. 
Independence Day fever was already there. At Civil Lines [Metro station] there 
were 150 people, people joining from other Metro stations. Tere were also 
hired and state buses. We were going to the Chhatrasal Stadium at Vidan Sabha. 
Leaders were there. On the Metro, we asked people, “Where are you going? 
Come along with us.” You could see who was in the movement and who was not 
in the movement. Another day we’d gone to Pragati Madan Metro station. Te 
police asked us to get into police buses, then a little later they told us to get down; 
they had just wanted to disperse us. Ten another day, police got wind of the fact 
that a group from IIT was going to Sonia Gandhi’s house to protest, so police 
were there at the IIT gate. Tey wouldn’t let us pass; when some [students] came 
forward, they put them in the police bus; we also came forward. Tey took us 
to Vasunt Kunj police station and lef us in an open space—not in the jail—and 
took our names and addresses. Tey kept us there for 3–4 hours, and then let us 
go. Tey didn’t charge any one of us. 
He pauses after telling his story and grins and tells me how from childhood, he
always “wanted to do something.” For Kapil, the Metro was a place that could
conjure a public through rhetoric and identification, by carrying symbols such
as the national flag, but also through mere presence and common destination. It
was a public that already had been introduced to each other through social media
and had been “addressed” through print and television media (Warner 2002). 
As the nation’s capital, Delhi is the site of many protest marches, often 
drawing people from neighboring states depending on the cause. And because 
it is the capital, those protests are highly surveilled by the state. The Metro has 
become a way for protesters to get around the city, to join causes; it has also been 
a way for the state, through the local police, to manage the crowds of protesters, 
often by closing key stations before, during, and after protests. This was the 
case for the Anna Hazare anti-corruption rallies in August 2011, the anti-rape 
demonstrations of December 2012–January 2013, and the anti-farm bill protests 
in 2015. The Metro and the protest have begun to have a symbiotic relationship.7 
In these protests, an idea of the nation is defined and articulated by protesters, 
most often through demands for inclusion or reform. The Metro enables the 
circulation of ideas and symbols, and protesters rely heavily on it (along with 
buses) to get to protest sites. At the same time, the Metro itself is an extension 
of the state infrastructural apparatus and is ultimately a control mechanism for 
state-controlled movement in the city. 
* * * 
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At Kashmere Gate station, one of the largest interchange stations in the system, 
people stand clustered to watch the lighted, moving Metro map, while others 
ascend the tall escalators that afford them a view of the massive station and their 
fellow passengers on the escalator beside them, moving in the opposite direction. 
Behavior is not only tempered, it is also considered. This consideration is a 
not only characterized by reflection but more specifically by regard. It is not 
that Metro riders show great regard for one another; they certainly don’t when 
entering crowded trains and not letting passengers get off before they push on. 
Yet there is regard in the sense of recognizing others in a new milieu that offers 
access to a wider swath of the population than most other urban spaces. There 
is a potential in each crowd and recognition of the crowd, by those in it and 
those just beyond it. This recognition—of people by people—is a new kind of 
“regarding” that is happening in this city, in these closed quarters, banked by 
booths and electronic gates, low ceilings and yellow lights, and also in those 
aboveground, fair-like stations, which are breezy and wide. This regard, which 
is something more than just visibility, does not necessarily translate into greater 
consideration for people, but it does widen the sense of the urban as a shared 
space with some shared goals, to see oneself in relation to others with a kind of 
regularity. And for this reason, social conflicts in the Metro demonstrate the 
nature of the urban as much as moments of reconciliation might. 
When might a metro crowd be recognized as a public? This question has 
shadowed the arrival of the Metro almost from its beginning in late 2002. 
What kind of collection of people, of commuters, of occasional riders, would 
assemble? And what might their newfound relationality to one another mean? 
As Aasheesh Sharma et al. write in “The Social Engine,” in the Hindustan Times
(October 1, 2011): “It is in the air-conditioned Bombardier coaches that the 
BMW crowd meets labourers, Chawri Bazaar traders discuss property prices 
with IT consultants and doctors quarrel with babus over standing room.” Here 
the value of the Metro public is the meeting of people across social classes. As the 
title of the article suggests, there is a sense that the Metro naturally accomplishes 
a kind of social work involving cross-class recognition. 
If the crowd is characterized by a physical experience and set of sensations,
bounded in a specific time and place, then a public is different. A public is not
necessarily connected to a reality in the here and now but rather to life experiences
and circumstances beyond a physical grouping; it is an idea as much as it is a
lived reality. Publics are multiple but also evanescent. So perhaps the question is
really about the nature of the metro crowd, which is surely composed of different
publics, with different political interests and proclivities. The Metro allows new
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forms of circulation of people and goods, but also of texts, such as advertisements
and announcement boards.8 A Metro public, meanwhile, might be recognizable
as such both off the train and on one. It comes into being through discourse rather
than the physical manifestation of crowds.9 In Delhi, the discourse on the Metro
public is often framed in terms of the ameliorative affect the Metro is meant to
have on “unruly” publics. The idea is that its order and cleanliness will rub off on
people and make them more in touch with their civic sensibilities. Rather than
be seen as regressive, Delhi’s metro crowds have more often symbolized a new
social order, and the Metro itself a kind of governance. An aspect of this order
homogenizes people’s behavior, creating new norms required for the trains to
operate, and yes, run on time. Nevertheless, there is a kind of social, political, and
cultural exposure that is happening to people as they ride the trains, too. This
aspect is harder to characterize. I sense it happening to me as I see others in a new
way and see the city itself, its landscapes and buildings, and people on its rooftops,
in new ways. It is a kind of recognition. And yet it may be empty of politics. 
* * * 
On September 28, 2014, three African students riding the Metro were chased after
and attacked by a metro crowd turned mob. The three males—two from Gabon,
one from Burkina Faso—were taking the Metro back to their home in Noida when
they got into an altercation with three other Metro passengers. The dispute moved
from the train to the platform when one of the African students was pushed out of
the train when it stopped at a station. The students were then pursued all the way to
a Delhi police kiosk in the busy Rajiv Chowk station at the city’s center, Connaught
Place. They were then alternately heckled at and jeered at by the mob and beaten
with metal rods. Locally, the shock was initially about the fact that something so
untoward, so chaotic and so undisciplined could happen on the Metro. Then,
once videos of the event were uploaded on YouTube, stories in the national and
international press focused on the racial aspect of the story.10 The students were not
only black but also foreign nationals studying at one of the country’s new private
universities. There was first a rumor that the students had been harassing a female
passenger when three Indian males intervened and started beating them up. This
narrative was celebrated minutes after the event when the mob started chanting
Vande Mataram (“Hail to the Mother”), the colonial-era nationalist chant. More
than anything, it underlined the xenophobic nature of the attack. 
The story from the perspective of the African students emerged only after
the incident. They said three Indian passengers were taking photos of them
while laughing, and when they protested, a scuffle ensued. At Rajiv Chowk
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station, one of the African students was pushed out of the train, and the others
followed, thrashing all three of them on the platform, where a Delhi policeman
also happened to be. The policeman took the six to the police kiosk within the
station, and it was during that period that people began to relentlessly pursue
and attack the three African students. On this point the story told by the African
students, which appeared on the online news website, Firstpost, is supported by
the videos taken of the event, which went viral and led to the story being picked
up internationally.11 One of the students, Yohan, who studies at Amity University
in Noida, described what happened: 
Tey were daring us to come outside. As the policemen who had rescued and 
brought us to the enclosure lef the spot, the cop who was deployed in the kiosk 
also stepped out afer some time and told the mob gathered outside something 
in Hindi, which we could not understand. We bolted the booth from inside to 
save our lives, but the frenzied mob smashed the glass facade and entered the 
police booth. Tey started hitting us with sticks and rods. Some of them were 
throwing furniture on us.12 
In the video, the African students are in the police kiosk, with clear panes of
glass all around. Their panic inside the booth is visible from the outside as
they scramble and climb through the windows of the kiosk to the roof in an
attempt to escape the mob violence. Then one of them gets on top of the roof;
he is a tall man; he could almost look imposing were it not for the fact that he
is hunched over, looking down at the mob jeering at him. Then, men from the
mob climb up after two of the students, striking them with long metal objects.
Police at turns look concerned and bored but act only to separate the mob
from the African students at the end of the video, which lasts a painfully long
five minutes. On the sidelines of the video footage, blurred and shaky, stands
a Yes Bank ATM, with a poster reading, “Invest in a Prospering India. Say Yes
to Growth.” It is not right side up for most of the video but becomes strikingly
legible by the end. 
There is something disturbingly light and almost festive about the look and 
sound of the crowd turned mob. At the edges of the crowd, people—nearly all 
of them men—are holding their phones high, capturing it all and perhaps trying 
to negotiate the line between participant and observer. Where one stands in 
this crowd can distinguish one from being an accomplice to being a witness, 
especially for those buffering their own involvement by holding up their phones. 
The African students were eventually saved from the mob and taken to
the hospital by several policemen who cordoned off the area near the Delhi
police kiosk. On the one hand, this could be seen as an isolated event, and it is
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certainly not what usually happens on the Delhi Metro. On the other hand, it
was a story that everyone could believe, especially in light of other recent racist
episodes targeting Africans in Delhi.13 Racial slights and insults among Indians
and between national and ethnic groups are not uncommon in the capital city.
In this case, the Metro could be read as a microcosm of urban society, with all
of its diversity and its prejudices. It could also reveal the underside of the new
civility that has come to be expected and even celebrated on the Metro. The
aspect of the story that seemed to turn it into a national and then international
news story was not that it was just a racially motivated attack in a cosmopolitan
city but rather that it happened on the Delhi Metro, which has been cast as
a liberal, disciplined space. If the Metro is meant to be the city’s new social
engine and social leveler, it came as a shock to see it as the site of an unruly
mob. 
Is, then, the telling of this story of the violent metro “crowd” or, rather, the 
metro “mob” another way for people to talk about “society”? By “society,” I mean 
the much larger set of relations between people off the trains. To what extent 
is the Metro an enclosed space, cut off from the outside, or a space contiguous 
with the city? For the youth activist, Kapil, the space of the Metro was a place 
to find like-minded people, a physical manifestation—or possibility—of a 
public. In the video of the mob attacking the African students, the metro mob 
represents a kind of mobilization. The mob has intent and purpose; it has rallied 
around a particular cause, or been rallied to a particular cause, with partial or 
faulty information or else an indifference to the accuracy of the information. 
The mob moves in unison and ramps up the physical intensity of the typical 
metro crowd. But the mob is also subject to management. In both the protest 
described by Kapil and the attack on the African students, the national, in very 
different contexts, is invoked through flags and song. In key moments, it can 
become a unifier and identifier for any purpose. 
This unpredictability—or malleability—of the crowd raises the question of 
whether or to what extent design and infrastructure matter. What might turn 
a crowd into a mob? On the one hand, a metro system is a form of global mass 
transit; and on the other, it is embedded in local issues, politics, and communities. 
While, for example, the ladies’ coach of the Delhi Metro certainly creates a 
secure and safe space for women commuters, it also skews the ratio of men to 
women in the rest of the train, altering all manner of social dynamics and crowd 
formations. The ladies’ coach may be celebrated as a refuge for women, even 
as the skewed gender ratio in the general coaches creates the dominant social 
formations on the train. It is impossible to say whether the presence of more 
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women in the general coach would have prevented the attack on the African 
students, but it may very well have altered the dynamics. 
* * * 
On the way to Mundka on Tuesday morning, I take the Violet Line in south 
Delhi to Central Secretariat where I change to the Yellow Line. At Kashmere 
Gate, I take the Red Line to Rithala, this time changing at Inderlok station to 
the Green Line. I then travel due west aboveground to Mundka, the end of the 
line station a few miles from the Haryana state border. The crowd in the ladies’ 
coach changes along the route: women wear more synthetic fabrics, the designs 
on saris become bigger, the gems on jeans shinier, there are more downcast looks 
and fewer confident bodies. These details are hard to assess, hard to document, 
but when all else in the Metro is constant, they are also hard to miss. The view 
outside is miles and miles of three-story concrete buildings, stacked one against 
another, chipped and crumbling. Nevertheless there is an unmistakable beauty 
in the hazy sky and the wide vista. 
It is days before Delhi’s state election of February 2015. On the way out to 
Mundka, Bharatiya Janata Party posters, featuring Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi, beseech passengers to “chalo chalein Modi ke saath” (“Come along with 
Modi”). Returning to central Delhi, ads from the Aam Aadmi Party promise the 
institution of a mobile phone safety button and CCTV cameras covering the 
entire city. Women sleep and chat under the posters.14 
When you get down at Mundka, a line of small white vans waits for passengers 
at the bottom of the escalator. Young men call out place names, all across the 
Haryana border. Cow dung patties dry in the sun to one side of the station 
escalator; jagged lines of cars and buses jostle on the other. Half-built Metro 
stanchions to support future stations rise up in the distance. Leaving Mundka, 
Raveena, a woman in her twenties, gets on the ladies’ coach with me. We start 
to chat, and she tells me that her father drops her and picks her up at the station 
each day. She lives in Bahadurgarh, which is a few kilometers from Mundka, just 
over the Haryana border. She takes the Metro a few stops eastward to Paschim 
Vihar, where her college is. She is certain that she would not be on the Metro at 
all if it were not for the ladies’ coach. “After Mundka, it’s good,” she says, “but 
before Mundka, it’s very bad, the crowd and all.” For Raveena, “crowd” is about 
place, about where you are from and the attitudes you may hold. It is an imagined 
likeness and social reality but perhaps more a public than an actual crowd. It is 
also, of course, a manner of speaking. Nonetheless, in her discourse we see where 
crowd and public might coalesce. “Haryana is not good, not good for girls. Men 
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are not good, even boys. They stare at me, sometimes they vent at me. I can’t do 
anything,” she explains. “Vent” is typical Delhi-speak to describe when someone 
lashes out in a stream of verbal abuse erupting like a volcano. On the street they 
see her as a species rather than a person. What are they angry about? That she 
is a girl in public, that she moves with confidence, that she is protected, that she 
studies, that they don’t have girlfriends, that they don’t have jobs, that, ironically 
enough, there aren’t more women around.15 The metro crowd is simply more 
“neutral,” Raveena says, and I also see that it allows her to imagine, and perhaps 
enact, a future beyond it. 
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Emotional Entrainment in Crowds  
and Other Social Formations 
Douglas Hollan 
The sociologist, Randall Collins (2004, 2009), has recently argued that emotional 
entrainment—the process whereby interacting human nervous systems can 
become physiologically and rhythmically attuned to one another—is a primary 
element of all social formations, including crowds. Collins uses and endorses 
recent research from a variety of disciplines suggesting that biologically based, 
embodied forms of imitation and mutual attunement, including empathy, 
mirror neurons, and sensitivity to facial expressions, are far more central to 
human social and cultural behavior than previously imagined. In this chapter, 
I use ethnographic and clinical material from rural Indonesia and the urban 
United States, respectively, to critically examine some of Collins’s claims about 
the role of emotional entrainment in crowds and other social formations. 
I argue that while Collins is certainly correct in drawing our attention back 
to the ways in which social formations are embodied in deeply emotional and 
intersubjective ways, he errs in suggesting that people entrain to other bodies in 
fairly uniform ways, under the influence of a mutual focus of attention. People 
in crowds and other groups entrain to one another, but they entrain to particular 
bodies in particular historical and cultural moments. These histories of mutual 
encounter leave particularized emotional residues in people that loop into 
future engagements in complex and emergent ways that cannot be predicted 
from a person’s habitus alone. Because Collins overgeneralizes the way emotions 
become entrained for people—a key part of his theory—he is unable to account 
for the various ways in which people’s emotional ghosts and memories are 
aroused to new life by social interaction. 
I begin by reviewing Collins’s theory of the centrality of emotions 
and emotional entrainment in human sociality and then use some of the 
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psychoanalyst Hans Loewald’s observations about the fluidity and contingent 
emergence of unconscious or preconscious thoughts, feelings, and images to 
suggest the limits of his theory. I illustrate and discuss these theoretical points 
by analyzing clinical and ethnographic case material from Toraja, Indonesia and 
the greater Los Angeles area of southern California. I conclude by suggesting 
that the “crowd” of emotional ghosts circulating within any group of people 
always far exceeds the number of concrete bodies present per se, which is why 
many social formations, whether highly organized and scripted or not, remain 
as emergent and unpredictable as they do. 
My critique of Collins’s entrainment theory is based on data gathered 
through an ethnographic and clinical approach that Robert I. Levy and I have 
referred to as person-centered ethnography and observation (Levy and Hollan 
2014). Person-centered ethnography attempts to represent human behavior 
and subjective experience from the point of view of the acting, intending, and 
attentive subject and to actively explore, rather than to assume, the emotional 
and motivational saliency of social, cultural, political, and economic forces. The 
focus is not only on the behavioral environment in which a person acts, but 
also on how individual persons are reacting to, embodying, internalizing, and 
transforming that environment. This includes investigating—often through 
open-ended interviewing techniques—what a person might be thinking, feeling, 
sensing, imagining, fantasizing, and dreaming as well as what they might be 
enacting through more overt forms of expression and behavior. Such a fine-
grained ethnographic approach is well suited, indeed even necessary, to evaluate 
the kind of broad claims Collins makes about the role of emotional entrainment 
in the formation and reproduction of social groupings, including crowds. 
Collins’s theory of interaction rituals 
In two recent books, Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) and Violence: A Micro-
Sociological Theory (2009), Collins develops a theory of interactions rituals 
as central to human life. Collins uses the concept of a “ritual” very broadly 
to include nearly any type of social interaction imaginable, including what 
are often referred to as “crowds,” though he focuses primarily on face-to-face 
interactions in real time. The physical presence of human bodies interacting 
with one another is critical to his theory, since it is the emotional entrainment 
these bodies generate in one another that drives and explains much of social 
life. According to Collins, “Interaction rituals in general are processes that take 
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place as human bodies come close enough to each other that their nervous 
systems become mutually attuned in rhythms and anticipations of each other, 
and the physiological substratum that produces emotions in one individual’s 
body becomes stimulated in feedback loops that run through the other person’s” 
(2004: xix). Here Collins uses and endorses recent research from a variety of 
disciplines suggesting that biologically based, embodied forms of imitation and 
mutual attunement—including empathy, mirror neurons, and recognition of 
facial expressions—are far more central and critical to human social and cultural 
behavior than previously imagined. Nevertheless, he argues forcefully, in good 
sociological fashion, that it is social interaction that drives these chains of 
emotional and physiological arousal and entrainment, not the other way around. 
According to Collins, then, emotional entrainment does not happen in 
a social vacuum. It primes and is primed by common actions or events or by 
a mutual focus of attention, separating out those people who are part of the 
interaction from those who are not. Bodies can be drawn near by a mutual 
focus of attention, or the emotional arousal caused by nearby bodies can 
facilitate a mutual focus of attention, but both must be present for a “successful” 
ritual to occur, and both processes are mutually reinforcing. As feedback and 
reinforcement between emotions and mutual focus intensify through rhythmic 
entrainment, the interaction ritual generates, when successful, a collective 
effervescence leading to a sense of collective solidarity, to symbols of social 
relationship, and to common standards of morality, such that participants in 
the ritual feel righteous anger and indignation when the ritual frame or sense of 
solidarity is violated in some way. 
Successful rituals also generate positive emotional energy—a collective 
effervescence—in participants, so that they feel confidence, elation, strength, 
enthusiasm, and initiative, much of which is carried away from the ritual and 
into other arenas of life. Collins argues that people tend to seek out, consciously 
and very much unconsciously, gatherings, crowds, and rituals that give them a 
sense of emotional energy and social solidarity while avoiding those that do not. 
“We operate,” he says, “through an emotional magnetism toward and repulsion 
from particular thoughts and situations in the flow of everyday life; we are 
seldom reflective about this, and are often grossly inaccurate in our assessments 
when we are reflective” (Collins 2004: 97). 
Collins is a sociologist and so of course he cites primarily sociological work
in the development of what he refers to as his “radical microsociology” theory
of “mutual focus/emotional-entrainment” mechanisms and processes, drawing
on and integrating especially some of the classical ideas and concepts of Emile
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Durkheim and Erving Goffman. Yet his theory resonates deeply with some earlier
anthropological work as well. The emphasis on complex feedback and feedforward
loops among dynamically related and mutually sensitive bodies leading to
predictable types of interactional patterns closely resembles Gregory Bateson’s
(1972) identification of what he referred to as “schismogenic” patterns of social
interaction and his ideas about an “ecology of mind.” The idea that people are
unconsciously drawn to certain kinds of interactions, roles, meanings, and symbols
while unconsciously avoidant of or repelled by others, overlaps considerably with
Gananath Obeyesekere’s (1981, 1990) concept of “personal symbols,” nonobligatory
aspects of culture that can acquire deep, usually unconscious, significance and
expressive capacity for some people but not for others. According to Obeyesekere,
it is the unconscious differential emotional investment in certain kinds of symbols
and meanings but not in others that distinguishes personal symbols from all other
types of meanings in the cultural and social world. 
Te limits of Collins’s theory 
Collins theorizes that the “emotional magnetism” driving social circulation and 
interactional participation can be explained in fairly straightforward sociological 
terms: as people participate in the interactional rituals that are available to them, 
they find themselves attracted, usually in a less than conscious way, to those 
interactions that enhance their emotional energy and sense of social solidarity 
while avoiding those that do not. Over time, this pattern of social participation 
becomes internalized, such that people’s thoughts, dreams, fantasies, and 
internal dialogs begin to mirror and reproduce the meanings and emotions of 
the interactions they have participated in, which sustains their emotional energy 
between rituals and which in turn, inclines people back toward social gatherings 
where those meanings and emotions can be evoked and enacted with others. 
Collins acknowledges that many attempted rituals, crowds, and social gatherings
fail, leaving participants feeling flat or even drained of energy, and that even in
successful interactions, the emotional energy field is often unevenly distributed
among the participants, so that some people are deeply engaged and energized while
others may remain on the margins. He argues that some of this interactional failure
and emotional inequality can be explained by structural variables such as power
or status differentials, but I think it is exactly here where his model of emotional
entrainment begins to fail him. This is because the model’s basic assumptions— 
bodies entrain, people mutually focus, leading to a common emotional experience
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and sense of solidarity—do not capture the kind of emotional complexities and
ambivalences, whether for structural reasons of power and status or otherwise,
that can haunt people in even the most successful of interactions. Indeed it is such
emotional complexity and variability that helps to explain why so many social
formations, including many types of crowds, can be as messy, unpredictable, and
emergent as they are. I turn now to the work of the psychoanalyst Hans Loewald
to help illuminate some of these emotional complexities. 
Ghosts of the unconscious 
In one of Loewald’s most widely cited articles, “On the Therapeutic Action 
of Psychoanalysis” (2000), he discusses the centrality and importance of 
“transference” in human life. By transference he means not only the unwitting 
transfer of emotional reactions and expectations developed in interaction with 
known intimates onto others who are less well known and with whom one is less 
intimate—the traditional psychoanalytic sense—but also the way unconscious 
memories and emotions come to infuse and animate consciousness and 
experience more generally and, in turn, how more conscious and organized parts 
of mind come to give form, meaning, and expression to thoughts, feelings, and 
perceptions that otherwise remain latent and unformulated. Such transference 
or communication among different parts of the self-system and between the 
self and other people and objects is critical, he argues, for the linking of past to 
present and future, of memory to perception, and of emotion and motivation 
to action and behavior. When such linkage breaks down, people can become 
haunted by the “ghosts” of the less conscious parts of mind, which may press 
for recognition in the form of recurring dreams and memories or somatic and 
emotional sensations or symptoms of various kinds. 
Loewald borrows the idea of ghosts of the unconscious from Freud, who in
chapter seven of The Interpretation of Dreams likens the persistence of unconscious
thoughts and wishes to the ghosts of the underworld in the Odyssey: “If I may use
a simile, they [unconscious thoughts and wishes] are only capable of annihilation
in the same sense as the ghosts in the underworld of the Odyssey—ghosts which
awoke to new life as soon as they tasted blood” (Freud 1965: 592n1). Loewald
uses this metaphor of unconscious ghosts to discuss how psychoanalysts use the
transference between analyst and client to evoke the client’s most troubling but
unconscious thoughts and feelings, so that they can be brought into the light of
conscious awareness and given new meaning and conscious articulation: 
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Transference is pathological insofar as the unconscious is a crowd of ghosts, 
and this is the beginning of the transference neurosis in analysis: ghosts of the 
unconscious, imprisoned by defenses and symptoms, are allowed to taste blood, 
are let loose. In the daylight of analysis the ghosts of the unconscious are laid 
and led to rest as ancestors whose power is taken over and transformed into 
the newer intensity of present life, of the secondary process and contemporary 
objects. (Loewald 2000: 249) 
The concept and image of a person’s inner world and unconscious that we get 
from Loewald (and many other psychoanalysts) is very different than the one 
we get from Collins. Collins focuses on the social aspects of this inner world: 
how over time, through a process of internalization, a person’s thoughts, dreams, 
fantasies, and inner dialogs begin to mirror and reproduce the meanings and 
emotions of the interactions they have participated in. He suggests, for example: 
If we had a large enough collection of chains of thoughts from people in particular 
situations, it may well turn out that they think many of the same elements, 
even arranged in many of the same combinations. With greater theoretical 
abstraction, examining the formative conditions of inner IR [interaction ritual] 
chains, the commonality we fnd must be still greater. (Collins 2004: 220) 
And indeed this is a key aspect of his entrainment theory: that through rhythmic 
entrainment of emotion and attention, successful interaction rituals produce 
common and collective thoughts and sensations of solidarity and effervescence 
that, in turn, motivate people to seek out similar interactions and rituals in 
the future and to avoid those that do not reinforce such emotionally gratifying 
thoughts and sensations. 
Loewald’s unconscious “crowd of ghosts,” on the other hand, is the emotional, 
cognitive, and fantasy residues of a person’s past interactions with others that 
have either been pushed out of awareness for defensive purposes or which have 
simply remained out of conscious thought because attention and symbolic and 
linguistic elaboration have been drawn elsewhere (Hollan 2000). While some of 
these ghosts become socialized and reflective of collective thought and sensation 
in just the way Collins suggests, many of them remain highly particular to the 
individual, resulting from a person’s unique history of interaction with other 
people in which emotionally related thoughts and feelings become associated 
to one another in a nonlinear looping way (Hollan 2012). Such associations 
of emotionally connected thoughts and memories, linking past interactional 
experiences to each other and to those occurring in the here and now, may 
“haunt” present interactions with thoughts or sensations that, from a third 
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person point of view, often seem to undermine, contradict, or be inconsistent 
with the most readily observable and apparent aspects of the interaction. For 
example, a person’s apparently joyful interactions might be haunted by the sense 
that the joy cannot possibly last for more than a moment. A person about to 
receive some form of social recognition or appreciation might be haunted by 
the sense that she is really a fraud deserving of nothing more than contempt. 
Expressions of love for another might be haunted by feelings of anger and 
disappointment, and so on. 
From a Loewaldian perspective, such emotional hauntings reflect the 
ambivalence and ambiguity that are a part of almost all social interactions. 
Although overt enactments of most public behavior can receive relatively direct 
feedback and socialization from others, and so can be brought into conformity 
with cultural expectations or ideals fairly easily, the emotions and imaginings 
accompanying many enactments are not so easily socialized and controlled. 
People can and do experience thoughts, emotions, and fantasies during an 
interaction that are at odds with its ostensible meanings and purposes. Such 
contrary thoughts and feelings can be left unattended or pushed out of conscious 
awareness, but they remain labile and can be stirred back into consciousness 
if they are allowed to taste new blood; that is, if present or future interactions 
present emotional stimuli to which the unattended or repressed thoughts and 
feelings can be associated. 
Loewald notes that psychoanalysts inevitably and deliberately evoke the 
transference of these unattended and repressed thoughts and feelings during the 
course of analytic treatment, but of course they are inevitably stirred and evoked 
by other types of interactions as well, including crowd formation. And indeed, 
this is where Loewald’s model of emotional evocation and entrainment differs 
considerably from Collins’s. Rather than assume that emotional entrainment and 
common focus lead to the development of common and collective inner worlds, 
Loewald would maintain that people may respond to social interactions in 
various and unique ways—depending on past relationship experience—and that 
some of these less common thoughts and feelings will remain durable, susceptible 
to being reignited and expressed if presented with the right emotional stimuli. 
From this perspective, the crowd of unconscious ghosts that people bring into 
social interactions always far exceeds the number of actual participants present, 
and the range of ways in which these unattended or repressed thoughts and 
memories may be stirred (or further repressed) by an interaction will also remain 
broad and contingent, depending on whom the other participants are and on 
how the interaction unfolds. There is emotional action and reaction here, but of 
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a kind that is much more emergent and unpredictable than Collins suggests. Let 
me now present some ethnographic and clinical “hauntings” that illustrate some 
of these points and which allow me to develop the discussion further. 
Hauntings 
Nene’na Limbong, Toraja, South Sulawesi, Indonesia 
Nene’na Limbong was one of the men I knew well during the time I was doing 
fieldwork in a mountain village in Toraja on the island of Sulawesi in Indonesia 
in the 1980s and ’90s (Hollan and Wellenkamp 1994, 1996). Nene’na Limbong 
was a high-status man, and a relatively wealthy one by local standards—meaning 
only that he and his family could afford to eat rice throughout the year rather 
than needing to supplement their diet with sweet potatoes, cassava, or other 
foods that were considered inferior to rice. Most Toraja at that time were wet 
rice farmers, living in small, widely scattered hamlets across high valleys and 
mountainsides, though many of the younger people were beginning to migrate 
to other parts of Sulawesi and Indonesia for employment and education. 
In part because Nene’na Limbong had the social means and position to 
do so, he was an active participant in community feasts, especially feasts at 
funerals,1 at which he would slaughter as many water buffalo, pigs, and chickens 
as he could afford and thought appropriate, so that meat could be distributed 
throughout the community according to people’s relative social position, and so 
that he himself could gain prestige through this contribution of animals. These 
funeral feasts were often large and lively events, drawing not only the immediate 
and extended family of the deceased, but also many of the deceased family’s 
friends, neighbors, and feasting partners. People were excited to see how many 
and what kind of animals were being contributed by whom and to whom the 
slaughtered meat of those animals would be distributed. Meat was supposed to 
be distributed according to relative social status, but determinations of relative 
social status were always in play, given that people could enhance their status 
by donating and slaughtering more animals. This made the meat division at a 
funeral a highly charged event, and one that could be quite contentious at times, 
as people argued about who deserved what kind of meat and how much. Indeed, 
by the 1980s, such disputes and the great expense of many funerals had led some 
Toraja, especially younger and more educated ones, to think that funerals had 
become a waste of time and resources. 
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Nevertheless, the Toraja feast remains, in many ways, the classic effervescence-
generating social gathering that is central to Collins’s theory: bodies come 
together in close proximity with a heightened mutual focus, in this case, an 
intense focus on the kind and number of animals to be slaughtered and on to 
whom the animals’ meat will be distributed. Nene’na Limbong certainly gained 
emotional energy and a sense of satisfaction from these feasts, since as long as 
he continued to contribute animals to them, they reasserted and maintained 
his social position. He was considered a “big” and important man in large part 
because he was known for having donated many animals to feasts over the years 
and it was assumed that his own funeral would be an important event, to which 
many people, in turn, would contribute large numbers of animals for feasting. 
Yet even such an obvious beneficiary of feasting activities as Nene’na Limbong 
was ambivalent about his participation. This was not obvious from his public 
behavior, much of which was reinforcing of the feasting culture, just as Collins 
might predict. But when we were once talking about his past and present 
nighttime dreams,2 he told me one in which he had seen his body being cut up 
and distributed to people in just the way a buffalo is butchered and distributed at 
a feast.3 He had been frightened by this image of himself as a sacrificial animal— 
in part because such dreams were thought to be prophetic—and the memory 
of the dream from several years prior was still fresh in his mind and easily and 
vividly narrated to me. 
Loewald would probably argue that the dream captured Nene’na Limbong’s 
implicit awareness that his life-sustaining interdependencies with others, as 
epitomized on feasting occasions, were also at some level overwhelming and 
even murderous to him. The dream captured this awareness graphically and 
dramatically and drew Nene’na Limbong’s focused attention in a way that his day-
to-day complaints about lower status people using the local rules of reciprocity 
to take advantage of him did not. His wariness and fear of others’ needs and 
demands had been pushed out of his everyday consciousness for the most 
part, but were not absorbed and replaced by collective focus and effervescence 
as a result of his participation in feasting. Rather, his wariness had remained 
durable and could be stirred into dream consciousness, and then into waking 
consciousness, by his chance encounters in everyday life in a transference-like 
way. So while Nene’na Limbong’s participation in feasts and other communal 
gatherings elevated his mood and energy in some ways, it also aroused and 
entrained contrary emotions and images that were far from promoting solidarity, 
trust, or confidence. The same kind of interactional ritual not only attracted, 
but also repulsed, and left behind a distinctive emotional residue of wariness 
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and fear. While many people knew that Nene’na Limbong often complained 
that others’ were taking advantage of his obligation to share his relative wealth, 
few could imagine that such a fortunate and high-status person could actually 
envision himself to be as helpless and vulnerable as a sacrificial animal. 
George, Southern California, USA 
Let me now move to a psychotherapeutic consulting room in southern California 
where George, a white, middle-aged, middle-class, unemployed man I have 
known for several years, described to me what it feels like to have the possibility 
of being hired back for contract work by the same corporation that let him go 
only the year before to downsize payroll and pension obligations. I am turning 
to this example to illustrate the broad range of social rituals and interactions that 
Collins’s theory is meant to cover and explicate. Work interactions and rituals 
are less crowd-like than the Toraja funeral feast since they usually involve fewer 
people, are more scripted, and occur on a regular and routine basis, but they too 
involve the mutual focus of attention and rhythmic entrainment that optimally 
lead workers to a sense of collective solidarity and achievement. The issue once 
again is, does rhythmic entrainment and a mutual focus of attention, which are 
common to many social formations (including work rituals), lead to the kind 
of common, collective feelings and inner dialogs and to the kind of predictable 
future social behavior as a result of emotional magnetism, as Collins claims? 
Or, as someone like Loewald would no doubt argue, must things inevitably be 
more complicated than this, given the significance and ubiquity of transference 
in human life? 
George began by telling me how torn he was about the idea of returning to 
work. On the one hand, he needed the money. But he also enjoyed his work, and 
he was very proud of the long and successful career he had had with his previous 
employer. He had also enjoyed the collegial relations he had developed with 
some of his co-workers and the opportunities they have given him for learning 
new skills and new approaches to his work. Collins would probably argue that 
George’s strong urge to return to work illustrates that his previous work rituals 
and interactions had been successful ones, and that the positive emotional 
energy and sense of collective solidarity they had developed in him were now 
impelling him back to work, just as his theory would predict. 
However, George’s self esteem had been deeply wounded by his laying off, 
this despite the fact that he “knew” rationally that his managers were just 
responding to corporate orders and to the changing world economy. The job he 
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was being asked to return to, including salary, was nearly identical to the one he 
had left, but now that his bureaucratic and legal status had changed from regular 
employee to contract worker, he felt differently about things. He felt ashamed 
about returning to the same job with a diminished status, and he worried what 
others would think of him if he did such a thing. Would they think he had no 
shame or that he had no better prospects, even though from the point of view 
of Collins’s theory, he is being offered an opportunity to reestablish gratifying 
rituals with people? 
While George was telling me about these mixed feelings and motivations, he 
began to remember a disturbing dream from the previous night in which a gang 
of men had been pulling him into the darkness to assault him. This then led to 
a number of recollections about how he was often bullied as a child, and how 
ashamed he was then and now that he was never able to stand up for himself. 
A week later, George decided to accept the temporary contract work, feeling 
that he had no choice, given his financial situation. While at first glance the level 
of coercion or ambivalence that George feels about returning to work would 
seem to indicate a different kind of interaction ritual than the ones Collins is 
concerned with—those in which participation is determined more by emotional 
attraction or repulsion than by structural or other deterministic variables—I want 
to suggest just the opposite: that many interaction rituals, including everyday 
work rituals and other types of crowd formations, generate more ambivalence 
in people than Collins’s model would indicate. Very few social interactions 
involve complete “choice” or “free” emotional magnetism or repulsion on the 
part of participants. If people do not feel constrained or pressured to participate 
in social interactions by financial or economic necessity, as does George, they 
may feel constrained by cultural or political expectation, or by fear of hurting 
people, or by fear of loss of status or esteem, or by fear of ostracism, and so on. 
George’s case may be a strong example of how a social interaction may engender 
or entail emotions that run counter to its most explicitly communicated goals 
and purposes, but it is by no means unusual in this regard. And while people 
may be fully conscious of some aspect of their ambivalence toward a certain type 
of social interaction, other aspects only become more conscious as repressed or 
unconscious thoughts and emotions become stirred or triggered by immersion 
in the interaction, exactly as someone like Loewald would hypothesize. 
When George eventually learned that he would have to undergo a standard 
background and financial check before he would given access back to the same 
offices where he had worked for over twenty years as a full-time employee, he 
was angered and humiliated yet again, and his ambivalence about returning to 
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work grew even stronger. In this context, he remembered another recent dream: 
“I am in a classroom of some kind, towards the back, feeling distant from the 
teacher and other students up front.” As he is recounting this dream, he tells me 
it reminds him of the second-grade teacher he told me about before, one who 
once pulled him out of class to tell him how disappointed she was in him. “You 
are smart enough to be in the front of the class with the other good students, if 
you would just put your mind to it,” she told him. 
While George is consciously aware of how humiliating it is for him to return to 
work under the circumstances that were presented to him, he is mostly unaware 
of his own implicit tendency to emotionally link together actual and imagined 
episodes of humiliation from throughout his life: his feelings of humiliation about 
returning to work precipitate dreams about being assaulted and about sitting in 
the back of a classroom feeling alienated and ashamed, which in turn stir up 
memories of never being able to defend or stand up for himself and of being 
reprimanded by his second-grade teacher for not working hard enough. These 
linkages become more conscious and recognizable for George, and for myself, 
as he spontaneously verbalizes his thoughts, feelings, and dreams in a stream of 
consciousness sort of way. Prior to this, however, there is no awareness, only the 
sense that the thoughts and emotions flood over him in an unbidden way. 
Of course the flip side of this from a social interactional point of view is 
that George’s interlocutors are also not likely to be aware of his tendency to re-
experience emotions and memories in this way. George’s manager, for example, 
may know that George might feel embarrassed about coming back to work as a 
contract worker, but of course he has no way of knowing that George actually 
dreams of it as a kind of assault. As with Nene’na Limbong, there is a haunting 
entrainment of emotion going on here, but it is a nonlinear, looping one, linking 
together emotional resonances from past and present in ways that would elude 
Collins’s model of relatively smooth social participation and reproduction. 
Toward a specifcity of emotional entrainment 
Collins theory of interactional rituals does us a service by drawing our attention 
back to the ways in which social formations, including crowds of all kinds, 
are embodied in deeply emotional ways. I think he is also right in his efforts 
to acknowledge and attempt to integrate new biological and neuroscience 
research about emotional entrainment into social theory. As Collins notes, to 
acknowledge this research is not to give it a privileged position, but rather to 
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acknowledge and understand better some of the mechanisms through which 
social formations may affect and shape emotions, bodies, and physiology in very 
concrete, identifiable ways. I have also suggested, however, that Collins’s model 
of emotional entrainment can be misleading, implying as it does that a mutual 
focus of attention, coupled with close bodily interaction, will lead to a fairly 
uniform emotional experience for members of a group that will in turn, incline 
those same people back toward similar interactions and emotional experiences 
in the future, or conversely will lead them to avoid interactions that are less 
gratifying. In contrast, my ethnographic and clinical examples illustrate that the 
overt meanings of an interaction ritual, no matter to what extent attention is 
focused or constrained, do not necessarily coincide with the implicit emotional 
meanings for the participants involved, which may be varied and contradictory 
(cf. Spiro 1984, Obeyesekere 1981, 1990). That is why someone like Nene’na 
Limbong can be haunted by dreams and images of himself as a sacrificial animal 
even though the Toraja feast reinforces and enhances his social position in many 
ways. 
George’s case is also problematic for Collins’s theory: the theory of emotional 
magnetism implies that people will either gain emotional energy and a sense of 
solidarity from participating in a certain kind of interaction or they will not. If 
they do, they will be drawn back to similar interactions in the future. If they do 
not, they will learn to avoid those kinds of interactions in the future. But George 
both did and did not want to return to work, for very particular reasons. He 
wanted an opportunity to work and to learn, he wanted a chance to reestablish 
collegial ties with his former workmates, and he wanted and needed a chance 
to earn money. In many of these ways, he is just like any other person who has 
had gratifying work experiences and wants the chance to have them again—just 
as Collins’s theory would predict. What the theory would miss, however, is that 
George’s previous work gratifications were also different from other workers. As 
a single and relatively solitary man, George used work more than anything else 
to provide a structure to his time and activities. Without that work structure, he 
felt lost and disoriented, unlike many of his co-workers who had preferred to 
work from home in order to be closer to their families. 
But it is not only George’s attractions to work that differ, but also his aversions, 
and it is these complicated emotional ambivalences about social interactions 
that Collins’s theory has the most trouble accounting for. While some people 
would not think twice about returning to work under George’s circumstances— 
always preferring to work rather than not work—others, like George, would 
likely feel embarrassed or ashamed to return to the same job but with a 
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diminished legal and bureaucratic status. But what would set George apart from 
these others is that his sense of humiliation is quite specific, linking together 
his treatment at work with memories of a castigating second-grade teacher 
and with dream images of assault. Such particular memories and images are 
noteworthy because they mean that while George may not be the only unhappy 
and disgruntled employee at his place of work, he is unhappy and disgruntled 
in his own particular way. The persistence of George’s emotionally associated 
memories and dream images, as punctuated, looping, and nonlinear as they 
may be, illustrate that past emotional experiences are not as easily smoothed 
out and revised by present-day interactions as Collins’s social imprint model 
would imply. They can be smoothed out and revised in light of present-day 
interactions, but they can also remain quite inert, strongly influencing the way 
a person experiences an interaction, even when attention is otherwise mutually 
and communally oriented, linking together different parts of the phenomenal 
field—people, objects, ideas, imaginings, past, and present—in ways that can be 
surprisingly idiosyncratic and contrary to the prevailing habitus. 
The larger point here is that while people in groups, including crowds, do 
emotionally entrain to one another, they do not do so in uniform ways. Rather, 
they entrain to particular bodies in particular historical moments, and these 
histories of encounter leave particularized emotional residues that loop into 
future engagements in unpredictable ways. The crowd of emotional ghosts 
circulating within any group of people always far exceeds the number of 
concrete bodies present per se, which is why, I would argue, that many social 
formations, whether highly organized and scripted or not, remain as emergent 
and unpredictable as they do. During social situations of almost any kind, these 
latent emotional ghosts are often stirred to new life in divergent, transference-
like ways, not uniformly. What triggers one emotional ghost—a sight, a smell, 
a touch, a focus of attention—will not necessarily stir another. The complex 
emotional effervescence produced by any social formation, including crowds, 
is certainly constrained by such variables as number and proximity of bodies 
and by the extent and kind of mutual focus and attention, but its emergent, 
dynamical properties, related in part to the contingent way latent emotional 
meanings associate to one another and are aroused by social interaction, will 
always exceed and overflow those parameters. 
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Enduring Crowds: Te Ritual Molding of the 
Anthropos in the Prolonging of Political Protest 
Bjørn Tomassen 
Introduction 
In this short chapter, I propose a novel concept that can supplement existing 
approaches to the study of crowds: “enduring crowds.”1 My starting point of 
discussion relates to the question of temporality, and to the trivial yet crucial 
fact that in many locations, since the period that we still talk about as the “Arab 
Spring,” the protesting crowds that occupied the central city squares stayed 
on for longer periods of time—weeks, months, or even years. I argue that this 
protracted temporality forces us to rethink basic axioms of crowd theory. The 
recent revolutionary events thus represent unique opportunities for us to develop 
a more articulate anthropology of the political crowd and of crowd behavior. I 
will do so by highlighting the dynamics of the 2013 Maidan uprising in Kiev, 
Ukraine,2 and by posing the simple question: What happens to crowds when 
they endure over time? 
I will first discuss the question of temporality in classical approaches to 
crowds, and then ask what it means to rethink crowds as “enduring.” I will link the 
discussion to a series of anthropological concepts that speak to crucial dynamics 
of enduring crowds, including Victor Turner’s notion of communitas. My aim 
is thus to make a theoretical contribution at the intersection of sociology and 
anthropology. While the study of crowds constituted a core theme in classical 
sociology and onward, the same was never the case for anthropology. In line with 
the overall ambition of this volume, I argue that anthropological perspectives 
can enrich and refine our understanding of crowds and crowd phenomena, 
not only by providing badly needed ethnographic accounts of crowding, but 
also—and just as importantly—by adding analytical depth. While my focus is 
Crowds
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on the Maidan uprising, I will draw parallels to the dynamics of political protest 
movements that emerged in early 2011 in the context of the Arab Spring, where 
crowds conquered main city squares around the world and provoked seismic 
political changes—the dramatic effects of which we still live with. 
When crowds do not have short lives 
The situations I refer to in this chapter all took place on public city squares. The 
2011 events in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and many other places thus evidenced the 
crucial spatial dimension of mass mobilization, as crowds literally conquered 
the central squares of the main cities of those countries peacefully. In some 
cases, these mobilizations provoked regime change, in others they did not. This 
question of outcomes is not my primary focus here, although I will address it 
in the conclusion. The concreteness of this spatial framing is a reminder that 
even in an age of social media, face-to-face encounters still matter. Squares 
form the frame for ritual action. Christian Borch’s (2010) discussion of Georg 
Simmel’s work highlights the ability of urban squares in particular to stimulate 
crowd formation. Squares—in contrast to narrow streets, or open fields—endow 
people with a new kind of breathing space, and can come to signify liberation in 
a very real and physical sense. The square is thus no mere “context.” To use the 
language of Gregory Bateson (1972), the square functions as a message about 
the message: a meta-communication that enables meanings and deeper layers of 
symbolism. The frame that signifies is the square itself. 
While the spatial dimension of crowd formation and the productive use of 
public space in recent and ongoing political uprisings are absolutely crucial, 
I argue that they intersect with the temporal dimension in ways that require 
more scrutiny. In practically all sociological approaches to crowds, crowds are 
considered phenomena that emerge very suddenly, and that have “short lives.” 
As Elias Canetti famously wrote, “The open crowd exists so long as it grows; it 
disintegrates as soon as it stops growing. For just as suddenly as it originates, 
the crowd disintegrates” (1984: 16). Only “closed crowds,” with erected barriers 
and fences, can keep people together for more than a little while, Canetti argued. 
Importantly, this view of the “suddenness” of the crowd was intimately related 
to a deep suspicion found among crowd theorists throughout the twentieth 
century, who have tended to see the crowd as a deeply anti-rational force where 
individuals lose their autonomy. This “suspicion” can be traced all the way back 
to Kierkegaard’s analysis of the crowd as the source of “untruth” and loss of 
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our “human-ness” (Kierkegaard, see in particular SKS 16, 86; SKS 20, 125), an 
account that directly inspired Adorno but probably also Simmel (see Thomassen 
2015). Of course, for the Frankfurt school, the “crowd” was not any crowd: it was 
the crowd that had materialized with the Nazi frenzy. 
The attraction of the crowd of course always had a “positive” element to it, 
connected to the concrete experiences undergone by human beings merging 
into a crowd. Canetti contended that the crowd provides individuals with the 
opportunity to rid themselves of the inequalities of everyday life, or “the burdens 
of distance” in his terminology. In the crowd, “distinctions are thrown off and all 
feel equal” (1984: 18, his emphasis). Canetti understood this as the “discharge” 
brought about via the crowd. Via this discharge, the crowd thus provided the 
individual with a sense of closeness that had gone lost in modern industrialized 
cities. But this always involved a loss: a loss of oneself. Simmel described such a 
process of de-individualization with the metaphor of the avalanche, referring to 
a social process by which persons are pushed by an external and overwhelming 
force, in short and dramatic moments. In his writings on “the quantitative aspects 
of the group” (1950: 87–104), Simmel described the fusion of masses, and how 
people are brought under one feeling, “in which all specificity and reserve of the 
personality is suspended.” 
In classical scholarship the crowd produces a toxic excitation that carries away 
the individual without meeting any resistance. It is no coincidence that some of 
the most important strands of crowd theory originated in France—the country 
that had seen a revolution sparked by crowd mobilization. Nor is it surprising 
that some of the first debates in crowd psychology were between criminologists, 
as in the discussion between Scipio Sighele and Gabriel Tarde, concerning how 
to determine criminal responsibility in the crowd (Sighele 1892; Tarde 1892). 
The crowd was irrational, dangerous, and uncontrollable. In fact, the word for 
crowd in all Latin languages is synonymous with folly. 
The term that Le Bon used to underscore this total loss of individuality was 
that of “contagion,” his second defining feature of the crowd, and one that follows 
naturally from the first quality of “suggestibility.” As Le Bon saw it, contagion 
involves a weakening of the individual, and he likens it to a sort if hypnotism, 
or a magnetic influence, where people are driven by unmediated instincts. As 
Borch says, in his recent summary of sociological crowd theory, “the individual 
loses his/her individuality in the crowd and is, however temporarily, absorbed 
in a collective entity that levels all personal characteristics and suspends his/ 
her reasoning” (Borch 2006). As Le Bon put it, the crowd is “like a savage,” an 
accumulation of stupidity. While aware that the crowd had paved the way for 
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the French revolution, early thinkers of the crowd still posited the crowd as 
the dangerous annulment of the autonomous liberal individual onto whom a 
rational and democratic political order could be built.3 To Le Bon and others, 
this irrational component also related to the fact that crowds so easily could 
fall prey to the spell of image-power and the chaos of “picture thinking,” which 
overruled conceptual thought. It is exactly because the crowd generates an 
intensified emotional stirring that it attracts people, against, beyond or even 
despite their rational will. 
While many of the tenets of classical crowd theory have been scrutinized, 
the notion of a sudden massing followed by a quick dissolution has remained 
surprisingly untouched. The stress on suddenness and short duration has also 
been incorporated into all working definitions of “revolution,” as in Skocpol’s 
definition, which famously starts with the word “rapid” (1979). Crowds still 
tend to be talked about as a paradigmatic social formation of an earlier “‘mass’ 
phase of modernity” (Mazzarella 2010: 699). Social theorists today still prefer to 
avoid the term “crowd” when describing the contemporary setting; as William 
Mazzarella observes, “Marx and Engels had their crowds; Hardt and Negri bring 
us multitudes” (2010: 700). We therefore need not only to revitalize crowd theory 
but also to relate existing theory to a social setting that is different from the late 
nineteenth or early twentieth century. 
Simply put, it seems to me that we have to start our thinking exactly from 
the unquestioned assumption that crowds by definition have short lives. This 
view has persisted up until today, and yet it flies in the face of evidence. It is true 
that in all of the mass mobilizations that erupted in 2011, things started with
an extreme suddenness: first there was one person, then two, then 100, and the 
next day a 100,000 people massed together. Yet, consider Yemen, perhaps the 
most enduring setting, where people appeared on the Change Square in January 
2011. And then they stayed. For a week, for a month, for a year, and then another 
year (see Porter 2016, for an excellent account). The easy way to deal with such 
a situation is to claim that such cases are simply not crowds any more, since 
temporal brevity is a defining feature. I think this would be very wrong, because 
what happened on Change Square, on Maidan, on Al Tahrir, and on many other 
squares, were indeed quite classic examples of crowds, not “multitudes.” People 
who participated in these events did indeed go through very emotional “letting 
go experiences” and have indeed described their own sense of having been 
carried away by a larger “will.” To be sure, images and “picture-thinking” played 
in all cases a huge role. In fact, televised images of the square quickly turned 
into exactly such a picture, functioning as symbolic vector and as collective 
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focal point, not just for the global television audience, but certainly also for the 
protestors themselves. Yet, several other assumptions of classical crowd theory 
do not seem to hold true, and let me try to illustrate why not. 
Becoming an individual in the enduring crowd 
I am reluctant to provide a sharp temporal delimitation of the “enduring 
crowd;” for now I have in mind crowds that have social existence for several 
weeks, months, or years. What happens to crowd experience during such longer 
time periods? The first and very simple suggestion I would like to make is that 
people are indeed transformed by such enduring crowds, but that while this 
initially happens as a part of the Freudian “oceanic feeling” that Borneman has 
captured so well (this volume), the ultimate transformation taking place at the 
level of the individual is of an entirely different nature than what is implied in 
classical crowd theory: precisely when persons come to feel deeply connected 
to an organic whole, they also start to gain a new sense of individuality. Using 
theatrical terms, human beings in enduring crowds do not lose their character: 
they step into it. 
Let me offer one example from what happened at Maidan (see Georgsen and 
Thomassen 2017). On the Maidan square in Kiev the “enduring” dimension 
began with the erection of barricades on November 30, 2013. This was a visible 
sign by the protesters that their intention was to stay. Once the barricades were 
up, one witnessed a classic case of Canetti’s “double crowd,” with police and 
protestors massing in front of each other. By relocating themselves on the square, 
the protestors separated themselves from their former social reality and from the 
previous status quo of the surrounding society. The square became a moving 
space, as the environment continuously changed during the fights with police 
and Berkuts. Barricades were built, improved, then destroyed, then rebuilt again, 
then seized by Berkuts who at some point succeeded in emptying the square, at 
which point they likewise started to build barricades out of concrete blocks— 
which remained when the protesters took back the square. 
In early December a huge tent was erected on the square where the protesters 
could get food and drinks. By now the whole square as well as the radial streets 
were fenced off by barricades and encamped by the protesters. This occupation 
further signaled how the protest was more than just a momentary act of folly. 
The encampment was also necessary, since a lot of the protesters were not from 
Kiev and had no opportunity to leave the square at night. It became their home. 
Crowds
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This lasted from December 22, 2013 until July 2014, for a total duration of seven 
months. 
Life at the site consisted of everyday activities: cooking, fetching water, 
repairing items, cleaning, lighting a fire, military street fight training, etc. 
Various social activities were arranged, including an open theatre stage, a library, 
a cinema, poetry readings, and an “open university.” A hospital was set up as 
well, and functioned so efficiently that even non-protestors came to the square 
for treatment rather than visiting the official hospital. There were thus clear 
elements of Ehrenreich’s idea of “governance by spectacle” (2007). Preexisting 
distinctions, temporal rhythms, and ordinary spatial figurations were up in the 
air, giving space to new forms of sociability and communication, breaking down 
boundaries of self and other. 
These concrete activities brought people together in ways they had not 
experienced before; indeed, people rid themselves of preexisting inequalities, 
and got rid of Canetti’s “burdens of distance.” Being part of the crowd was thus 
linked to a particular and very concrete experience of freedom generated in such 
a setting; however, this involved not a “loss of self ” but its opposite. Persons on 
the square would consciously talk about how they became aware of themselves, 
and how they gained a new understanding not just of the political situation 
of their country, but also of their own role within it. People did not lose their 
individuality: they gained it along with a sense of selfhood and individuality in 
the enduring crowd. 
This happened not just as an act of reflection but very much via concrete 
social action. The enduring crowd did not annul social action of the individual; it 
fostered it. For example, on the square a camp was constructed called the “Open 
Mic Camp”: a microphone, a loudspeaker system, and a small homemade stage. 
In the description made by participants this created an opening for parrhesiastic 
speech acts (Foucault 2001). The occupants of the camp explained that they 
“created this place as a place of free speech […] people can come here and 
speak or sing in this microphone and it is like small out cries of thoughts.” This 
speech practice was consciously seen as a contrast to the false and “trickster” 
type of political speech rhetoric exercised by the regime (Horvath 1998). The 
process—and the speech modality captured by Foucault—is simple yet deep: one 
becomes by saying. A parrhesiastic speech act is courageous, open, and sincere. 
The sincerity conveys its truth-value, in the relationship between the speaking 
subject and the words pronounced. The enduring crowd created the setting for 
people to find a new way to form an identity around words and statements, in a 
society which they up until then had been experienced as corrupt and false. The 
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loss of self was prior to their crowd experience, something they had experienced 
during “ordinary” social life. 
The experience of Maidan had much to do with Canetti’s “discharge” 
(1984: 17). The crowd experience was about the loss of former distinctions and a 
spontaneous form of equality; however, the differences that were annulled over 
time opened the space for other differences to emerge: a difference in oneself. 
As participants saw it, this did not therefore imply a loss of will or responsibility, 
quite the contrary. A young woman addressed her hope for a better future in this 
vein: “The level of self-responsibility is so high now. Before people didn’t care, 
they just minded their own business, you know. Now everyone is so into it.” She 
described how people changed, completely: “And there is no way back! I hope” 
(Georgsen 2014: 8). Her friend added: “Even me. First I just thought it was a 
political game and I tried to separate myself from it. Here in Ukraine we have 
had a lot of political games, which haven’t been initiated by the people. But at 
some point I realized that it was not just a political game” (Georgsen 2014: 44). 
As another young girl stated it, even more directly: “The people who went to 
Maidan have changed inside.” The initial process of undifferentiation thus led to 
a process of differentiation in the form of a deep-bound subjectivation process 
that was jointly political and personal. 
Communitas 
If one stays within the language of classical social theory on crowds, the process 
through which the individual merges into a larger whole and yet also gains a 
stronger sense of self (rather than a mere loss of individuality) remains obscure 
and contradictory. This process, however, can be captured with precision through 
a central term introduced and examined by Victor Turner: communitas. Turner 
elaborated on this term in his analysis of rites of passage and that particular kind 
of bonding that takes place in a cohort of people going through the same liminal 
experiences, exposed to the same testing (Turner 1988). 
Protestors on Maidan indeed referred themselves to being part of an
organism and a “human corporation” characterized by solidarity and
collaboration (see Georgsen 2014; Georgsen and Thomassen 2017). In people’s
description of how they, for example, built barricades, what emerges is a tacit
collective experience animating their actions. They did not talk, they did not
think, nobody defined any plan of action. People just acted spontaneously.
The informants’ description of their crowd experience here echoes Turner’s
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notion of a “social will”: “What is being introduced into situations of crisis
is the non-rational, metaphorically ‘organic’ order of society itself, felt rather
than conceived as the axiomatic source of human bonding” (Turner 1988: 91).
In other words, people lived through a series of “flow experiences,” something
they described as immanent beauty. Here, as elsewhere,4 crowd participants
explicitly likened their experience of what happened as a falling in love, a
feeling accompanied by a spontaneous non-voluntary smile even when talking
about it—a sheer joy of being. 
Such stirring of emotions are absolutely central to any anthropological
understanding of crowd phenomena, but staying within a ritual framework,
this stirring does not work separately from reason or rationality. I stress this
point, and with emphasis, as it serves to reformulate classical crowd theory,
which always assumed that the emotional discharge and loss of self involved
in crowd experiences was made possible by the (momentary) loss of reason
and autonomy. Turner’s insights help us to realize, that affective and cognitive
processes are not necessarily “opposites” but should rather be understood
as dimensions that form part of a singular process of social and personal
transformation. They work together, not against each other. In his late works,
Turner argued that “there is a structural relationship between cognitive,
affective, and conative components of what Dilthey called lived experience”
(1988: 90). This is shown in the tripartite structure of the social drama, which
harkens back to van Gennep’s recognition of the sequential structure of ritual
passages divided into (a) separation, (b) liminality, and (c) re-aggregation. The
different worldviews coexist in each phase, but each of the phases tends to be
dominated by one or the other. An analysis of the actors’ usage of symbolic codes
in each of the three phases thus demonstrates how “a particular psychological
tendency” corresponds to their practices (Turner 1988). In the first phase, the
affective attitude is often primary. The rupture with the existing order needs
an emotional appeal, a stirring of emotions, “though an element of cognitive
calculation is usually present, and the transgressor’s will to assert power
or identity usually incites the will to resist his action among representatives
of the normative standard which he has infringed” (Turner 1988: 91). In the
second, the crisis or liminal phase, all three “propensities” are equally present.
In principle, the third redressing stage is dominated by the cognitive or “legal”
attempt to reinstall order via redressive action. A strong act of “will” is also
needed to “terminate the often dangerous contestation in crisis,” yet “cognition
reigns primarily in judicial and legal redressive action” (Turner 1988: 91, italics
in original; for an extended discussion of this point, see Thomassen 2012). To
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put it simply: crowds with short lives may indeed be carried and energized
almost exclusively by emotional forces and “instinctual” drives. In the enduring
crowd, one instead recognizes a sequence where emotional, conative, and
cognitive components come into work as part and parcel of the same process— 
and not as elements contrary to each other. 
Te transcendent square—Maidan, the “unknown quantity” 
What I have said so far does not imply that the square was only the total sum 
of individuals gaining new forms of self-awareness—it was, at the same time, 
something more and something else than this sum. This “something” became 
ethnographically observable as protestors turned the square into a collective 
voice. They did so in a conscious manner, and as a conscious discursive strategy. 
Crowd experience is indeed about how hitherto separate individuals start to feel 
and act like a collective body. We would, however, be very wrong to assume, that 
this propensity to act stands in any opposition to reason, as Le Bon did: “Little 
adapted to reasoning, crowds, on the contrary, are quick to act” (Le Bon 2002: 
xi). What happened on Maidan was very similar to what has been documented 
on other revolutionary protest squares; there as well the gathering of people was 
driven by an emotional charge. However, what happened then, during these 
enduring events, involved explicit and conscious political reasoning and on-the-
spot formulations of goals. We might here talk about a “reasoning crowd,” or 
perhaps even a “teleological crowd,” where a sense of shared aims and goals, even 
worldviews, took shape in the form of a living future. 
The Maidan square was quite concretely subjectivized by the participants, 
with expressions, political slogans, symbols, and images. This was summed up 
very well by one of the participants, analytically and reflexively reporting in the 
middle of the events (writing in February 2014): 
Maidan, that is the subject, the unknown quantity, that has had Ukraine holding 
its breath for three months. According to the time of day and the occasion, 
within a few hours it can swell to a crowd of several hundred thousand, before 
shrinking again to a few thousand. Ofen you hear: “Te opposition parties don’t 
represent Maidan.” Or “Maidan is shocked.” Or “Maidan demands this.” Or “We 
ask Maidan to ensure that … ” Or “Maidan doesn’t accept that.” Maidan is a 
social body. (Belorusets 2014: 25) 
The square became imagined as an affective field of forces, a collective focal 
point for political statements that belonged to everybody and no-particular-
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body at the same time. If this was a projection, it remained an extremely 
conscious one. The square became a transcending figure of the crowd, imposed 
by impulses from below, but articulated within an explicitly formulated series of 
political demands. The square, I insist, did not emerge as a social force beyond 
the control of individuals. It was not a super-ego imposing its being upon docile 
egos dissolved in the mass—the square became the crowd and the crowd became 
the square, because the members of the crowd wanted it to. It is also in this exact 
sense that the square emerged as a Batesonian space of meta-communication. 
New voices were heard, new claims were made, but it was not only the messages 
but also the very frame around them that had changed, emerging as a new kind 
of signifier which transformed those messages. The participants created the 
square as a subject in order to speak through it. They created the square to gain 
voice, not to lose the one they had. 
Te shifing crowd 
The points I have made so far relate to another crucial aspect of enduring
crowds: their composition, or more precisely, their shifting composition.
Toward this discussion, I propose another straightforward term: “the shifting
crowd.” As said, in all classical accounts of crowds and crowd states, it is
assumed that a bunch of persons quickly mass together quickly and just as
soon disperse. This view prevents us from addressing a crucial fact about
enduring crowds, namely, that the composition of particular people may
change over time. Some might leave, while others join; some come to stay,
others pass by for shorter moments. On the surface, this likens the protest
crowd with street fairs or markets, where people quite simply come and go,
while the massing of people continues. In short, the “coming and going”
indicates that what we are not really dealing with a crowd as understood by
crowd theorists. Here it is important to stress, that in the enduring crowd
the people composition might indeed change while the consciousness of
belonging to a protesting crowd persists, or may even be strengthened by
continuous injections of new “energy” by people from the outside. The
crowd, in contrast to farmer markets or fairs, can formulate aims, and
raise consciousness among the participants. The temporal endurance thus
intersects with the unfolding group dynamics, and neither is an a priori. I 
think this aspect deserves much more attention than what it has received so
far. Let me again refer to Maidan as an example. 
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Who were the people to first go out into the streets and occupy the square? 
Because the mobilization initially happened via Twitter and other social media, 
it is safe to conclude (and this is confirmed by eyewitnesses as well as online 
documentation) that early protesters were young people already trained in social 
media usage and “Euromaidan was the revolution of people born after Ukraine 
declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991” (Hudoschnyk 
2015: 23). However, interesting patterns emerge from a series of surveys taken 
from the construction of the first barricades and the following weeks (as 
summed up in Hudoschnyk 2015: 23ff). During the first 6–7 weeks of the crowd 
mobilization almost 70 percent of protesters were older than 30 years, and 25 
percent of participants were older than 55 (Onuch, as cited in Hudoschnyk 
2015). At the last stage of the revolution, the number of participants with higher 
education remained steadily high (43.1 percent), whereas the number of students 
had decreased (from 10 percent to 6 percent). Almost 60 percent of protesters 
were specialists, entrepreneurs, and managers (Hudoschnyk 2015.). 
These are significant numbers that reveal dynamics of a “shifting crowd,” and 
they serve to correct the stereotypical description of Maidan (or other square 
mobilizations) as youth rebellions. They started as such, but it very quickly 
turned into something else. As observed by Hudoschnyk (2015: 23–25), students 
played a major role in inspiring the initial stage of mobilization; “early joiners” 
and “stalwarts” were undergraduates, journalists, and “self-identified members 
of civic organizations” (Onuch 2014, as cited in Hudoschnyk 2015). Initially this 
was indeed a youth-led movement, apparently similar to Occupy. However, this 
changed over time—and this change connected to changing policy goals and 
political claims made by the participants. As Hudoschnyk (2015: 23–24) writes: 
“Early joiners” did not necessarily stay on the Maidan throughout the revolution 
as the numbers indicate. Te percentage of youth, activists and experienced 
protesters dropped as soon as protesters’ demands shifed from foreign policy 
claims to human and civic rights. It leads us to refections about the importance 
of studying the role of youth as a catalyzer of the social movement versus a 
sustainer of the Euromaidan revolution. 
This prompts a series of questions concerning the role of youth as a catalyzer 
of social movement mobilization, to be distinguished from the social forces and 
categories of protestors that actually ended up sustaining the revolution. Here 
again it seems to me that what happened at Maidan speaks to an open-ended 
processual pattern that can be observed in most other public square protest 
crowds. It also shows that any blind notion of an “anonymous” crowd will only 
bar us from even asking these questions. 
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Conclusion: nonlinear time and political becoming 
Taras Fedirko, a Maidan protestor, reflected on the question of chronology in the
middle of the events of Maidan with these words: “The linearity of a chronology
cannot adequately convey a nonlinear process. Therefore, it cannot capture the
ambiguity in all of the moments that make up the overarching horizon of events,
the common denominator that does not conform to any unified interpretation.”
Fedirko’s on-the-spot reflection bears testimony to an essential aspect of the
Maidan experience, namely, ambiguity. “Ambiguity” is from such a perspective
not to be understood as a negative, as a “lack” of unified interpretation or common
denominator. Fedirko’s reflection also captures, in condensed form, how this
open-ended process intimately relates to temporality. In fact, his words help us
to sharpen what we might mean by “enduring crowds”: not simply an extension
in time, but also—and more fundamentally—a relativization of chronology. 
In this chapter I have argued that we need to think anthropologically about 
the social life of “enduring crowds.” The permanence of such crowds is by no 
means secured by “closing boundaries,” as Canetti suggested in his typology. 
“Closed crowds” in Canetti’s (1984: 17) terms, are the kind of crowds that put 
their stress on permanence, and they do this by operating a closed boundary: 
endurance is achieved by renouncing expansion. This is simply not so. In 
the political crowds that conquered the squares around the globe from 2011, 
endurance was achieved while holding boundaries open. Expansion happened 
as a consequence of endurance, not at the exclusion of it. 
As discussed above, to “mass” implies an instinctual longing to be with others 
in a particular way, to really be with others and “to experience what Freud 
(1921) called the ‘oceanic feeling,’ a return to being one or being contained by 
the mother, the pre-symbolic, pre-rational, pre-hierarchical, non-differentiated” 
(Borneman, this volume). I have tried to stress that such emotional experiences 
cannot be separated from either “reason” or “will.” Following Borneman, crowd 
experiences of political protest can in this vein be considered a necessary 
intermediate stage between the unmediated mass and conscious political 
subjecthood; the setting of public liminality engages a particular form of ritual 
experience where the molding of the anthropos takes place. The crowding of 
human beings is in this sense not an anti-thesis to the rational, deliberating 
individual that normally grounds our notion of the modern political subject we 
are rather dealing with two aspects or instances of ritual dramas as acted out by 
political protestors who, in constant movement, and with shifting actors and 
audiences, give life to enduring crowds. 
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There is of course much more to say about temporality—there always is. 
By stressing endurance, I have not only indicated a “quantitative” temporal 
stretching of crowd processes, but also an experience of time and “sequence” 
that is not easily summarized in the chronology of historians—as understood so 
well by Fedirko, writing from Maidan, quotes above. The experience of time in 
liminality (Thomassen 2014) is inherently open and ambivalent, and multiple 
temporalities are always in play. Such nonlinear temporalities do in fact relate to 
the question of “outcomes” and to the question what enduring political crowds 
can actually achieve—or what they have actually achieved. In a recent article 
on the Yemini revolution, Ross Porter talks about a revolutionary logic he calls 
“being time,” “a temporal formulation that asserts a fusion between means and 
ends, presents and futures within a single enduring moment.” (Porter 2016: 59). 
Porter develops this notion in his analysis of a square occupation that lasted 
for several years. His point is extremely well-taken, and speaks to a broader 
phenomenon: that the change brought about in and by enduring crowds cannot 
be restricted to the externally visible signs of toppled regimes and deposed 
dictators. The change that takes place is one that relates to formative processes 
of subjectivation. I have argued in this chapter that while we are indeed living in 
yet another “era of the crowd,” what we witness is perhaps not the anonymous 
drowning of individuality in contagious crowds, but rather the emergence of 
new forms of political becoming. 
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Te Ethics of the Digital: Crowds and Popular 
Justice in Bangladesh 
Nusrat Sabina Chowdhury 
“Bloggers are not really street activists,” Anik,1 a Bangladeshi online activist told 
me. We were chatting weeks after a massive crowd of protesters had taken over 
a major junction in the capital city in early 2013. A group of bloggers who had 
long been demanding justice for war crimes sensed a conspiracy in the workings 
of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT). Set up in 2010 by the government of 
Bangladesh under the leadership of the Awami League to try the collaborators of 
the war of independence of 1971, the ICT had become the target of a spontaneous 
outburst. The bloggers occupied Shahbag, a busy crossroads in the middle of 
Dhaka and had rallied a crowd of thousands in a matter of days. The platform 
that quickly became known as the Shahbag Movement questioned the seeming 
lenience in one of the tribunal’s verdicts. Because 2013 was an election year, the 
protesters suspected strategic negotiations between the government and Jamaat-
e-Islami, the largest Islamist opposition party. A number of Jamaat-e-Islami’s 
high-ranking members were under trial, and it was believed that the verdicts 
could very well be used in exchange for political concessions. In other words, 
long-held suspicions of foul play in the judicial process, the electoral system, 
the party in power, and the state in general had stoked the anger of the relatively 
young organizers of the protests. 
My warmest thanks to Megan Stefen for including me in this exciting conversation. Her def editing 
and encouragement were critical to fnalizing the chapter. Nazmul Sultan has shared valuable 
comments and ethnographic knowledge. Te essay has also benefted tremendously from my 
conversations with William Mazzarella, Francis Cody, Lotte Hoek, Lawrence Liang, and Nishant 
Shah, who have all read or heard diferent parts of the argument. I am grateful for the feedback 
I received at the American Anthropological Association meeting in Denver (November 2015); 
Department of Anthropology at Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh (January 2016); Center 
of South Asian Studies at University of Edinburgh (March 2017); and the Unit for Criticism and 
Interpretive Teory at University of Illinois, Urbana-Champagne (May 2017). 
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Anik was right in pointing out the curious role of online activists in
Shahbag. It was not the street but rather the virtual medium that was generally
their playground and political field. And yet, in this movement, part of the
blogging community had transferred its grievances from the keyboards to a
hectic but historically meaningful corner of one of South Asia’s most crowded
cities (figure 9.1) (Rosen 2016). Anik was one of the 135 protesters who
formed a human chain during the afternoon of February 5. They were angry
about the ICT’s second ruling of life imprisonment and were demanding the
death penalty for Abdul Kader Molla, a convicted war criminal and member
of Jamaat-e-Islami. Theirs was generally a disembodied passion, Anik seemed
to imply, but it was their transition from the screen to the street that gave the
bloggers rare political recognition and unforeseen notoriety. 
Figure 9.1 Billboards at Shahbag. March 2013. Photo: Nusrat Sabina Chowdhury 
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I met Anik while walking around Shahbag just a couple of days before. The 
area was still cordoned off from the city’s infamous traffic. Small groups of 
students, activists, bloggers, and political workers socialized, as billboards with 
graphic appeals for justice and capital punishment hovered nearby. Some of 
them were already peeling off. Peeking through them were familiar commercial 
exhortations of fairness products and mobile phone connectivity. Those who 
were gathering to start a torchlight protest to commemorate the 42nd year of 
national independence remembered the giant crowds of which they had been a 
part when the Shahbag Movement was at its peak in early February. “You have 
no idea what it was like,” a friend who had fought in the liberation war told me 
as he guided me through the impromptu shrines that had cropped up on the 
street and the sidewalks during the protest. They glorified and memorialized 
the war and were now at various stages of ruin. Even as our procession of 
hundreds started its journey from Shahbag, glowing under the flickering flames 
and circling the nearby University of Dhaka campus, I could tell it was nothing 
compared to the crowds of early February 2013, images of which were beamed 
across the globe almost instantly thanks to the tech-savvy urban protesters. 
This rally held in March 2013 was a little over a month after the killing of Ahmed
Haider Rajib. A self-proclaimed atheist blogger, Rajib was stabbed to death near his
house in Dhaka for his anti-religious Bangla blog.2 Rajib’s death had rejuvenated
the crowd, if only for a little while longer. By May 2013, however, the equation
had changed for good. The members of Hefazot-e-Islam took issue with Shahbag’s
secularist agenda. In response, they too occupied a congested roundabout only a
few miles east of Shahbag, at Motijheel, the business district. Hefazat is a coalition of
about a dozen religious associations based in more than 25,000 qawmi madrasas.3 
By 2013, with the support of the main opposition party and its allies, Hefazot was
intervening into national politics with a confidence rarely seen before. Mirroring
the very incitement that they were opposing, the Hefazot rally also demanded
capital punishment for the bloggers. It took issue with the atheism expressed in
the “blasphemous” writings of the Shahbag Movement’s organizers. The Hefazot
activists demonstrated in the thousands, presented a thirteen-point manifesto to the
government, which included harsh indictments of bloggers, and they vandalized
public property. The state repressed the uprising with force. The full extent of the
nighttime operation is still unclear. To deflect accusations of harboring the atheists,
the government arrested four bloggers under the Information and Communication
Technology Act.4 The self-consciously secular and religious crowds at Shahbag and
Motijheel, respectively, revealed a competitive mimesis between the now powerful
Crowds
















categories of atheist (nastik) and militant (jongi). While Shahbag was resolutely
nonviolent, the Hefazot activists organized anti-government showdowns that
relied on well-known strategies of urban unrest. 
In the shadow of the state killing of the Hefazot members, the arrest of internet
activists, the ritualized murders of bloggers, and the crowds of secular and religious
citizens that set the events in motion, I offer here some thoughts on crowdedness
and the politics of visual evidence-making in Bangladesh. The image-politics that
emerged in the wake of Shahbag and Hefazot are symptomatic—and not simply
representative—of the ideological and social fissures that the protest movement of
2013 had cracked wide open. They played out partly in the streets of Dhaka, from
Shahbag to Motijheel, and partly in the blogosphere. The traffic between physical
space and cyberspace that these events so powerfully brought to public attention
is now a part of their lasting legacies. No longer hidden behind usernames and
moderated blog spaces and sheltered from print and satellite news media, bloggers
and their words became now fodder for the mill of contagious rumor that invited
public scorn, governmental scrutiny, and at times, fatal violence. 
Contagion and crowds are intimately if ambivalently tied (Mazzarella 
2010). From Gabriel Tarde’s “imitation suggestibility” and Elias Canetti’s fire-
like insatiable crowd, to the viral circulation of user-generated material on the 
web, the epidemiological metaphor of contagion has captured the aura of the 
crowd at once vilified and celebrated (Canetti 1984; Sampson 2012; Tarde 2014). 
Technologies of sociality and connection produce crowds that are digitally 
enabled. Virality is located in this epidemiological space in which a world of 
things mixes with emotions, sensations, affects, and moods (Sampson 2012), 
all of which are supposedly in abundance in the overly embodied crowd. A few 
images of crowds that went viral on Bangladeshi mass media in the months 
and years after the Shahbag and Hefazot face-off bring into relief the cultural 
valences of contagion and crowd action. These images were either featured in 
television news reports or posted on Facebook, or both. The content and the 
form of the visual texts, and public responses to them, do at least two things. 
First, they expose the social and political fractures along religious and class 
lines that were rejuvenated in the post-Shahbag political atmosphere. Second, 
on a more conceptual level, the images—made and consumed by what can best 
be described as digital crowds—are symptomatic of the crowd as a category of 
social analysis. By attending to some of the effects of the encounters between 
these crowds—virtual and actual, religious and secular, progressive and 
traditionalist—this analysis highlights the relationship between crowds and 
mass mediation in shaping public life in Bangladesh. 
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Te jongi in the crowd 
Let me discuss a couple of crowd-related incidents from 2015 that are
seemingly unrelated to either the Shahbag or the Hefazot showdowns in
2013. The first happened on April 14, 2015, the first day of the Bengali New
Year, when groups of men physically assaulted multiple women and children
amid the celebrations near the University of Dhaka campus. A group of
20–30 young men attacked twenty women and one 10-year-old child near
the Teachers Students Center on campus. They were molested for hours at
different locations, not far from each other. A crowd of men stood by and
watched. Many were seen with cell phones in hand taking photos or shooting
videos on their handheld devices. Witnesses have claimed that the police
officers standing merely 20 yards away did not intervene.5 Except for one
political activist, who happened to be at the spot and managed to rescue a
victim from the melee, there was no immediate interference into the attacks.
Most explanations ascribed this unfortunate fact to the density of the crowd.
Incriminating CCTV footage, however, became public soon after. The
surveillance camera feed made its way into newsroom exposes and was played
on a loop on multiple cable television channels. The videos made the rounds
on social networking sites and video-sharing websites. 
The attacks were particularly shocking because the Bengali New Year 
or Pahela Baishakh, along with the primary site of its celebration on or near 
the Dhaka University campus, is widely considered to be the last bastion of 
Bengali secularism. On New Year’s Day when the festivities start at the crack 
of dawn and go on all day, one of the largest crowds gathers at Ramna Park 
and the university’s campus. A well-known cultural institution, Chhayanat, has
been organizing the morning celebrations with live musical performances at 
the public park for half a century. The nearby Faculty of Fine Art brings out a 
rally (Mangal Shobhajatra) that showcases local traditions with vibrant papier 
mâche installations every New Year’s Day. In 2016, the ornate procession made 
UNESCO’s Intangible Heritage of Humanity list. The Pahela Baishakh fanfare is 
a national holiday and the country’s biggest nonreligious festival. A particular 
brand of national, cultural secularism that these celebrations embody, one that 
the educated, secular-progressive bloc of Bangladesh holds dearly, was evidently 
under siege. In 2001, for example, a bomb blast at the same spot had killed ten 
people, including a suicide bomber. This was one of the early incidents of militant 
violence. Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, a religious group that was eventually banned 
for extremism in 2005, took credit for the deaths. 
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Ekattor Television ran an exposé on the 2015 incidents of sexual violence at 
the festival. Ekattor TV (TV ’71) is Bangladesh’s fourth private satellite news 
channel, and its name is telling. By referencing the year of independence in 
its proper name, the TV channel directly sides with Bengali nationalism—a 
fetishized domain that has been officially coopted by the ruling Awami League. 
As the mainstream party, Awami League claims recognition for representing 
the voice of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, during its fight for independence 
from the Western wing. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the nationalist leader and icon 
who steered the party in those heady days, is both the biological father of the 
current prime minister and the metaphorical father of the nation (Jatir Pita). 
The Awami League had a sweeping victory in the 2008 national elections. Two 
of its campaign promises caught the imagination of the youth, who came out to 
vote in large numbers; the first was establishing trials for war crimes (of which 
ICT was the logical conclusion), and the second was the promise of a Digital 
Bangladesh by 2021. “Digital” here denotes a rather nebulous future-looking 
agenda to help the country cope with the challenges of the twenty-first century.6 
Despite the manifesto’s key focus on technological advancements, the Awami
League essentially drew from a glorified version of the nation’s past. In 2009,
the President of Bangladesh Computer Samiti stressed the connection in his
book, Digital Bangladesh: “As the citizens of Bangladesh had to fight against the
armed forces of Pakistan to achieve independence, they have the right to live free,
independent and developed lives. So it is important to implement the Digital
Bangladesh program to fulfill the hopes and desires of the nation by using digital
technologies” (Jabbar 2009; cited in Shoesmith et al. 2014: 219). Through its name,
Ekattor Television spells out its closeness to precisely this brand of nationalist
political affect and by extension, its distance from religious politics, such as the
one practiced by Jamaat-e-Islami and supported by Hefazat-e-Islam. The verdict
against one of the Jamaat members had fueled the Shahbag movement, which
went on to demand a moratorium on religious politics of any kind. 
The channel aired a couple of videos of the harassment incident right after it
happened in mid-April 2015.7 On average two to three minutes long, the video
reports were culled from hours of recording from the actual sites of the crime.
They start by showing a festive crowd. Women in their ethnic best are pushing
through the crowd along with men in traditional wear. Street vendors are seen
hawking foods and souvenirs while cycle rickshaws paddle through a throng
of pedestrians. On Pahela Baishakh, the area near Ramna Park is off-limits to
cars and other motor vehicles as is the nearby University of Dhaka campus. The
video story starts in color as the female voice over reminds the viewer that the
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surveillance footage does not come with any sound. Farzana Rupa, a journalist
well known for gritty and investigative reporting, edited one news report. The
video of 2:40 minutes, Rupa tells us, was edited down from sixty minutes of CCTV
footage. Though it was made available on YouTube, it has since been taken down. 
In Rupa’s report, the camera zooms in on a second screen shot of the CCTV 
footage, taken around forty-four seconds into the video. The video also turns 
black and white at this point, presumably to facilitate identification. Seen here 
is a bearded man in a white tunic standing in the middle of a crowd of men, 
women, and motorcycles. The viewer learns that during the few hours of the 
recorded footage, men far outnumbered women and almost no woman was seen 
without a male companion.8 Within seconds, a red circle on the screen locates a 
specific spot in the crowd where a group of men surround a rickshaw carrying 
two women. One of them is being forced to get off. Other color photographs of 
the same incident in print media have the faces of the women blurred out. 
In the second installment of the video available on YouTube, the figure of 
the bearded man resurfaces. The super-imposed circle separates this particular 
individual from a sea of people. For the first time the physical description of the 
man in question holds a clue to the source of the gendered violence. He wore an 
embroidered panjabi (tunic) and sported a beard, the journalist noted, a fact she 
repeats at least twice in the short report. The man seems to have been hovering 
aimlessly for a while around this one spot, leading the journalist to inquire after 
his motive. 
A few seconds later in the same report, this particular individual reappears 
near a large group seen moving around together and allegedly participating 
in more than one episode of harassment. Some of these men also sported 
beards, bandannas, and long tunics. A traditional piece of clothing, a panjabi 
is everyday attire for Bangladeshi men similar to the kameez is for women; it is 
also a traditional equivalent of holiday formals for men regardless of religious 
affiliation, though devout Muslim men often wear simple long tunics when 
praying. The aimless wandering of the man with a beard, his proximity to the 
scene of crime, and his sartorial choices, according to the report, implicate him 
in the crimes. The report’s focus on his outward appearance—which hints at his 
faith—is crucial. Long before the Shahbag movement took its distinct shape, 
numerous artistic and satirical representations of the collaborators of the war 
highlighted and mocked the skullcaps and beards that are often read as signs of 
religiosity (figure 9.2) (Mohaiemen 2011; Mookherjee 2015). The collaborators, 
some of them war criminals, were known to have betrayed the Bengali-dominated 
East Pakistanis in their quest for freedom, not on the basis of Islam but on shared 
Crowds










Figure 9.2 Portrait of a collaborator at Shahbag. Photo: Nusrat Sabina Chowdhury 
cultural heritage. In this particular interpretation of the footage, the journalist 
draws from a well-worn language of culture wars—Bengali/secular vs. Islamic— 
that found loud expressions in the antagonism between Shahbag and Hefazot 
crowds. The reporter concludes by suggesting that an Islamist conspiracy is 
behind the attacks on Bangladesh’s largest secular cultural institution. 
There were multiple lines of reasoning running through the news coverage.
From the chief of the local police station to the Proctor of the University to the
Minister of Education, various authoritative figures gave public statements.
A few of them completely denied that any harassment ever took place. The
police said they were unable to identify the faces in the crowd despite the fact
that avid users of social media were already locating, accusing, and shaming
the men caught on camera by going into their Facebook accounts. Still others
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casually dismissed the public disrobing and molestation of women as boyish
mischief. Until now, nobody has been punished for the crimes. Most people
chalk this lack of prosecution up to the fact that many of the perpetrators were
thought to be student cadres of the ruling party and therefore more or less
unaccountable. 
The televisual reporting of the New Year’s Day events opens up several 
analytical possibilities about crowds and democracy in Bangladesh. The figure 
of the crowd resists individuation and identification. The resulting confusion is 
more generally symptomatic of crowds; it is a form of confusion that challenges 
the “actuarial gaze” of the state and the media devoted to biopolitical policing 
(Feldman 2005). This kind of forensic visualization, Allen Feldman argues, helps 
identification and the management and mass marketing of risks. The reports 
on crowd violence on Pahela Baishakh used digital manipulation, such as slow 
motion, freeze-framing, and spatialization to disaggregate a collectivity. This 
was done to resurrect and then incriminate a figure of religious alterity: the 
radical Islamist. The sleeper body is the currency of the public safety apparatus, 
Feldman would say. A rise in surveillance technologies in public spaces in 
Bangladesh also points to efforts to control spaces and bodies more rigorously.9 
Ekattor TV tried to reinstate this controlling gaze through investigative reportage 
for its own purposes that need to be situated historically, since its roots remain 
firmly grounded in a brand of Bangladeshi nationalism. This secular, nationalist 
impulse gained renewed urgency in the post-Shahbag political climate of 
resurgent extremism, paranoia, and divisiveness. 
The stereotype of the religious crowd as highlighted in the photos bears many
of the significations attached to the crowd in canonical social theory (Canetti
1984; Freud 1921; Gould 2009; Jonsson 2013; Le Bon 2002). The crowd represents
a childish moment of savage indistinction; it is corporeal, affective, and irrational
(Mazzarella 2015: 105). The opposition between the revelers at the secular
(Bengali) cultural event and the bigoted Muslim predators with their tunics and
beards reenacts the distinction between the crowd and the autonomous citizen/ 
subject at the heart of the modern democratic imagination (Mazzarella 2010).
Crowd-like behavior is often associated with face-to-face gatherings, embodied
affect, and with the dangers of new technologies (Cody 2015: 52). In this sense,
the Hefazot-e-Islam uprising of 2013, or the Islamist crowd more generally,
symbolized the quintessence of the crowd. The way mainstream media covered
the Hefazot protests brings the point home. A major vernacular news outlet
wrote the following when covering one of the oppositional rallies organized by
Hefazot: 
Crowds
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When asked the question, “Why did you come to the rally?” a couple of madrasa 
students (age 14) from Gazipur anonymously told banglanews24, “Tey [the 
bloggers] have insulted our prophet, they have insulted Islam, that’s why we 
came to the procession” … When asked how they were insulted, they answered, 
“We don’t know. Our Boro Hujur [senior teacher] knows. He told us to come, so 
we came.” 
The highlighted naivete of the madrasa students contrasted sharply with 
the perceived power of the youth of Shahbag. Urban, middle-class children 
gathered here with their parents carrying placards that demanded death for 
the collaborators. Some even sported painted-on pro-hanging slogans on their 
bodies. The idea of children lending their voice to the demand for capital 
punishment has been lauded in die-hard patriotic circles as a sign of a nation 
coming of political age. The Hefazot activists, often quite young themselves, were 
bereft of such innocence or potential. They were alternatively criminalized and 
infantilized. Their gullibility resulted from their backwardness and their lack of 
(secular) education and proper political tutelage. Even when their protests were 
criminalized, the political insincerity of the madrasa student boiled down to 
ignorance, poverty, and distance from the mainstream of Bangladeshi society. 
The enlightened secular crowd, so to speak, was the constitutive other of the 
immoderate religious crowd. 
Here one also needs to keep in mind the gender of the crowd. The South 
Asian crowd, as an empirical reality and a subject of intellectual enquiry, does not 
adhere to the gendered thinking that has informed classical European literature 
on the masses. In the writing on mass psychology and its fascination with the 
crowd, individuality has been understood as a masculine phenomenon and the 
masses a feminine one (Jonsson 2013). In the vast repertoire of South Asian 
studies, however, one finds a quintessentially masculine, if not male-dominated, 
crowd. Among the ethnic rioters across South Asia’s cities (Tambiah 1997), the 
unruly peasants in colonial Uttar Pradesh (Amin 1988), or the mourning fans 
at the funeral of their favorite film star in Dhaka (Hoek 2012), we see crowds as 
men. They participate in protest or celebration the styles of which are culturally 
tied to young men. The jouissance of the urban masses ever present in political 
rallies, communal showdowns, cinema halls, and religious functions is also 
culturally male (Hansen 2001; Prasad 2009; Verkaaik 2004). Trivializing sexual 
harassment as youthful dalliance is to be placed against this background. Men 
enjoy certain comfort in and control over public space that are not available 
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to most women. For women in Bangladesh, from congested streets, markets, 
and public transport to New Year’s revelries and cricket victory celebrations, all 
carry explicit threats of bodily and verbal violence, a phenomenon that is widely 
recognized in South Asia by the unfortunate euphemism, “eve teasing.” 
The video report also brings up what many may recognize as the familiar
problem of “bad apples.”10 On the one hand, crowds are blamed as crowds for
crimes such as the incidents of sexual molestation discussed above because,
as Freud (1921) famously pointed out, people are capable of certain excess, or
madness, when they are in crowds. On the other hand, the crowd is exonerated
as crowd by singling out the wrongdoers in it, the always-already criminal
individuals who cynically try to do their business hiding in the crowd. Soon
after the Bengali New Year incident, social media in Bangladesh went into
overdrive. The uproar gave way to online activism. A Facebook group called
“Moja Loss?” started identifying the homepages of social media users seen in
the CCTV footage. Moja Loss? has been known for spreading satirical memes
about everyday social inconveniences and for trolling public figures, including
political leaders and celebrities. The name of the group is equally significant. In
Bangla, it is a colloquial and mildly accusatorial phrase that roughly translates
as, “Taking Fun?” The phrase has been popular among the youth and addresses
(in the second person) the gazing spectator who is only interested in gratuitous
viewing pleasures.11 The group itself has become more politically outspoken
in recent years and in 2015 the moderator of Moja Loss? was taken into police
custody in relation to an investigation into the group’s apparently seditious
and anti-government posts.12 In this case, theirs was an activist reaction to the
idle responses of those in power. Neither the police nor the university officials
attempted to or succeeded in incriminating anybody from the crowd. The ways
in which Moja Loss? exposed the faces of the miscreants, by singling them out
and sharing information about their personal lives drawn from their Facebook
pages forged a sense of communitas among the users of social media. In their
quest for justice, they mimicked the very crowds that they held responsible,
the same crowd capable of committing acts of public violence against women.
After all, the Pahela Baishakh celebrations are legendary because of the kinds
of crowds it attracts, which are ideally educated, civic minded, and secular. The
vigilantism of social media, then, is a product of multiple factors including
politics, class, religion, and gender. The next section elaborates on this
confluence. 
Crowds




In July 2015, a 13-year-old boy, Samiul Alam Rajon, was killed by a group of 
men in Sylhet, a city in the northeast. Rajon, a poor boy who sold vegetables, 
was suspected of stealing a rickshaw van. He was tied to a pole and beaten by 
a rod. The twenty-eight-minute shaky cell phone video was shot on the spot 
and was uploaded to Facebook by someone who found it on the internet. Many 
people reasoned that the 2–3 men who were torturing the boy did not expect 
him to die and failed to contemplate the repercussions of sharing evidence on 
the internet. Regardless, the voyeuristic pleasure of vigilante violence is not new 
to South or Southeast Asian pubic culture where physically punishing thieves 
and pickpockets, or at times public lynching of petty criminals or witches, is 
neither novel nor the most shocking among other acts of public violence (Siegel 
2005). The recording and digital circulation of Rajon’s murder, however, added a 
whole new element to an otherwise routine affair in a peripheral town. Facebook 
erupted over Rajon’s death. Those tying him up, torturing him, taking photos, 
and laughing were identified from the camera footage. In late 2015, six people 
were given death sentences for the murder of Rajon and another young boy 
who fell victim to a mob attack soon after.13 The man who shot the video was 
given life sentence. The verdicts that came out only four months after Rajon’s 
murder were uncharacteristically fast for a system infamous for a corrupt and 
long drawn-out judicial culture. One of Rajon’s torturers was a migrant worker 
in Saudi Arabia who was recognized on Facebook. He had fled soon after the 
video got public attention and was brought back to Bangladesh with the help of 
his Bangladeshi coworkers and the Saudi authorities. 
Rajon’s death is not a one-off case of public cruelty against minors. Multiple 
stories of vigilante violence targeting poor and working-class children, often 
household help, have been in the news, mostly, it seems, because they end up 
on the internet. #JusticeforRajon became a hash tag and a Facebook page almost 
immediately. Bloggers and regular internet users voiced their outrage, frustration, 
and trauma. Some were more introspective and acknowledged their collective 
complicity in this culture of raw vengeance. Haunted by the sound of Rajon’s 
cries in the video, a well-known blogger Arif Jebtik wrote, “I will probably not 
be able to sleep tonight. I will hear ‘Somebody please save me’ repeatedly. But I 
will probably sleep tomorrow. [M]aybe even the day after tomorrow.”14 Another
person expressed her fear in becoming the crowd on her Facebook post: “And 
those who are crying out in revenge that the perpetrators should be killed this 
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way (eye for an eye), I am asking them what is the difference between those 
people and you?”15 “We all have blood on our hands,” said Anushay Hossain in 
an article titled, “Why Is My Country Numb to a Child’s Murder?”16 
One of the striking contrasts between the case of Rajon’s death and the violence 
against women is the curiously contradictory responses of the state. The crowd 
of molesters successfully evaded the actuarial gaze of the state, though not the 
gazes of digital media consumers, as the case may be. Rajon’s murderers, on the 
other hand, many of whom were from working-class backgrounds themselves, 
were swiftly brought to trial. Some commentators have claimed that they would 
have never been caught without the help of social media. That may very well be 
the case. The issue, I believe, is not simply that everybody knew about Rajon 
because his death was filmed; what is of note is how the filming presupposed 
and harnessed crowd-affect. The kind of crowds that Rajon’s death energized 
brings us again to the distinction between the so-called responsible citizens 
and criminal crowds. The tiresome tension between reason and affect that 
undergirds much thinking about crowds stops us from seeing how and when 
the differences are blurred, as middle-class users of social media respond to the 
supposed primitivism of the religious and/or the working-class crowd. This is 
a moment, in other words, when publics and crowds become one and the same 
(Cody 2015). Nested in this story is also a history of the arrival, proliferation, 
and supervision of technologies of sociality and surveillance such as the internet, 
cell phones, and close-circuit cameras in an otherwise struggling economy with 
inadequate infrastructure. This technological unevenness and its contradictions 
embody, enable, and capture some of the fundamental ambivalences of the 
specific shape mass democracy has taken in Bangladesh. And yet, this shape 
and its ambivalences are surely not unique to Bangladesh. The contradictions 
that this technological unevenness embodies and enables capture some of the 
fundamental ambivalences of mass democracy have taken a specific shape in 
Bangladesh, and yet surely is not unique to it. 
The global spread of flash mobs and the curiously Chinese phenomenon 
of “Human Flesh Search” are two instances of the so-called dark underbelly of 
cyberspace. The Human Flesh Search started in China around 2001 and spread 
to other parts of East Asia where crowdsourced virtual detective work engages 
and rouses a large number of internet users. Many of them are online virtually 
at all times. These “netizens” (another coinage from East Asia) are powered by a 
combination of computer networking skills and human connection. They trace 
the original video links of crimes and reveal the identities of the perpetrators. 
Crowds
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Scholars of new media have been well aware that these sites, where collaborative 
production of information and peer-to-peer, loose affiliations take place, can 
also generate dangerous and destructive ideas and actions (Tsou 2015). Idealized 
as a democratic space of exchange and an unregulated playground, the internet, 
in the Asian context and well beyond, is in actuality neither (Shah et al. 2015; 
Shoesmith et al. 2014). In their ability to form crowds and indulge in affects 
associated with crowds, such as collective vengeance or sudden outbursts, digital 
natives are able to stoke governmental and ethical anxieties that travel between 
cyber and physical spaces. In India, the state has banned the self-proclaimed 
apolitical flash mobs, even when the meetings are planned to take place in 
upscale shopping malls just for “fun” (Shah 2007). The Human Flesh Search, 
for its part, tells a story that resonates with the digital responses to mob violence 
in Bangladesh. The cyberposse, as Tsou calls them, makes every possible detail 
of people’s lives known and has been responsible for their targets quitting or 
being fired from jobs, changing address or even leaving town. The Human Flesh 
Search, according to Tsou, 
graphically depicts this kind of search that is conducted by human connections 
rather than machine-based algorithms of locate the sources of information 
as well as calculate the relevance of the data for the sake of ferreting out and 
hunting down the human target who has committed all sorts of wrongdoings, 
ranging from telling a lie, blocking the ambulance and fashing the middle 
fnger, refusing to yield the seat to the elderly, abusing a cat, sexually harassing 
a girl, having an afair, hit-and-run to anything that is considered “immoral” or 
“improper” by the wide wired world which could virtually go wild in the name 
of justice and vengeance. (Tsou 2015) 
The curious and far-reaching effects of the Human Flesh Search, and its inchoate 
manifestations in the internet culture in Bangladesh, bring us back to contagion. 
In the cases of molestation of women and torture of children, active social media 
users were responding to affective contagious encounters. As Tony Sampson 
argues in his eponymous book, virality is not simply an analogy; it is more than 
a representation of the hyper-connected nature of digital sociality (Sampson 
2012). By unraveling the discursive and rhetorical references to viral disease, 
Sampson focuses on how discourse is intimately tied to a flow of contagious 
affect, feelings, and emotions (Sampson 2012: 3). He believes human emotions 
spread universally like viruses across networks (Sampson 2012: 2). The anger, 
pity, and pain felt by the members of social media when watching, parsing, and 
analyzing the video footage of violence generates behavior that, true to crowd 
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affect, has a mimetic quality. In revealing the criminals, some sheltered by the 
state and others not, the internet users of Bangladesh became yet another crowd, 
or rather, Mob 2.0, as Tsou calls the participants in the Human Flesh Search. In 
so doing, these “upright” citizens continually aim to secure the borders between 
themselves and the perpetrators and the stigma of mob violence. The latter are 
also users of social media and regular subscribers to cell phone technologies, 
thereby blurring the boundaries of social and economic distinction. 
There were 129.584 million mobile phone subscribers in Bangladesh at the end
of February 2017 (www.btrc.gov.bd). The number soared since the early 1990s
when mobile technology first arrived. Its use grew fast, which is not uncommon for
developing countries where rundown infrastructure and a labyrinthine bureaucracy
make access to other means of communication, such as land lines, money exchange,
face-to-face interaction, etc., far more cumbersome (Rafael 2003). In a rather
striking statistic, Dhaka has been ranked second among global cities in terms of the
number of active Facebook users.17 It outranked Jakarta and Mexico City. Most of
these users access social media on their phones. The widespread popularity of cell
phone technology in Bangladesh is duly noted in Bangladesh’s Changing Mediascape
(2014) in which the authors mention the two familiar figures of urban poverty—the
rickshaw puller and the domestic worker—to make their point: 
Initially a tool of rich urbanites the mobile phone has rapidly percolated down
to the poorest sectors such as the rickshaw pullers and domestic servants …
Phone costs are cheap by world standards: for example, a basic Nokia 1280
handset may be purchased BTD 1650 (approximately US$25, and time credits
purchased from street vendors for as little as US$1) … Mobile phones and the
Internet, unlike the mass media per se, have been incorporated into Bengali
culture as seemingly organic extensions of an essentially oral culture of the
masses. (Shoesmith et al. 2014: 8) 
The cell phone and the crowd enable each other in a process through which 
the “oral culture of the masses” comes into contact and remediates virtual 
space. In this rapidly growing site of ambivalent inclusion, rickshaw pullers and 
domestic workers seemingly brush virtual shoulders with the bourgeoisie. Here, 
identifying the so-called bad apples helps others in distancing themselves from the 
excessively cruel crowd, even when doing so demands indulging in comparable 
crowd affect. The negative intimacy between the secular and religious crowds 
mobilized in the Shahbag-Hefazot phenomenon finds analogous expression in 
the vigilantism across virtual and actual crowds. 
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As the examples from contemporary Bangladesh show, secular and religious 
crowds, in their desires to be seen and heard, have ended up mimicking each other. 
In order to mete out justice, individual online users of social media have acted 
in tandem, coming together and performing the excess and volatility associated 
with crowds. The mimetic quality of crowd behavior is also noticeable at yet 
another level. The Shahbag crowd was mostly celebrated for avoiding familiar 
routes of anti-governmental protests and holding peaceful demonstrations 
that involved forming human chains, signing petitions, singing songs, lighting 
candles, and flying balloons. Its fundamental demand for the death penalty, 
however, made it a rather unique group of vigilantes. The relentless slogan, “We 
want the noose” that defined Shahbag’s core affect, made many of its detractors 
and some sympathizers ambivalent of the movement. Demanding capital 
punishment on the streets by bypassing due process would cast long shadows on 
the neutral functioning of the judiciary, many observers feared. 
Still, reading Shahbag’s demand as either spontaneous outburst or 
governmental ploy would be to simplify a social context in which people seek 
justice in ways that challenge and/or exist outside a liberal democratic framework. 
In the absence of a state owning up to its actions—the lack of accountability for 
public molesters or the death of Hefazat supporters are cases in point—people 
take matters in their own hand, as they say. To say this is not to absolve the cruelty 
or criminality of their actions but to take note that whether physically violent 
or not, the call for adequate punishment demands a crowd for its execution. 
It also takes a crowd to protest the cruelty of collective violence against the 
disenfranchised or to make those in power answerable. The Bangladeshi state, 
in turn, has made its allegiances known in an opportunistic fashion, either by 
indulging or by repressing certain crowds over others. Since 2013, both Shahbag 
and Hefazat crowds have fallen in and out of favor with the ruling political elite 
for reasons that ultimately come down to political expediency. And yet, the story 
of the crowd, its remediation through so-called new technologies, and its vexed 
relationship to institutions of power are not reducible to the vagaries of the state. 
What happens when we start rethinking the public sphere, as Francis Cody has 
recently urged us to do, from an illiberal perspective? For Cody, this means 
making the libidinal, corporeal, and poetic ties of kin and community and not 
the empty stranger/citizen as a starting point (Cody 2015: 61). What happens, 
one might ask, when we start with the crowd—and the possibilities of politics 
that it opens up or forecloses—as constitutive of South Asian political modernity 
and not an aberration from it? 
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Te Bangladeshi crowd 
When it comes to crowds, few places are as overdetermined as Bangladesh. Its 
57,000 or so square miles are some of the world’s most inhabited. The landmass 
of Bangladesh is one-118th the size of Russia, but its population exceeds Russia’s 
by more than 25 million, says the New York Times (Rosen 2016). Comparisons of 
scale are strategies to put an out-of-the-way place on a familiar map. They make 
the global south legible to the Euro-American reader. These reports also point out 
that comparisons can be inadequate if not misleading. Jody Rosen finds himself 
in Dhaka on a day of hartal, a tried-and-true model of political protest that aims 
to halt the regular movement of people and things. The traffic during hartal, 
depending on who is calling the strike, is relatively thin. But as Rosen discovers 
quickly, “relatively thin” is highly relative, particularly since he ranks Dhaka 
crowds above those of Mumbai and Cairo. Moreover, this density is exaggerated 
when the cities and townships have to accommodate a different kind of traffic, 
that is, the flow of a michhil or a procession powered by the movement of people. 
The scourge of a traffic-clogging political procession—a regular fixture of South 
Asian cities—is worsened by rapidly shrinking spaces of public congregation: 
“On occasions when these programmes draw big crowds, the entire city, already 
well known for congestion, experiences traffic gridlocks.”18 
Whichever political side one is on, the goal is to take over the street—not the 
agora or the arena but “the asphalt in-between” (Morris 2013). These are not 
spontaneous outbursts of angry citizens, though those too happen with relative 
frequency—Rajon’s death is a grim reminder—but are more or less rehearsed 
spectacles of presence. They are a visible gauge of popularity for a cause, an 
institution, or a leader. Indeed, political crowds in the form of processions and 
meetings have been a big part of the origin story of the nation. The crowd of 
thousands at Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s 1971 speech at the Ramna Racecourse 
(the same place where Pahela Baishakh celebrations now take place) is a part of 
national folklore. The March 7 event by the future first president of Bangladesh 
was a grand moment of declaration, if not as yet of independence then surely of 
a more concerted voice of the Bengali majority population of Pakistan. A little 
over nine months after the event, and at the end of a war between Pakistan’s two 
wings, Bangladesh became a separate nation. 
To rethink crowds against developments in digital technology discussed 
in this chapter is politically consequential and theoretically productive for 
Bangladesh and South Asia for sure, but that is only one part of the story. The 
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trends here follow the course of contemporary geopolitics. “From around the 
world rises the repeated specter of a crowd that calls for change,” writes Rosalind 
Morris in her theses on the New Offentlichkeit (Morris 2013). Recent public 
protests in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe, and northern Africa make a 
transnational language of democracy seem truly global. Yet these manifestations 
of crowd power across borders also translate into paranoid policies of safety and 
security. They have impacted South Asian regional politics, with India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and Myanmar particularly resorting to an anxious rhetoric that at 
once vilifies religious and secular affect, particularly when targeted against the 
ruling authority. These modes of instituting sovereignties invoke governmental 
strategies that immediately individualize and privatize public life. In Bangladesh, 
the current fetish of isolated figures of transgression, for example, the blogger 
and the militant, purposely downplays and displaces the power of the crowd. By 
moving political threats from the masses to marked individuals is a move against 
politics. It runs the risk of limiting what one might call the sphere of the political 
(Rosanvallon 2006). Still, any event of political value in Bangladesh must take 
place in the street and gather a huge crowd to have any significance. 
Revolutionary politics in South Asia has long relied on the power of the 
crowd, as has counterrevolutionary forces from the colonial to the contemporary 
(Chakrabarty 2007). In vibrant rallies that rouse mass affect, and political 
violence where homemade bombs are hurled at jam-packed buses to kill as many 
ordinary commuters as possible,19 the crowd is truly a political pharmakon; that 
is, it is both a remedy and a scapegoat. This duality remains fundamental to 
the idea of the crowd in modern mass democracies. A fast-growing number 
of urban Bangladeshis waste time and exhaust public resources being stuck in 
traffic in an increasingly atomized capital city (Rosen 2016). At the same time, 
they are apparently logging on to social networks much more frequently than 
people living in some of the world’s most populated cities (Murad 2017).20 Being 
ethical, both online and on the street, as Anik had told me in 2013, has become 
a rising concern in profoundly shifting political and digital climates. Like Anik 
and his contemporaries, ethnographers must also attempt to make sense of the 
interactions and inter-textualities between the disparate crowds that make up 
Bangladesh’s contemporary urban life. 
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Death on the Bund: Crowd Control and the 
Chinese Dream in Shanghai 
Scott Moskowitz 
Prelude 
On New Year’s Eve 2010 I found myself at a party held in the offices of an 
investment firm several floors below the executive suite of the Bank of China 
building, located in Shanghai’s historic Bund neighborhood. Looking down at 
the once sleepy Bund, I was startled by the mass of people assembled there in 
the first year of its reopening, following significant investment by the Chinese 
government to refashion the Bund into an elevated walkway and premier tourist 
attraction. The Bund delimits Puxi (West of Pu) and stretches along the banks 
of the Huangpu River in front of Shanghai’s grandest colonial architecture, 
directly across from the skyline of Pudong’s (East of Pu) futuristic Liujiazui 
financial district. The crowd below me moved as one, packed tightly into the 
streets, spilling up onto the viewing platform, the two masses separated by a long 
retaining wall but linked by sinews of revelers ascending and descending stairs at 
intermittent access points. I was in awe of the assembly, puzzled by the crowd’s 
appeal to its participants, worried for their safety, and thankful to be viewing 
the phenomena at a distant remove. Five years later, I would suddenly recall this 
sense of proxy alarm and relief, while fighting to escape a deadly stampede in 
this same spot. 
An ethnographer in the crowd 
The day before New Year’s Eve 2015, I find myself in Shanghai again, that night 
in 2010 completely absent from my mind. Although I have been conducting 
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research in Western China, I have flown in and out of Shanghai on a brief trip 
to Europe and am stuck in the city awaiting the arrival of a first-time visitor to 
China who I have promised to shepherd around before returning to my research 
commitments out west. Around midnight I check into a hostel in a dilapidated 
colonial building several blocks from the Bund. All windows are open to the 
near-freezing street.1 
Hoping the hostel has a bar or cafe where I might warm up while my room 
reaches a sleepable temperature, I inquire at the front desk. A young man in his 
twenties wearing a crisp black baseball hat informs me regretfully that there is 
only an “activity room,” but it has already closed for the night. His tone draws 
a sharp look from a more senior colleague, and perhaps to change the subject, 
he compliments my hat. I am wearing a knit acrylic winter hat, bright red and 
blue, adorned with the logo of the New England Patriots and topped with a large 
red and white pompom. It is not, objectively speaking, stylish. But it is warm. I 
thank him for his compliment and ask if he is a fan of “American-style olive ball,” 
the Chinese name for the sport played by the “New England Country Lovers,” 
or Patriots. He has never seen a game but assures me he has heard of the sport 
and invites me to come drinking with him after his shift. With no plans beyond 
fighting jetlag in a freezing room, I accept, and, encouraged by my receptiveness, 
he begins to tell me his story. A high school graduate from Shandong province, 
he was hoping to travel before furthering his education or properly joining the 
workforce, and had taken a job at the hostel several months earlier, but has 
had so little off time he hasn’t been able to explore Shanghai much. Another 
glare from his coworker cuts our conversation off. Agreeing to meet soon, we 
exchange social media contacts and I note that his chosen handle is the English 
phrase “Armani’s Chopsticks.” 
Upstairs, near the closed activity room, a couple of young travelers from 
Taiwan lounge in the hallway. When I first registered, they had been downstairs 
discussing the differences in divorce laws between China and Taiwan with 
Armani’s colleague. I nod hello and soon find myself in a discussion about the 
broader cultural and legal differences between Taiwan and China. One young 
man, nicknamed Minmin, expresses disappointment at his failure to connect 
with other young Chinese people during his first trip to Mainland China, where 
his family is from. 
Several in the party depart for bed and I find myself alone with Minmin. I 
invite him to join Armani’s Chopsticks and me for a drink. For all his professed 
disappointment at failing to connect socially with his Mainland Chinese peers, 
Minmin is unnerved by the offer, hesitant to come. But he appears incapable of 
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refusing in a way that will not embarrass him or me. Annoyed at his prejudgment 
of Armani, and by proxy, me as a judge of character, I don’t really want Minmin 
to come either. I suspect he may say something offensive about Mainland China 
to Armani, compromising all three relationships. But, thousands of miles from 
my field site, I am essentially still on vacation and not thinking strategically as 
an ethnographer. I am jetlagged and, having flown a surprisingly dry Russian 
airline, could use a drink. “Zouba,” I say authoritatively. Let’s go. “Zouba,” 
Minmin replies, meekly, and follows me downstairs. 
In the lobby I make eye contact with Armani and then nod back at Minmin by 
way of introduction. “Taiwanese friend,” I say. Armani nods having encouraged 
me to invite any and all friends. “Zouba,” he says and heads out the door, turning 
left and walking briskly toward some undisclosed location. “Where are we 
headed, to a bar?” I ask. “No, no bars around here,” says Armani. Minmin looks 
at me nervously. We end up getting beers and kebabs at a barbecue stand down 
the street. After we sit and toast each other Armani begins questioning Minmin 
on his opinions of China and young Chinese people. Minmin’s responses are 
hesitant and diplomatic, but Armani’s opinions are far harsher. He bemoans that 
while young Taiwanese people like Minmin come to China to explore, young 
Chinese are parochial and careerist, that there is no sense of camaraderie at the 
hostel, only hierarchy. He is looked down on for not having attended university, 
even though he eventually plans on continuing his education. Minmin and 
Armani are soon deep in conversation about the role of youth in traditional 
Chinese culture. I try to remain engaged nodding in agreement at various points, 
though my opportunities to contribute are few. Eventually food and drink are 
finished and we return to the hostel. 
Still jetlagged, I wake in the late afternoon on New Year’s Eve to an imploring 
message from Armani on my phone. “Hey, where are you?” He has been working 
all day but hasn’t seen me, and last night we apparently made plans to spend New 
Year’s Eve together. “Have you eaten yet?” I ask, thinking we might get an early 
dinner while sorting out the evening’s plan. But of course in Chinese this is also 
a standard greeting, akin to asking “how’s it going?” and does not necessarily 
imply an invitation. Armani responds that he has eaten and inquires back the 
same. I have been in my room all day and so have not eaten. This confounds 
Armani. After a time he urges me to go eat and then return by 7:30 p.m. at the 
latest. “Tonight there will be very many people. Also, the Taiwanese guy has 
returned.” I assume this means he has invited Minmin to join us. 
I don’t manage to make it out before 7:30 p.m., but Minmin is downstairs with 
several of his traveling companions and they have not eaten dinner yet either. 
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Armani is distressed, explaining that there is going to be a laser show at the 
Bund, and we will never secure decent viewing positions if we don’t hurry. It is 
his first day off in ages and he is excited to participate in the kind of large group 
activity he could never experience in his home city. Cosmopolitan opportunities 
like this are the reason he traveled to Shanghai. I offer that I am fine with street 
food in a hurry, but the Taiwanese insist on introducing us to a nearby Fujian-
style chaoshou restaurant they have discovered that reminds them of home. 
Outside the dumpling shop, the streets are more crowded than normal, if not 
alarmingly so. Armani takes the lead, marching us vigorously several blocks to 
the Bund, and up the elevated platform where we begin to search for a prime 
viewing space. As with most public holidays, the night is bright and clear 
without a trace of the haze that normally obscures views. This may owe to a 
happy coincidence of weather, aided by the holiday closing of local factories, 
or possibly to the type of strategic measures undertaken by the government to 
ensure clear skies whenever its cities will be on public display. Sweeping shots 
of China’s iconic cities, including Shanghai, are sure to feature in the New Year’s 
Eve variety shows that will be broadcast on nearly every station.2 
We have arrived a little after nine, according to the clock on the British-built 
former Shanghai Customs House, which looms behind us. Nearby is the Bank 
of China Building. I am suddenly reminded of New Year’s Eve in 2010, when I 
looked down toward the street and its startling crush of humanity. While the 
walkway is crowded, it doesn’t feel as claustrophobic as I had imagined, looking 
down from above. People are packed several rows deep at the water’s edge, 
jostling for position, but the area behind them is relatively empty. I can think 
of no reason to enter this fray. Pudong’s glittering skyline, towering over the 
negative space of the darkened Huangpu River between us, is fully visible from 
all parts of the viewing platform. 
Behind the fray, the crowd is mostly listless. Some people pose for pictures 
against the backdrop of Pudong and futuristic Liujiazui, and a few hawkers are 
pedaling headbands adorned with fuzzy ears evocative of cartoon animals, the 
tchotchke du jour, which nearly every woman in sight has purchased, along with 
some of their partners. Some carry plastic neon hand-clappers, but no one is 
using them. Mostly though, as on any given day on the Bund, people simply 
stare across the water at Pudong’s sparkling promise of the future. Though at 
street level Liujiazui is largely absent of cultural or economic life—among the 
bases of its mega towers, wind howls at traffic snarls but there are few shops, 
vendors, or pedestrians—from across the river, its skyline is a developmental 
triumph, featuring the city’s three tallest buildings, each of which topped out as 
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the second tallest building in the world at the time of their construction. To gaze 
across the water at Pudong and its prosperous articulation of the future, what 
President Xi Jinping is referring to when he frequently invokes his trademark 
slogan “the Chinese Dream” is to situate one’s self in the present with your back to 
China’s colonial past. The grand stone facades of all the Western-built banks and 
custom houses that originally came to constitute the Bund were once the beating 
economic heart of Colonial Shanghai, though most ordinary Shanghai residents 
were largely excluded from this activity and the attendant cosmopolitan cultural 
life that made Shanghai famous. Today, spotlights illuminate the names of the 
old colonial landlords carved into the stonework facades, as well as the larger 
modern signs of their new tenants—mostly Chinese state-controlled banks but 
several posh Chinese-owned hotels and nightclubs as well—and the five-star 
Chinese flags flapping triumphantly from the roof of each. 
The evening is relatively quiet. The air of revelry one might expect from a 
large public gathering on New Year’s Eve in a major global city, like the iconic 
yearly gathering of revelers at New York’s Times Square, is absent. Mostly, people 
are just milling about, expectant but unsure, as if waiting for further instruction. 
The crowd stretches off to both sides of the Bund’s visible horizon and I ask 
Armani where he thinks the light show we have apparently come for will be 
focused. “Just … Pudong,” he says, gesturing across the water. Eventually we 
settle in front of the green-roofed former Sassoon Mansion. Armani stares 
straight ahead at Pudong as if willing the show to begin. 
I am wearing a fleece jacket over a heavy Fair Isle sweater, which matches 
the color scheme of my Patriots hat. Once we stop moving I immediately feel 
the cold penetrating my layers. The Taiwanese are mostly sporting stylish but 
flimsy windbreakers and I can tell they are not used to the cold. I fish around 
in my pockets and dig out a single glove and another winter hat, which one 
of them gladly accepts. By ten o’clock, the idea of waiting another hour begins 
to seem untenable and I suggest we find a restaurant or cafe to warm up in 
before returning. After all, the Bund is not nearly as crowded as Armani had 
anticipated. Reclaiming our spot should be easy. 
We walk toward one of the exits at the back of the platform and immediately 
stop. At the base of the stairs is a thin plastic cordon reinforced by two officers 
yelling into a megaphone at a mass of people determined to ascend. They fill 
the streets, which have been closed to traffic, stretching from the far sidewalk 
all the way to the base of the stairs. This is more people than I have ever seen in 
one place, except possibly in the same exact place, from my perch in the Bank of 
China Building back in 2010. They are fighting for position, craning to see up 
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the stairs, jostling to be first in line in case someone leaves and the police allow 
another to pass, like bouncers at a popular nightclub. There will be no chance of 
returning to the viewing platform if we leave, and even the possibility of leaving 
seems remote, if not dangerous. 
Our agency arrested, I stare at the crowd for several minutes, transfixed. At 
one point, a young Eastern European couple ducks under the cordon and sprints 
up the stairs. The crowd yells angrily after the transgressing foreigners and a 
police officer sprints after them. I decide not to linger near the stairs, in case my 
foreignness elicits resentment when so many locals are packed together beneath 
me, seemingly intent on ascending to the privileged location I currently inhabit. 
And yet the situation doesn’t quite make sense to me, as a participant or 
observer. Pudong’s skyline, the sight of the evening’s promised “activity,” will be 
just as visible from the street as from our inexplicably coveted vantage. There 
is no real advantage to our position, beyond the intrinsic superiority of higher 
ground, and perhaps, in this moment, space itself. There are no activities, or 
entertainers, or diversions of any kind on the platform, not even the sort of 
overly cheery volunteers one might expect to be directing people or handing out 
programs at such an event. Below is a mass of humanity collectively fighting for 
the right to ascend upstairs where there is simply more space and an opportunity 
to view the lights of Pudong from a slightly different, though not necessarily 
superior, perspective. 
I am cold and quickly losing interest in the promised light show, about 
which no announcements have been made to indicate format, or start time, or 
even to confirm its existence. Ultimately, the spectacle will be little more than 
flash and sparkle above the water, a testament to the showmanship of the local 
government, a conceptual extension of Pudong and of the Chinese Dream itself. 
Such public spectacle is necessary because it is the kind of thing one expects 
from a prosperous society, the promise of the Chinese Dream. The government 
must provide such spectacle to reassure that social life in the PRC is developing, 
moving toward the experiential mean of prosperous societies around the world, 
even as the PRC’s political life and civil freedoms have regressed under Xi 
Jinping.3 But the delivery of such promised experiences is ultimately inhibited 
by the PRC’s sharp restrictions on independent civic life. 
The lack of apparent civic involvement in this event, besides that of the police, 
has leant a thin, formless quality to the evening and the social atmosphere up on 
the platform. Rather than the light show arriving as a grand finale after a night of 
public celebration and communal revelry, there is little interaction among those 
gathered on the platform—and with no side shows, street performers, volunteers, 
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or licensed vendors, nothing to foment it—merely a sense of guarded anomie as 
the would-be revelers stand around, biding their time and their carefully staked 
positions, waiting for the promised spectacle to materialize in the night sky. 
Meanwhile, on the street below, a perceived lack of access to the payoff of 
this promised spectacle has created a dangerous tension in the crowd. Whereas 
external activities—performers, even food carts—might divert the flow of traffic 
by splitting attentions, such potential diversions have all been banned, in typical 
Chinese fashion, so as to ensure both aesthetic and public order. While awaiting 
the main spectacle, there is nothing to do on the street but clamor for entry 
and ascension to the platform above; likewise, there is nothing to do on the 
platform above except fret about those below and the chaos and compromise 
their hypothetical ascension could bring. To me, this tension highlights the 
experiential gap between urban life in the PRC and much of the developed 
world, a dangerously yawning chasm between the reality of public life in China 
and the much ballyhooed “Chinese Dream.” But to Armani, the gathering crowd 
below is not ominous but affirmative, and the evening is still full of potential. He 
is proud to have secured entry to the platform, despite having been waylaid by 
his foreign charges, a testament to the urban savvy he has already accumulated, 
a small payoff on his risky investment in personal development through travel. 
I glance at the Taiwanese and they appear unsure, but Armani is buoyed by his 
accomplishment and its yield of our superior position on the platform; he is 
eager for an experiential opportunity far superior to anything available in his 
comparatively small hometown. For now, I see little chance of leaving, and 
though unsure I want to be at this event at all, I am, admittedly, relieved to be up 
on the platform, rather than below on the street with the crowd. 
This relief is short lived, however. Soon, an indistinguishable cry rises from 
the crowd below, and I turn to see a column of people streaming up the stairs 
into the elevated walkway. The police line has either broken or the police have 
simply given up. At some point, I realize I have lost track of my friends, or they 
have lost track of me. I determine to hold my position and hope they will find 
me. The platform does not fill quickly, and at first I am unconcerned, hopeful 
that the shifting dynamic will equalize the two crowds, creating egress at the 
base of the stairs. The new arrivals immediately rush toward the water, fighting 
for position with those already there. The back of the platform has yet to fill in, 
however, and I ease away from the crowd, toward the rear wall. From here I can 
keep an eye on the ascending column. I hope to leave once the column thins, 
but the initial wave is nearly the width of the stairs, and exiting against the tide 
seems risky. 
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The negative space around me slowly fills. I edge toward the stairs but am 
soon buffeted by people surging out of the upward funnel of the stairway. 
Slamming into my shoulders, some look up at my foreign face in surprise before 
pushing toward the water. Rebuffed, I back away from this stream of people 
and wait again for the crush to relent, keeping an eye on the stairs. Despite the 
growing crowd, the situation on the platform is still not quite alarming; it feels 
like the type of crowd one might encounter on a busy thoroughfare in Shanghai 
at rush hour, but without the threat of errant motorbikes. 
I am in an hourglass, the crowd spilling off and settling around me like grains 
of sand. Despite the obvious metaphor of danger, I am more perplexed than 
anxious until, quite suddenly, I find myself pressed against flesh from all sides. 
The cocoon of personal space most Westerners take for granted has entirely 
disappeared. It is likely that my self-conception as a foreigner, as a sociologist 
apart from the Chinese crowd I normally study, has enhanced my danger, 
allowing me to view myself as symbolically—and, as such, physically—separate, 
isolated from the crowd even while being consumed, or rather absorbed, by 
it. The experience stands as a resounding physical lesson against the myth of 
objectivity, a myth that even if long laid to rest intellectually, may still smolder 
deep within the ethnographer at an emotional level. All attempts to remain 
“objective” or separate from events are, at best, attempts at self-soothing or, at 
worst, delusions allowing me to deny the very real risk of physical harm I now 
face. 
Sure enough, the false safety of my observational locus soon dispels, like 
vapor squeezed from my lungs by the tightening of the crowd. With difficulty— 
and increasing alarm—I rotate 180 degrees to better assess any opportunities 
for escape. I am now a great distance from the stairs and at least eight people 
from the back wall, beyond which, a drop of significant but not life-threatening 
distance still separates me from the safety of the sidewalk below. That is, if 
the sidewalk is clear of people, which it likely is not. Confronted by the utter 
impossibility of lateral movement I think to myself, If I were the kind of person 
who freaks out, I might start freaking out right now. I am bemused by the idea 
of sharing this thought with my neighbor, with whom the colloquialism will 
surely fail to resonate. But while thinking to myself narratively in English, I 
have apparently already begun to communicate verbally with my neighbor in 
ardent—if surely confused—Chinese. I have been repeating the phrase, “We are 
not safe. We are less and less safe,” though I only become fully aware of this when 
he responds. “Friend, no one likes this situation. There is nothing we can do.” 
His tone is even and he wears the broad, uncomfortable grin that is commonly 
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offered in Chinese cities in response to an emotional display by a stranger. I am 
embarrassed, but this is oddly calming. He is wrong of course. I reassure myself 
that, as improbable as it may seem, the crowd is now so tightly packed that, if I 
could just muster enough vertical leverage, I might escape by walking over the 
heads and shoulders of others. 
And yet, if too many people were to attempt such a feat, the crowd might 
collapse in on itself. It is the very density of the crowd—now pressed so tightly 
that breathing is a labored act but falling to the ground and getting trampled 
would be impossible—that assures its momentary safety and must, for now, 
be preserved. As the crowd had filled in, I remained falsely calm, still able to 
envision myself as apart from the crowd itself. Now, the knowledge that I have 
unwillingly been absorbed into the crowd, and have no control over when I will 
be able to depart, is causing me a great deal of anxiety, even though I am, at 
this moment, perhaps safer than I had been while calmly surveying the crowd 
rushing up the stairs, buffeting me, surrounding me, absorbing me. I heed my 
rear neighbor’s annoyed calm and realize that my anxiety, my very individuality, 
my foreign self-regard, is a liability to myself and to us all. In this sense, the 
crowd is a paradox, a suddenly arising mass form born of many individuals 
seeking a brief individual advantage, a space above and apart from the mass. 
But instead the individuals end up trapped together in a formation where all 
individual advantage is negated. There is a brief and immediate social contract 
struck in and perpetuating of such stasis, however unstable, a version of what 
Emile Durkheim might have called collective effervescence. 
As if to demonstrate this stasis, the crowd begins to ripple, confronting us 
with our own inability to act individually while reinforcing the tentative safety 
of our rebirth as a singular organism. Shrieks of terror and excitement travel 
northward through the crowd, heralding a great, approaching wave crest of 
flesh. All along the winding Bund, we are the flesh of an undulating Chinese 
dragon, covered not in shimmering scales but tacky cartoon ears. 
No one around me seems to be bracing for the surge. To react against the 
crowd’s energy is dangerous but to allow oneself to move with it, invigorating. 
I loosen my body and allow the wave to pass through me, lifting me so that my 
weight is redistributed from my feet and onto my neighbor to my right. For a 
moment, my toes are barely touching the ground and I can lift my feet without 
falling. Everyone around me is stacked at a similar, improbable angle. Falling to 
the ground is an impossibility. The wave soon passes back in the other direction 
with growing cries of excitement and diminishing screams of terror. My anxiety 
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gives way, briefly, along with my sense of self. The pattern repeats three or four 
times before subsiding. 
Suddenly, with no logic or forewarning, the crowd breaks and space appears 
around me. There is a palpable anxiety as individuals emerge again from the 
collective effervescence of the mass formation and spill from the guts of that 
roiling tacky-eared dragon. I am relieved but keenly aware that this is a moment 
of potential agency and, as such, high danger. There is no way to know how 
long this new physical iteration of the crowd will last or what form it will take 
next. Whereas moments ago escape was impossible and the crowd negated the 
individual on a physical and, to some extent, emotional level, now each individual 
must confront the possibility of escape but also the possibility of harm at the 
hands of others attempting to escape. I am reminded of the hoary cliché, beloved 
by authors of business articles, that the Chinese word for crisis, weiji, is formed 
from the concatenation of the characters wei and ji, danger and opportunity.4 
Amid the confusion, my companions reappear. After confirming that 
everyone is unharmed I suggest we take advantage of the momentary relent to 
escape. Visibly shaken, my Taiwanese friends nod in agreement. It is now after 
eleven and Armani concedes that we might as well leave since the promised light 
show has not materialized. He shakes his head in frustration, embarrassed to 
have led us all this way for no payoff. 
We push toward the exit. On the stairs we are pressed against the far wall, part 
of a single-file column attempting to exit against a countervailing current at least 
five wide. “Friends, it is not safe to go up. It is crowded and very dangerous, go 
down go down,” I urge to anyone who will listen. No one does. “The activity has 
been canceled,” Armani clarifies, “There was no activity.” 
Several of our party have managed to successfully descend when suddenly 
the crowd tightens up again. I find myself pressed forcefully against a girl in 
her early twenties whose head comes up to my chest and whose back is against 
the wall. With my hands on the ledge and my back stiff against the crowd, I 
strain to maintain a protective frame so as not to crush her. I will not be able to 
hold the position for long and I urge her to use this moment to climb over the 
wall and escape the crowd. She is so small, unable even to see above the crowd. 
My forearms are shaking now but the nobility of my effort is invigorating. I 
know the unpredictable crowd seems scary I tell her, but I will be right behind, 
protecting her and making sure she can climb over the wall safely; my friends, 
who are on the other side calling to me, will make sure she is not hurt climbing 
over the wall. “Thanks,” she says, her face implacable. “No need. No need.” She is 
still hoping for a chance to make it up the stairs, she tells me. After all, everyone 
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is struggling to get up there, and she has already made it this far. Whatever is at 
the top must be worth the risk. 
I feel my resolve start to give way, along with the rigidity of my forearms,
and I swear in frustration. Not at her, but at the absurdity of the situation. At
myself, for misreading this crowd so badly and ending up trapped dangerously
in a stairwell. But also, maybe, at her. Am I wrong to be scared? Why isn’t she
scared? What is so alluring about the platform? Did I miss something while I
was up there? Would I still be trying to get up there if I hadn’t already been, or
is there something particular to the state of being young and Chinese and of a
certain income bracket at this particular moment in time that is propelling this
stampede? They seem driven—in this instance, to near frenzy—by a thirst for
new experiences. Understandably, in this anxious moment of rapid cultural and
economic expansion, there has arisen a palpable, all-possessing ache to possess
what until recently seemed unpossessable—not merely in terms of material goods
but in a potential variety of imagined lives—but are now suddenly within reach,
yet may still, just as suddenly, recede, a sense conveyed to me by many informants. 
I wedge myself between my reluctant rescuee and her neighbor and, using 
a railing for leverage, manage to hoist myself above the wall, pausing to steady 
myself and assess the state of the crowd at its base of origin. A huge mass 
continues to shove its way into the mouth of the stairwell against the trickle of 
those attempting to descend. Rather than individuals digging their way through, 
several have committed their fortunes to the success of the entire group, having 
planted their feet for leverage, in attempts to drive the entire scrum up the stairs, 
like the transit officials hired by the Shanghai Metro to “shove commuters into 
trains” in response to complaints over the inefficiency of overcrowded lines.5 
The crowd seems possessed—and is, itself, a type of possession—by the idea that 
effort alone might overcome the physical limitations of the stairwell’s width. In 
truth, it just might. 
And yet, beyond the mass formation surging up through the base of the 
stairwell, the rest of the street is comparatively calm, if slightly more crowded 
than on a normal evening. My friends have gathered beneath me, extending 
their arms to help me over the wall. I straddle the ledge on my stomach, one 
leg pinned painfully by the crowd before finally releasing. I land solidly, but 
on my feet and otherwise intact. Immediately we begin to retreat. Animal-ear 
headbands litter the ground and crunch under foot. We are moving against the 
flow of most pedestrian traffic, but there does not seem to be a clear destination 
that is drawing people. Whatever might be transpiring on the platform, there is 
no sense of urgency or panic in the street. 
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We walk in silence most of the way and several blocks from our hostel, I stop 
to buy a steamed bun even though I am not particularly hungry. The group 
pushes on, anxious to return to the relative calm of the hostel, and I hang back, 
relieved at the prospect of being alone for the first time since the evening began. 
I eye bottles of cheap watery lagers at a convenience store but am overwhelmed 
by the variety and leave without a purchase. When I finally make it back, the 
alley by our hostel is dark and nearly empty and it barely feels like New Year’s 
Eve, let alone as if a riot could be happening nearby. I am beginning to wonder 
if I haven’t completely misinterpreted the situation when a young man suddenly 
appears, waving his arms and shouting excitedly about the Bund. At first I 
assume he has escaped the stampede as well and is requesting help, but he is 
asking for directions to the Bund. It is still several minutes to midnight. 
I explain that whatever was supposed to happen there tonight appears to 
have been canceled. The situation is dangerous, the police have abandoned 
the street to the mobs, and he should stay away at all costs. “WHERE … is … 
the Bund?” he repeats loudly, slowly, revealing a Southern Chinese accent. He 
is frustrated to have discovered that I am a foreigner and have obviously not 
understood his question. Resigned, I point behind him in the general direction 
of the waterfront. “Thank you, thank you,” he repeats, relieved. He has come all 
the way to Shanghai for New Year’s Eve after all and is not going to be deterred 
now, moments before midnight. He turns and scampers off, buoyant with the 
possibility of the New Year, of this megacity with its megatowers, its live holiday 
extravaganzas, its iconic waterfront at the crux of history, its seemingly empty 
alleys filled with foreigners who speak Chinese and can, with a little insistence 
and slow enough speech, point you in the right direction when you are lost. 
Death and departure 
At the front desk Armani’s boss is reading. She is surprised I am back before 
midnight. I try to convey the sheer mass of people, the crush of humanity that 
seemed to almost swallow us before spitting me out onto the street. She looks 
at me with a mix of pity and annoyance. “Of course there were crowds. It’s New 
Year’s.” When I am not immediately mollified, she explains further: “Shanghai 
has a lot of people.” 
Back in my room, I can hear the peppy voices of a young male and female 
host couple counting down to the New Year somewhere nearby. I wonder if we 
weren’t in the wrong location the whole time and flip on the TV looking for 
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any sort of news to confirm my recent experience, which already feels distant, 
even imagined. There are no news reports about any sort of stampede, and 
flipping the channels I find mostly New Year’s programs and one seems to match 
the voices outside my window, though it doesn’t appear to be broadcast from 
anywhere recognizable. I will eventually discover the source of revelry as a large 
LCD advertising screen installed temporarily at a nearby intersection. 
I turn off the television and crawl into bed, though the broadcast continues to 
spill in with the cold through my single-paned windows. At midnight the hosts 
wish each other a happy new year and a festive holiday song plays. The expected 
crack of fireworks is absent. New restrictions meant to combat air pollution, I 
had read. The light show that never materialized was supposed to have taken 
their place. I pull my knitted cap back on and curse at the noise from the unseen 
party—that, of course, is virtual and isn’t actually there—and then at myself. It is 
barely midnight on New Year’s Eve and I am alone in a dark room complaining 
about street noise. I am supposed to be a sociologist studying what it means to 
be middle class in contemporary China, how this idea shapes and is shaped by 
tastes, experiences, and desires. And yet, here I am, cowering alone in my room, 
having retreated from experience, from the people I supposedly came here to 
study because … there were too many of them in one place? What did I actually 
experience tonight? Was I ever in real danger or was I simply afraid of something 
because, even though I had claimed to study this phenomena, I had never gotten 
close enough to properly experience or understand it? 
The next morning I wake to a frantic text message from my brother back 
home, anxious to make sure I am OK, which is surprising. Minmin has sent me 
something as well, a link to an article. Apparently, just moments after we had 
escaped the previous night, a stampede on a stairwell leading up to the Bund’s 
elevated platform had critically injured many people, with thirty-six eventual 
fatalities. Authorities, wary of their ability to control expected record crowds, 
had actually canceled the public light show we had come for several days earlier, 
moving the event to a smaller venue and restricting admission to those lucky 
enough to receive tickets. With the venue changed, crowd control measures at 
the Bund were cut further. But news of the change, which would likely have 
led to public resentment, was never widely disseminated, and record crowds 
materialized anyways. 
According to some accounts on social media, the tragedy occurred after 
nightclub owners dumped boxes of coupons, in the guise of American currency, 
to the street below, causing the mob on the stairs, struggling desperately to ascend 
to the platform for an event that did not exist, to suddenly reverse course. Wary 
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of a narrative in which striving young urbanites, deprived of a promised public 
spectacle, ultimately trampled each other to death while grasping for fake US 
currency dumped from the windows of an exclusive nightclub, officials issued 
numerous reports in which they sought to disseminate a clarified timeline. 
The official microblog—the Chinese equivalent of Twitter—of the Shanghai 
Public Security Bureau reassured the public that an official investigation had 
concluded that the stampede had already occurred by the time the fake money 
was released.6 The thoughtless stunt had not caused the tragedy. The coupons 
merely fluttered down, harmlessly, into a street already littered with the dead 
and broken bodies of the young. Minmin and I exchange missives exclaiming 
our thankfulness and shock at having learned that we escaped just moments 
before tragedy. Downstairs, I ask Armani if he has heard the news. He shakes his 
head in somber disbelief of what he is saying, “There never was any light show 
to begin with. They canceled the activity.” His boss shoots us a fierce look. “No 
talk of disaster. This is not a good discussion.” Armani looks down at his desk. 
Minmin checks out later that day, apologizing by text for not finding me to 
say goodbye in person after what we had experienced. He assures me that we 
are fated to meet again. I check out later, bidding farewell to Armani who tells 
me quietly that he doesn’t plan to stay on at the hostel much longer. I head to 
Beijing to collect my cousin, feeling ill-prepared to play tour guide. Several days 
later we would return to Shanghai, working our way south before heading inland 
along the Yangtze to my primary field site, where he would depart and I would 
continue on with my research. 
Te Bund, darkened 
I was anxious about returning to the Bund but excited to be able to walk through 
the events while they were still fresh, as well as to introduce a first-time visitor to 
this fascinating nexus of history, the juxtaposition of austere colonial buildings 
lit up on one side of the platform, Pudong’s empty dazzle reflecting off the dark 
water opposite. When our cab driver stopped it was already early evening. I didn’t 
recognize the area and thought at first he must have misheard. He assured me 
that we had arrived at the Bund—“yes the main part of the Bund”—and I began 
to register the colonial stonework receding into shadows. The usual spotlights 
were absent, their facades drained of drama. Across the river, Pudong’s skyline 
was similarly darkened, and what stood out against the resurgent post-holiday 
haze was fast disappearing. A few garish tour boats shaped like creatures from 
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Chinese mythology still lit the water, but the buildings themselves were soon 
swallowed by the night. 
The walkway was nearly empty of tourists, the extra police officers, patrolling 
against signs of public grief and outrage, all the more conspicuous. I stopped a 
senior-looking officer patrolling with a younger female partner. 
“The lights are all off,” I said, immediately feeling foolish for stating the 
obvious. 
“Yes,” he replied, nodding patiently. 
“But they were on before … ” 
“Yes.” 
“I mean, not just during the holiday, but normally. They are normally on at 
night.” 
“Yes.” 
“So why are they off now? Will they turn on later?” 
“No lights this evening,” he explained, no less patiently. 
“Do you know when they will be turned back on?” 
His partner looked at me nervously and then turned to him, expectant. He 
gave a slight snort and then shrugged at the absurdity of the question, as if he 
might have any more idea than me. The lights would not be off forever of course. 
They would be off until public anger had died down or moved on to some other 
momentary outrage. It was too soon to turn spotlights on the site of tragedy. But 
to keep them off forever would risk memorializing the event with absence. There 
would be no official announcement of their return, lest it be acknowledged that 
the lights were off for any particular reason; they would simply be turned back 
on at the unknowable but exactly appropriate time. The officers turned upriver, 
toward Chenyi Square, fading into darkness like the Pudong skyline. 
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Guide to Further Reading 
Megan Stefen 
This Guide to Further Reading is for students looking to read more about 
crowds. It is by no means an exhaustive review of the scholarly literature on 
crowds. It draws mainly on works that were either written in English or have 
been translated into English. In addition, many major works on crowds have 
been omitted, either in the name of space or else because I found the premises 
of their investigations repulsive. In the Introduction, I gestured to the fact that 
much of the earliest conceptual work on crowds was developed in concert with 
the (then) emerging field of eugenics (Resina 2006; van Ginneken, J. 1992: 
101). As several contributors to this volume point out, the taken-for-granted 
association of irrational behavior with non-white, non-male, and “non-modern” 
bodies is foundational to popular and scholarly thinking about crowds. While 
it’s tempting to patronize early thinkers who employed discriminatory analogies 
by historicizing them, one can easily find the same misogynistic and racist logic 
in books published by well-regarded university presses as recently as 1981. I have 
refrained from engaging with authors whose thinking I found unimaginative, 
discriminatory, and essentialist unless it was unavoidable. Instead, I encourage 
students reading this to pursue texts that the contributors to this volume found 
helpful to their own thinking, texts that have been unusually generative within 
the field of crowd studies more generally, and texts that are similar to the chapters 
in this volume. I have organized the guide roughly by time period, topic, and 
approach. 
Students searching for an overview of the history of the major theorists of 
crowds will find The Politics of Crowds: An Alternative History of Sociology by
Christian Borch (2012) extremely useful. Borch examines the history of crowd 
theory up to the late twentieth century, but his intervention into the early 
scholarship on crowds is particularly helpful as it links the emergence of crowd 
theory to the emergence of the discipline of sociology. As this volume shows, many 
of the works analyzed by Borch continue to be read widely today. For instance, 
in this volume Bjørn Thomassen draws on Gabriel Tarde’s The Laws of Imitation
(2014), and several of the contributors make a passing reference to Gustave 
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Le Bon’s The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (2002). Borch’s (2012) well-
documented assertion that Emile Durkheim developed his ideas about collective 
effervescence in opposition to Tarde and other contemporary theorists of crowds 
explains, perhaps, why many of the authors in this volume make reference to 
Durkheim’s theory of collective effervescence—a sense of heightened solidarity 
with others that could emerge from crowd-like experiences—but do not directly 
engage his work. Where Durkheim remained devoted to the power of collective, 
crowd-like experiences to transform people into mutually constitutive social 
beings, thinkers like Le Bon and Tarde highlighted the irrational behavior and 
suggestibility of crowds, respectively. 
Students who want to understand the importance of crowds in religious 
contexts should examine many works that may not explicitly mention 
crowds. Beyond outlining the idea of collective effervescence, Durkheim’s The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1995) offers a theory for how people form 
groups and become part of a society through worship. Victor Turner’s work 
on the dynamics of rituals to transform people within groups may be similarly 
useful; for instance, in this volume, Thomassen draws heavily on Turner’s 
(1988) The Anthropology of Performance to think about collective experiences. 
Abdellah Hammoudi also refers to Turner’s analysis of liminality in his chapter 
on crowds during the hajj. For students who want to know more about crowds 
during a specific religious event, Hammoudi’s (2006) book-length account, A 
Season in Mecca, is indispensable. Hammoudi’s vivid, firsthand narrative brings 
not only the hajj’s crowds to life but also its context; the people surrounding 
Hammoudi are pulled together and pushed apart by their beliefs, bureaucracy, 
and the market forces behind their pilgrimage. As I noted in the Introduction, 
there have historically been methodological, logistical, theoretical, and political 
reasons anthropologists and ethnographers have not frequently taken up crowds 
as an object of study; however, there are several notable exceptions, including 
Hammoudi’s book. Stanley Tambiah’s Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist
Conflicts and Collective Violence (1996) uses archival materials and firsthand 
accounts to analyze ethnic violence in South Asian contexts. “Crowds,” an essay 
by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1962) analyzed in the Introduction, provides an account 
of one ethnographer’s confrontation with a crowd in what was then Calcutta. 
Finally, contributor Nusrat Sabina Chowdhury’s (2019) book, Paradoxes of the 
Popular, provides an in-depth, ethnographic examination of crowds, protests, 
and politics in Bangladesh. 
Although crowds are not exclusively a modern phenomenon, writers often 
associate crowds with the social shifts that accompanied industrialization 
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and democratization. Students who want to read more about how early 
industrialization affects group formation can find more of Durkheim’s thinking 
on solidarity in The Division of Labor in Society (1984). Stefan Jonsson charts 
the historical construction of the crowds, masses, and revolution in A Brief 
History of the Masses (2008) and Crowds and Democracy (2013). Drawing on art 
criticism, intellectual history, and social theory, Jonsson analyzes not the crowds 
and masses as phenomena in the world but representations of them. In his 
analysis of religious crowds in this volume, Ebenezer Obadare relies on the work 
of historian Georges Lefebvre (1934), who sought to understand the crowd’s role 
in revolution. He also draws on the work of Marxist theorists Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri (2004), who separate crowd theory from their own concept of the 
“multitude” that resists and transforms the existing structures of neoliberalism. 
Finally, George Rudé’s (2005: 210, 257; 1959) historical work on crowds in 
England and France offers an empirical critique of theorists like Le Bon. 
As they read, students would do well to be mindful of the historical factors that 
shaped the literature on crowds. In Crowds, Psychology, and Politics 1871–1899, 
Jaap van Ginneken (1992: 3) shows how the erosion of monarchies and elite 
structures of power in the nineteenth century motivated the first wave of 
writing about crowds. Borch argues that the world wars of the twentieth century 
similarly inspired a new set of scholars to begin theorizing “the transformation 
from crowd to mass: the features typically associated with crowds of co-present 
individuals suddenly appeared to seize the entire nation, which therefore 
emerged as a mass” (2012: 98). Borch identifies Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and 
Robert Park as some of the first thinkers to identify the masses as an object 
of inquiry in their studies of urbanization and capitalism’s consequences. The 
election of authoritarian leaders, rise of totalitarian governments, and adoption 
of nationalism in the twentieth century created a new sense of urgency for 
thinkers trying to understand what it was about the modern society that had 
made people capable of horrific acts of mass killing during the Holocaust and 
throughout Asia in the Second World War. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
Hannah Arendt explicitly links concentration camps to the crowds of 
supporters who pushed authoritarian leaders into power, writing, “The insane 
mass manufacture of corpses is preceded by the historically and politically 
intelligible preparation of living corpses” (Arendt 1966: 447). Her analysis of 
the historical factors that made totalitarianism possible is unflinching, and she 
ultimately argues that totalitarianism emerged from a modern society made 
up of the masses, where class structures had broken down, leaving individuals 
atomized and lonely (1966: 317). Not all thinkers saw crowds, modernity, and 
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totalitarianism as inevitably linked, however. Elias Canetti’s (1984) Crowds
and Power is in many ways an attempt to rehabilitate crowds both from the 
anachronistic notion that crowds were an exclusively modern phenomenon and 
from the assumption that their effects on the individual were always negative. 
In this volume, Hammoudi takes issue with Canetti’s analysis of the hajj crowds, 
but many of Canetti’s typologies of crowds remain good to think with, if only 
because they manage to depart from the Machiavellian impulses that animate so 
much of the crowd theory that preceded him. To Canetti, crowds can be violent 
and irrational, but they can also be liberating. 
Students searching for more on the connection between mass media and 
group formation will find scholars approaching the topic from many different 
angles. Benedict Anderson (2006) argues that newspapers, mass media, and other 
forms of print capitalism were essential to the formation of national identities in 
Imagined Communities. While Anderson does not explicitly address the types of 
co-present crowds that many of the chapters in this volume describe, his analysis 
provides insight to those looking to understand how groups form around 
circulating images of themselves. In The Mana of Mass Society (2017), William 
Mazzarella synthesizes media theorists with some of anthropology’s earliest 
thinkers to better understand the relationship between so-called modern mass 
phenomena (advertising and propaganda) and the putatively primitive ones that 
anthropologists studied. While Mazzarella’s focus on the history of anthropology 
as a discipline may be beyond the scope of what’s useful for students pursuing 
further reading on crowds, his identification of the Frankfurt School’s major 
thinkers’ contributions to the study of mass media will be helpful. Mazzarella 
pulls the works of Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Max Horkheimer with 
social theorists like Claude Lévi-Strauss, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Durkheim. 
For a theoretical approach concerned with understanding the specificity of 
crowd formation on the internet, students can turn to Byung-chul Han’s (2017) 
In the Swarm: Digital Prospects. Han helpfully distinguishes between different 
types of media. “Electronic media such as radio assemble human beings,” Han 
argues, “In contrast, digital media isolate them” (Han 2017: 11). While some of 
Han’s observations sound hyperbolic, his attention to the emotional experience 
of using contemporary digital media is urgent and prescient. 
Many other disciplines have also produced works that will help students 
understand the principles of crowding and group formation. Psychology in 
particular has focused on understanding group decision-making and the effects 
of density on individual behavior. In this volume, several of the contributors 
draw on Sigmund Freud’s (1921) Group Psychology and the Analysis of the 
Guide to Further Reading 
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Ego, which may have more in common with Le Bon’s work than the later 
contributions of social and environmental psychologists. Students interested in 
these approaches can start by turning to classic works like Irving L. Janis’s (1972) 
Victims of Groupthink and Jonathan Freedman’s (1975) Crowding and Behavior, 
respectively; more recent work can be found in journals specializing in social 
psychology and environmental psychology. For help further distinguishing 
between crowds, crowding, masses, mobs, and other related concepts, students 
can turn to Crowds, an eclectic volume edited by Jeffrey Schnapps and Matthew 
Tiews (2006). With contributors from many different disciplines, the chapters 
vary in their approach. Some, like John Plotz’s (2006) essay on alienation and 
the crowd in the thinking of sociologists like Erving Goffman, Robert Putnam, 
and David Reisman, offer probing analyses of why certain theories of crowd 
behavior gain traction in particular times and places; others, like Urs Staheli’s 
(2006) chapter on finance and business literature, offer critiques of the return 
of crowd theory in contemporary economics. In Among the Thugs, students can 
find one of the most unflinching, firsthand accounts of violent crowd behavior 
in journalist Bill Bufford’s (1992) examination of English football hooligans. 
Finally, issue 2 of Limn is devoted to the theme “Clouds and Crowds” (Irani 
et al 2012); it links anthropology, the digital, and several of this volume’s other 
themes. 








1 See, for instance, “Syria refugee crisis: Facts You Need to Know,” World Vision 
website, available online: https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/ 
syria-refugee-crisis-war-facts (accessed May 24, 2017) and “Syria! Confronting 
Fragmentation: Impact of Syrian Crisis Report,” Syrian Center for Policy Research, 
available online: http://scpr-syria.org/download/1269/?v=1480 (accessed May 24, 
2017). 
2 Tere are many active private individuals and organizations documenting the 
planned violence of the regime and the human rights violations of all combatant 
organizations during the confict. See especially the reports of the Syria Justice and 
Accountability Center (https://syriaaccountability.org), which is gathering evidence 
to be submitted to the Commission for International Justice and Accountability 
(CIJA) and the excellent summary article of evidence gathering by Taub (2016). 
3 Te idea of “swarm intelligence” has been most developed out of several disparate 
felds, including evolutionary biology and cognitive and computational processes. 
Drawing on studies of ant behavior and fsh schooling, the sociobiologist E. O. 
Wilson (1975) has theorized how the social sharing of information among 
conspeciates ofers an evolutionary advantage. From this, scholars in other felds 
have extrapolated to processes of optimization of nonlinear functions using 
what they call “particle swarm methodology.” For humans, the peculiarity of 
this intelligence rests, I assume, on the ability to recursively use such atavistic 
intelligence for particularly human, i.e., nonadaptive, afect-motivated, culturally 
specifc ends. 
Chapter 2 
1 A successful coup is one in which the existing government has been ousted and 
replaced by the junta who launched the coup. Tere have been at least seven 
additional unsuccessful coups and likely many more imagined but never realized. 
2 Shortly afer the rise of the PDRC in late 2013, Nidhi wrote, “Totalitarian 
dictatorship, no matter where it arises, destroys the principle of the democratic 
majority entirely. A majority that holds that every person is politically equal 
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is the very problem. Everyone should not be politically equal—not when they 
have diferent levels of education, hold diferent shares in the country, and view 
the collective diferently …. When the principle of the majority is destroyed, it 
dissolves the legitimacy of the institutions of the majority as well. Te government 
that came from the approval of the majority in parliament is null and void. Even the 
parliament or assembly that gave the approval is null and void. Te state ofces that 
are under the direction of those who have become null and void inevitably are as 
well. Everything is completely null and void. Or everything has been cleared out for 
the ‘great mass of the people’ to create anew, or for a ‘good person’ prime minister 
selected by the ‘good people’ to be royally appointed” (Nidhi 2013). 
3 On April 1, 2015, Article 44 was used to order the continued force of many 
measures of martial law, including provision for the arbitrary arrest and 
detention of those deemed problematic by the NCPO and the criminalization of 
public gatherings of fve or more persons. For full details, see the original Tai-
language NCPO Order 3/2558, published in the Ratchakitchanubeksa [Royal Tai 
Government Gazette], Book 132, Special Issue 73 Ngo, April 1, 2558 [2015], 1–4. 
Te 2014 Interim Constitution was replaced by a new, permanent constitution 
following passage via a referendum on August 7, 2016. Article 44 and all orders 
issued under it still remain in force. 
4 NCPO Announcement No. 7/2557 was made on May 22, 2014, and stipulated 
that public gatherings of fve or more persons were illegal and punishable by 
imprisonment of one year, a 20,000 baht fne, or both. Tis was replaced by Head of 
the NCPO Order No. 3/2558 on April 1, 2015, afer the revocation of martial law. 
5 Te Internet Dialogue on Legal Freedom (iLaw) compiles monthly statistics of 
arrests and criminal charges; see http://www.ilaw.or.th. 
6 Protests were held by both the red shirts as well as their opponents, the frst color-
coded political movement, the yellow shirts, who launched the movement calling for
the ouster of Taksin Shinawatra beginning in early 2006 that led to the September
19, 2006 coup. Te most signifcant of the protests was an extended protest by
several hundred thousand red shirt protestors who came to Bangkok from all over
the country between March and May 2010. Tey were protesting the unelected
government of former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and calling for elections.
Abhisit and his deputy prime minister, Suthep Taugsuban (who later became a key
PDRC leader). ordered a military crackdown on the protestors that led to ninety-
four deaths and over 2,000 injuries. See Keyes (2014) and Tausig (2013) for analysis
of the red shirt movement. 
7 Metta Wongwat (2014), “Aunties on the Frontline against the Coup: A Special 
Report,” Prachatai, June 9, available online: http://www.prachatai.com/english/ 
node/4105 (accessed December 4, 2016). 
8 After the NCPO banned demonstrations and began breaking up and arresting
groups of activists who massed in public with signs and banners, the Thai
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dissident toolbox expanded. One of the new and unexpected symbols of
protest was sandwiches. In early June 2014, students at Kasetsart University
in Bangkok organized a protest in the form of a walking distribution of
free sandwiches in a neighborhood near the university. As they handed out
sandwiches, which are easy to handle, they shared anti-coup messages with
those around them. The NCPO then tried, unsuccessfully, to ban the eating of
sandwiches. 
9 Since the coup, any organization, university department, or other collectivity 
that wishes to hold a seminar or other event on any political topic must request 
permission from the authorities frst. If permission is not requested, then events 
may be shut down. Even if permission is requested, all events are surveilled by 
a range of intelligence ofcials and in some cases have been shut down while in 
progress. 
10 For more information on Tai Lawyers for Human Rights, please see http://www. 
tlhr2014.org. 
11 For more information on the New Democracy Movement and PDF copies of To 
Overcome (in Tai), please see http://www.ndmth.org. 
12 On the 2015 draf constitution, see McCargo 2015: 329–354. For an English 
translation of the 2016 draf constitution, see International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance 2016. 
13 An analysis of the myriad problems of the draf constitution is beyond the scope 
of this essay, but a very concise assessment of the primary ones was done by the 
Khana Nitirat, a group of progressive law lecturers at Tammasat University 
(Khana Nitirat 2016). 
Chapter 3 
1 In the particular case of Ekiti state, perhaps we may include as part of this practice 
of “ostentatious humility” the very act of granting access to the premises of the 
new government house itself to ordinary citizens. Following his election, Governor 
Fayose had openly criticized his predecessor, Dr. Kayode Fayemi, for what he, 
Fayose, described as a “show of wickedness to Ekiti people,” referring to the N3.3bn 
reportedly spent on the project. 
2 I thank Rosalind Hackett for urging this particular point on me. 
3 All the cases cited here involved incumbent state governors. However, other 
examples in this category may include regular prayer sessions convened by state 
houses of assembly and university vice chancellors. 
4 See Egan, T. (2011), “Rick Perry’s Unanswered Prayers,” Te New York Times, 
August 11. 
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1 Zhang Yimou (2008), “‘Only China Can Produce Tis’: An Interview with Zhang 
Yimou,” Southern Weekend, September 5, trans. by China Digital Times, available 
online: http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/09/only-china-can-produce-this-an-
interview-with-zhang-yimou-2/(accessed May 25, 2017). 
2 Other scholars have made versions of this argument but none perhaps as incisively 
as C. T. Hsia (1999). 
3 Zhang (2008), ibid. 
4 See, for instance, the response of the hostel operator in Moskowitz (2018, this volume). 
5 Although, perhaps not; see Chumley (2016) for an ethnographic description of 
circles and quanzi recorded well before WeChat became popular. 
6 For a recent review of the literature on guanxi, see Osburg (2013). 
7 My interlocutors’ aversion to crowds is in stark contrast to the enthusiasm Scott
Moskowitz’s informants display in Shanghai (Chapter 11, this volume). While to
Moskowitz’s informants from rural areas, crowds represent city life, modernity, and
cosmopolitanism, my upper-class, urban interlocutors associated crowds with chaos
and backwardness. Upper-class real estate developments all marketed themselves
with photoshopped pictures of eerily empty landscaped courtyards, and when
upwardly mobile people spoke wistfully about the appeal of Zhengzhou’s wealthy
New East District, its lack of people was one of the frst things they mentioned. 
8 Renao is a phrase that literally translates as “hot and noisy,” but I am grateful to Saiyin
Sun for pointing out that a more idiomatic translation was more appropriate here. 
Chapter 6 
1 Te Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) is the half-central government, 
half-Delhi state government that built and operates the Metro. Its frst managing 
director, Elattuvalapil Sreedharan, was the one who decided that the Metro should 
have a ladies’ coach, afer reported incidents of harassment. For pros and cons of 
the ladies’ coach, see Rhitu Chatterjee, “Why I Love Riding on the Women-Only 
Car on Delhi’s Metro,” April 4, 2016, National Public Radio: http://www.npr.org/ 
sections/goatsandsoda/2016/04/04/472997605/why-i-love-riding-on-the-women-
only-car-on-delhis-metro and Ankita Rao, “Why the Delhi Metro Needs to Get 
Rid of the Ladies’ Compartment,” Scroll, November 24, 2014: http://scroll.in/ 
article/691395/why-the-delhi-metro-needs-to-get-rid-of-the-ladies-compartment. 
2 “Noida,” a planned city standing for “New Okhla Industrial Development 
Authority” is across the Yamuna River in the state of Uttar Pradesh but is part of 
the National Capital Region (NCR). 
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3 It is true that Kolkata (formerly Calcutta) has a metro that was built in the 1970s 
and began running in 1984, but it only ever boasted one line with sixteen stations. 
It was a sign of that city’s modernity at the time; however, the scale and scope of 
the project always remained limited. I contend that Delhi’s Metro—considering 
its vastness, scale, and the various ultra-contemporary technologies it deploys— 
is transforming the city’s landscape and social mores in new and completely 
unprecedented ways in the context of South Asia. 
4 Tose cities are Mumbai, Chennai, Hyderabad, and Bangalore. By comparison, 
Mumbai is more populous than Delhi but has much more public transportation 
and many more restrictions on motor vehicles and where they may ply. 
5 Tese goals and purposes at frst seem more limited as compared to the railway 
blockages as protest (rail roko) detailed by Mitchell (2011). Tis limitation likely has 
to do with the kind of enclosed set of technologies that the Metro is and represents. 
Yet the Metro is also an evolving space, and it remains to be seen how it might be 
used for diverse political communications. 
6 “Tri-color” refers to the Indian fag that has bands of orange, white, and green with 
a charkha (wheel) in the center. 
7 As a point of comparison, see Lisa Björkman’s (2015) example of Mumbai street 
protest crowds whose assembly she characterizes as a mass political performance in 
which the crowd becomes its own audience. 
8 Michael Warner (2002) has emphasized the relationship between texts, their 
circulation, and publics, as when he asks, “Can a public really exist apart from the 
rhetoric through which it is imagined?” 
9 Tis public is routinely referred to in the Indian news media, though usually in 
terms of “commuters” or “Delhi-ites” as in the Hindustan Times article, “Commuter 
Behavior Worries Metro as Games Draw Near” (Indo-Asian News Service, May 
11, 2010), which discusses the perils of crowd behavior in Delhi in advance of the 
October 2010 Commonwealth Games. 
10 See Mackey, R. (2014), “Beating of African Students by Mob in India Prompts Soul-
searching on Race,” Te New York Times, September 30, available online: http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/world/asia/beating-of-african-students-by-mob-in-
india-prompts-soul-searching-on-race.html (accessed October 2, 2014). 
11 For one of the videos uploaded to YouTube of the attack at the Metro police kiosk, 
see “Fight at Rajiv Chowk Metro Station—New Delhi,” posted September 28, 2014: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0XHBOE93Oks (accessed May 24, 2017). 
12 Anwar, T. (2014), “Delhi’s Everyday Racism: African Students Recount Lynch Mob 
Attack in Metro,” Firstpost, available online: http://www.frstpost.com/living/delhis-
everyday-racism-african-students-recount-lynch-mob-attack-metro-1739881.html 
(accessed October 5, 2014). 
13 For one example, see “Delhi L-G Gives Nod to Prosecute AAP’s Somnath Bharti
in Connection with Khirki Extension Raid,” First Post, April 4, 2015, available
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14 Te AAP would go on to win the election a few days later, making anti-corruption 
activist, Arvind Kejriwal, the chief minister of Delhi. 
15 Haryana has the lowest ratio of women to men, according to the 2011 Census of 
India. Tere are 877 females to every 1,000 males in the state, whereas the all-
India rate is 940 females to 1,000 males. See the Government of India 2011 census 
website: http://www.census2011.co.in/sexratio.php. 
Chapter 7 
1 Te Toraja are well known in Indonesia and elsewhere for their elaborate and 
expensive funeral feasts. See, for example, Volkman (1985) and Adams (2006). 
2 Many Toraja believed that certain types of dreams were prophetic, which made 
them of great interest to people and one of the topics I raised in my person-
centered interviews (Levy and Hollan 2014) with people. 
3 He mentioned this dream while talking about a number of other disturbing
dreams that had to do with the many social, political, and existential problems he
had had to overcome in his life. For further discussion of these dreams, see Hollan
(2003). 
Chapter 8 
1 Taking here a cue from Porter (2016). 
2 I thank in particular Mie Scott Georgsen, and her permission to draw on her 
interview and observation data from Maidan. Te empirical material from Maidan 
was collected by Georgsen for a postgraduate project work in the social science 
department, Roskilde University. Te interview material is accessible via Georgsen 
(2014). We have recently discussed some of this data in an article focused on the 
connections between liminaity and afectivity (Georgsen and Tomassen 2017). 
3 Of course, Le Bon’s ideas also lent themselves to positive phantasies about the 
productive use of such crowds; it is well known that Le Bon’s work greatly inspired 
professional crowd leaders, such as Mussolini. 
4 See, for example, testimonies from Tahrir participants, as documented in Al 
Jazeera: Al Jazeera (2012), “Tweets from Tahrir,” July 29, available online: http:// 
www.aljazeera.com/programmes/2012/02/201221612278666943.html (accessed 
July 29, 2016). 
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2 See Hammer, J. (2015), “Te Imperiled Bloggers of Bangladesh,” Te New York 
Times, December 29, available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/ 
magazine/the-price-of-secularism-in-bangladesh.html (accessed August 14, 2017). 
3 Qawmi madrasas are outside the purview of Bangladesh Madrasa Education Board. 
Tey are charitable organizations that run on private donations. 
4 Hossain, E. (2013), “Bangladesh Arrests ‘Atheist Bloggers,’ Cracking Down on 
Critics,” Hufngton Post, April 3, available online: http://www.hufngtonpost. 
com/2013/04/03/bangladesh-bloggers_n_3009137.html (accessed August 14, 2017). 
5 Amin, L. A. (2017), “Bengali’s Biggest Celebration, Pohela Boishakh, Tainted,” 
Dhaka Tribune, available online: http://archive.dhakatribune.com/weekend/2015/ 
apr/23/bengalis-biggest-celebration-pohela-boishakh-tainted (accessed June 7, 
2017). 
6 See Mursalin, T. E. (2009) “Towards Vision2021 of a Digital Bangladesh,” 
Te Financial Express, February 8, originally available online http://www. 
thefnancialexpress-bd.com/2009/02/08/58247.html and Rahman, F. (2009), 
“Towards a Digital Bangladesh,” Te Financial Express, January 10, originally 
available online: http://www.thefnancialexpress-bd.com/2009/01/10/55476.html. 
7 Another video published by the same user who uploaded the Ekattor TV report 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-LyMjolits) shows the women being attacked 
in the crowd much more clearly. It includes interviews with the person who 
tried to help a victim, the Vice Chancellor of the University of Dhaka, and other 
eyewitnesses. Tis installment, however, does not ofer the analysis found in the 
video I analyze in the chapter. 
8 Tis footage was initially available at Babu, A. (2015), “TSC at Pohela Boishakh 
| Farzana Rupa’s Investigation,” available online: https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=ki0Q59ASJeg (accessed June 7, 2017). 
9 See, for instance, banglanews24.com (2016), “CCTV in Govt Buildings Soon,” on 
http://www.banglanews24.com, July 28, available online: http://www.banglanews24. 
com/english/national/article/54229/CCTV-in-govt-buildings-soon (accessed 
August 14, 2017). 
10 I thank William Mazzarella for alerting me to this aspect of the crowd. 
11 I am grateful to Nazmul Sultan for explaining this and for his perspective that as 
the name of the Facebook group, the phrase has lost some of its initial denunciatory 
undertone. 
12 Te vigilante impetus of Moja Loss? preceded the New Year’s Day events. In 2014, 
the group had publicized a video on Facebook in which a man was seen slapping 
a woman riding a rickshaw on her own. Moja Loss? asked for help in catching the 
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perpetrator from the footage, which eventually led to his identifcation. See Bangla 
Tribune Report, 2015, “‘মজা লস’ নিয়ে যত কথা: অ্যাডমিন দুই দিনের রিমান্ডে,” 
Bangla Tribune, December 11, available online: http://www.banglatribune.com/ 
country/news/59563 (accessed August 14, 2017). 
13 See BBC News (2015), “Bangladesh Boy Killings: Six Sentenced to Death,” 
BBC News, November 8, available online: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-34761620 (accessed August 14, 2017). 
14 Sanyal, P. R. (2017), “A 13-Year-Old Boy’s Horrifc Death Becomes Viral Facebook 
Video in Bangladesh,” Public Radio International, available online: https://www.pri. 
org/stories/2015-07-17/13-year-old-boys-horrifc-death-becomes-viral-facebook-
video-bangladesh (accessed June 7, 2017). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Hossain, A. (2015), “Why Is My Country Numb to a Child’s Murder?” in Te Daily 
Beast, August 17, available online: http://www.thedailybeast.com/why-is-my-
country-numb-to-a-childs-murder (accessed August 14, 2017). 
17 Murad, M. (2017), “Dhaka Ranked Second in Number of Active Facebook 
Users,” bdnews24.com, April 15, available online: http://bdnews24.com/ 
bangladesh/2017/04/15/dhaka-ranked-second-in-number-of-active-facebook-users 
(accessed August 14, 2017). 
18 Tribune Online Report (2013), “No Open Space in Dhaka for Political 
Programmes,” May 5, available online: http://archive.dhakatribune.com/ 
politics/2013/may/05/no-open-space-dhaka-political-programmes. 
19 Sultan, N. (2015), “Anonymous People and the Insidious Logic of Petrol Bomb 
Terror,” Te Daily Star, February 10, available online: http://www.thedailystar. 
net/op-ed/anonymous-people-and-the-insidious-logic-petrol-bomb-terror-1606 
(accessed August 14, 2017). 
20 According to Jody Rosen’s New York Times article, “Dhaka’s trafc jams eat up 
3.2 million working hours each day and drain billions of dollars from the city’s 
economy annually” (Rosen 2016). 
Chapter 10 
1 Shanghai sits just south of an imaginary national divider called the Qin-Huai Line 
that originates along Western China’s Qin Mountains and Huai River, following 
various provincial and county borders near the 33rd parallel. Te line had long 
unofcially demarcated the split between Northern and Southern China, and 
during an energy crisis in the 1950s it was decided that new technology from the 
Soviet Union, where buildings were connected to city-wide heating grids, would 
only be installed in cities north of the line. Shanghai’s colonial buildings were 
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never retroftted, and new construction was required to feature neither heat nor 
insulation. For more, see Julie Makinen (2014), “For Central Heat, China Has a 
North-South Divide at Qin-Huai Line,” Los Angeles Times, November 15, available 
online: http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-heat-20141115-story.html 
(accessed May 2014, 2017). 
2 Netizens coined the term “APEC Blue” to describe the preternatural hue of 
Beijing’s skies—typically obscured by a curtain of acrid smog—while the capital 
played host to the Asia-Pacifc Economic Cooperation summit. Ten thousand 
factories were closed, and tens of thousands more forced on reduced production 
schedules. Compulsory vacations for workers and students removed nearly12 
million cars from the road and Beijing’s myriad construction sites were shuttered 
so dust could settle from the air. Tis had the added aesthetic beneft of hiding 
undesirable human elements like migrant workers from the visiting delegations. 
For more, see Christina Larson (2014), “How Did Beijing Achieve ‘APEC Blue’?” 
Bloomberg Business, November 18, available online: http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
bw/articles/2014-11-18/beijings-blue-sky-act-for-apec (accessed May 24, 2017). 
3 For a summary of some of the changes, see Charlie Campbell (2016), “Five Ways 
China Has Become More Repressive under Xi Jinping,” TIME Magazine, October 
6, available online: http://time.com/4519160/china-xi-jinping-cecc-human-rights-
rule-of-law/(accessed July 7, 2017). 
4 For commentary on the history of this saying and the misunderstanding behind 
it, see Victor Mair, “How a Misunderstanding about Chinese Characters Has 
Led Many Astray,” available online: http://www.pinyin.info/chinese/crisis.html 
(accessed May 24, 2017). 
5 See, for instance, Bao Daozu (2010), “Shanghai Metro Hires People to Shove 
Commuters into Trains,” China Daily, February 4. 
6 See, for instance, this post from the “Ofcial Microblog of the Shanghai Public 
Security Bureau” issued at 10:18 p.m. the following day titled “Zhendui wangzhuan 
‘12–31’ waitan chenyiguangchang yongji caita shijian xi you ren zai waitan 
18hao paosa ‘meijin’ yinfa yishi de jingfang diaocha,” which translates as “To 
the internet regarding the ‘12–31’ crowd trampling incident at Chenyi Square, a 
police investigation of whether or not the incident was triggered by the scattering 
of ‘American currency’ by people at Bund 18” (Shanghai shi gonganju 2015), 
available online: http://weibo.com/2493592183/BDzUU0H8q?type=comment#_ 
rnd1443494484830 (accessed August 14, 2017). 
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